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Causation and Counterfactual Dependence

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Abstract

Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Stephen Barker and two anonymous referees for their very useful suggestions on early drafts of this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Programs in History and Philosophy of Science, College of Natural Sciences, Seoul National University, Kwan-ak-gu, Seoul, 151-742, Korea

    Sungho Choi

  2. Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada

    Sungho Choi

  3. Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Main Quad, A14, NSW 2006, Australia

    Sungho Choi

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  1. Sungho Choi
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Correspondence to Sungho Choi.

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Choi, S. Causation and Counterfactual Dependence. Erkenntnis 67, 1–16 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9000-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9000-7

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