Abstract
This chapter expores the similarities and differences between the virtue theories of Mencius (372–289 BCE) and David Hume (1711–1776 CE). Their individual explications of virtue, the main topics of their moral philosophies, focus on the sentiments. Mencius, concerned with teaching moral self-cultivation, believes that the sentiments are the grounds for achieving virtue. Hume, who aims at an empirical theory of moral evaluation, maintains that we determine a character trait as virtue through the moral sentiments. Given their moral foundation of sentiments, two frameworks of comparison are available:epistemic and structural comparisons. The former examines the philosophers’ views of the epistemic characteristics of sentiment as they relate to virtue and morality. The latter investigates how their virtue theories have a parallel structure based on the general characteristics of sentiment. I argue that a structural comparison deepens our understanding of Mencius’s views about the virtues and their cultivation. Next, I suggest that Hume’s scientific inquiry into moral evaluation informs us of another aspect of Mencius’s sentiment-based virtue. Considering the causal process involved in the arousal of sentiments, Mencius’s heart of compassion should be regarded as a mental cause that renders human nature inherently good and not as a mental effect of an aroused sentiment. Moreover, I argue that, because virtue-related sentiments take two sorts of intentional objects—one’s self and others—we can classify Mencius’s and Hume’s virtues into other-regarding and self-regarding virtues. Mencius’s cardinal virtues of Ren and Yi correspond to Hume’s humanity and dignity.
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Notes
- 1.
I mainly use Van Norden’s translation of the Mencius (Mencius 2008) unless otherwise noted. Also, I use pinyin romanization, such as ceyin zhi xin (the heart of compassion), Ren (benevolence), and Yi (righteousness), to rule out unnecessary associations with the English notions.
- 2.
Hume concludes: “Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1). In his Enquiry, Hume discloses the object of his moral inquiry: the “complication of mental qualities,” or “Personal Merit,” of which investigation means “the proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue” (EPM 1.10, 1.7).
- 3.
Liu’s book (Liu 2003) contains five chapters. Two are comparative studies that are revised from earlier publications (Liu 2002a, b). The other three chapters respectively discuss Hume’s views of sympathy and reason, and Mencius’s concepts of Ren and human nature. His epistemic comparison has merit, but the reader anticipates a comprehensive comparative study of the virtue theories of Mencius and Hume. Another good example of epistemic comparison is Gordon B. Mower’s suggestion that Hume’s account of “double relation of impressions and ideas” can provide an account of “how we might understand the extension of that virtue” (Mower 2016, 475). Hume’s analysis of the mind might help us clarify the epistemic process in Mencius’s method for self-cultivation: “Mengzi might make use of Hume’s double relation [between the sprouts of benevolence and approval and disapproval] together with the imaginative feature of sympathy” (481).
- 4.
Hume’s investigation of sentiment and virtue exemplifies the epistemic and structural directions. For one, Hume explores the epistemic features of sentiment. His moral sentimentalism has influenced contemporary meta-ethical interests in the relationship between sentiment and moral judgment, thoughts, facts, language, knowledge, and the motivation of action. Second, Hume argues that some character traits are called “virtues” not only because they are based on our natural sentiments (e.g., benevolence) but also because they are created through a social process (e.g., justice). Similarly, we call some character traits “virtues” because of their usefulness and others because of their agreeableness. In fact, one can understand Hume’s sentiment-based account of virtues without specific knowledge of how sentiment constitutes moral judgment because his catalogue of virtue is built on the assumption that sentiment begets moral evaluation.
- 5.
In a recent study, Carey and Vitz pay attention to “intriguing connections between Mencian and Humean moral psychology” and investigate their similar approaches to sympathy-based compassion, familial love, and understanding to reveal the strong similarities in the psychological, social, and cognitive sources of the virtue of humanity of Mencius and Hume (Carey and Vitz 2019, 699). This study is remarkable but implicitly founded upon an epistemic assumption that Mencius is as much concerned with moral psychological analysis of virtues as is Hume. Zhang’s recent comparative study views Mencius’s yi as mainly “related to social norms,” and argues for “its structural resemblance with artificial virtues in Hume” (Zhang 2020, 188–189).
- 6.
This specific goal of Hume’s “science of MAN” is disclosed in the full title of his Treatise: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, published in 1739–40 (T Intro. 4). He considers “the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects” as the due course of philosophical development, comparable to the transition from Thales to Socrates (T Intro. 7). This project is also represented by the title Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), a recasting of Treatise Book III “Of Morals.”
- 7.
Hume argues that because reason is “nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations,” reason can neither make moral distinctions nor provide moral motivation (T 3.1.1.24).
- 8.
Hume claims that “first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 3.3.1.1).
- 9.
Hume is alive to criticism that someone might have no sentiment of aesthetic approval when one encounters, say, the Mona Lisa, or does not experience disgust or indignation at another’s wrong doing. Although he was not concerned with the objection, he could respond with: “though there may be found persons, who give the preference to the former [bad] authors; no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous” (Hume 1987: 231).
- 10.
Hume regards the perception of virtue as the recognition of “moral beauty” by feeling “the proper sentiment” toward the object of moral beauty (EPM 1.9).
- 11.
Hutcheson, whose account of moral sense much influenced Hume, claims that by a “moral sense of beauty in actions and affections,” we “perceive virtue or vice, approve and disapprove them in others” (Hutcheson 2004: 9, 89).
- 12.
Mencius’s sentiment-based account of benevolence parallels Hutcheson’s account. Mancilla identifies four similarities in their notions of benevolence: the notions’ relation to compassion, that they take broad intentional objects, are sensitive to proximity, and require constant cultivation (Mancilla 2013: 57). These similarities, however, seem to be general characteristics of benevolence if it is understood as a sentiment.
- 13.
For Hume, the significance of the effect-based human science is that “the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects …” (T Intro.8). Regarding moral inquiry, he claims: “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general” (EPM 5.17 n.19).
- 14.
Baille comments that Hume’s moral theory aims “to provide a causal account of moral evaluation without appeal to any sui generis moral sense” (Baillie 2000: 24).
- 15.
Elsewhere, I argue for this cause-focused view of Mengzi’s ceyin zhi xin (Choi 2019a). If this view sounds plausible, I think that this mental cause is best translated as “the Principle (li 理)” (6A7).
- 16.
The exact meaning of 4B12 is open to interpretation. Following Zhao Qi, who reads chizi as “children of the ruler,” Van Norden renders the passage as “Great people do not lose the hearts of their ‘children’” (Mencius 2008: 161). Van Norden also regards Zhu Xi’s comment that “the heart of a child is pure unity without artificiality” as originating from “the Buddhist influence on his thought” (ibid.). I agree that Zhu Xi relies too heavily on purity, but this does not mean that Zhao’s reading is acceptable. The “children’s hearts” may indicate their natural preferences for their parents and siblings, without an appeal to purity, as Mencius says elsewhere: “Children carried in the arms all know to love their parents” (7A15, my translation).
- 17.
Through the lens of contemporary, emotion theories, Myeong-seok Kim regards ceyin zhi xin as one of the “higher cognitive emotions” that contain our concern-based construals (Kim 2010: 407–11). I believe that this mental effect of emotion encompasses cognitive characteristics, as it passes through a complex mental process, including a cognitive stage. However, given Mencius’s conviction that achieving virtue begins with our recognition of ceyin zhi xin (1A7), its essence must function in vigorous moral cultivation, such as motivating benevolent actions, for which a cognitivist view should account (for more details, see Choi 2019a). We can classify other commentators’ views about ceyin zhi xin according to how the commentator locates the core of ceyin zhi xin in this process of feeling compassion. Liu Xiusheng identifies ceyin zhi xin with Hume’s notion of sympathy. However, because sympathy is more concerned with the epistemic function of perceiving others’ mental states, this identification neglects the moral content of ceyin zhi xin. David Wong presents a reflection-focused view. Innate moral feelings are “plastic and indeterminate” emotions, which require ethical reasoning for the “further determination of the intentional object of compassion,” and to produce appropriate moral feelings to the given situations (Wong 2002: 192). His account of ethical reasoning presupposes a causation-based understanding of ceyin zhi xin because it implies that we should discern the multiple causes that influence the process of emotional arousals to seek the most appropriate feeling. In fact, both Wong and Kim implicitly admit the natural infrastructure in the heart causes moral sentiment. In Wong’s claim that “the sort of feeling we currently direct to the child is directable towards the homeless person” it seems that such directability of moral sentiment is supported by the underlying foundation in human nature (Wong 2002: 193, original emphasis). Also, in viewing compassion as a concern-based construal, Kim implies that a concern for others is aroused prior to the construal. I believe that for explicating the reason of our concern we have to grant a natural infrastructure that parallels Hume’s “primary constitution of nature” (T 2.1.7.5).
- 18.
Just as an object of beauty “by the primary constitution of our nature” is “fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul,” one can detect the moral beauty of a character trait by attending to the agreeable feelings aroused through our mental constitution (T 2.1.8.2, original emphasis). Also, we feel pleasure from the useful effects of virtue-driven actions.
- 19.
This object-based distinction of virtues is identical to Hume’s classification of the indirect passions of pride and love, which take one’s self and others, respectively, as intentional objects (see Book II, “Of the Passions,” of the Treatise). In the Enquiry, sections 5–8, Hume investigates differences in the intentional objects and the sources of pleasure. For example, section 7 is entitled “Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves” (EPM 7).
- 20.
One may also see similarities between Mencius’s and Hume’s notions of virtue by contrasting them with Plato’s four cardinal virtues. While virtues in Mencius and Hume focus on caring for others and self, Plato’s virtues are excellent states of a universal human soul.
- 21.
In the Enquiry, Hume distinguishes between general and particular benevolence and identifies general benevolence with sympathy and virtue of humanity (EPM II.n.60).
- 22.
After this comment, Hume introduces the self-regarding aspect of benevolence (for his remarks on the two main characteristics of benevolence, usefulness and agreeableness, see EPM 2.22 and 3.48). Thus, we cannot reduce his moral theory to utilitarianism, though Selby-Bigge points out that “a more destructive use of ‘utility’ is one of the distinctions made in the Enquiries” (1975: xxvi–xxvii).
- 23.
Hume argues that “vice and virtue … may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which … are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind” (T 3.1.1.30). Mencius also vindicates virtues by perceptions, either of one’s own sentiment (2A6) or of spectators’ sentiments (6A7). On the basis of this similarity, Liu claims that “according to Mencius and Hume, moral qualities like secondary qualities are conceptually tied to certain human sensibilities, that is, they are response-dependent” (Liu 2002b: 84).
- 24.
Hume clarifies that “usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end” (EPM 5.17).
- 25.
For consequence-based interpretations of Mencius, see Kim (2014, 425–431) and Im (2011, 41–64). Sungmoon Kim argues that Mencius would allow for “moralized interest” from its contribution to public welfare (425), while Manyul Im aims to read Mencius partly as “an objective act-consequentialist” (59). However, I think that moral assessments from people’s sentimental hearts take precedence over public welfare achieved through the promotion of agent-neutral, sociopolitical goods. For instance, providing “a constant livelihood” is morally approvable only when people can achieve and maintain a “constant heart” (1A7, 3A3). Mencian moral evaluation requires satisfying both agents’ virtuous motives and spectators’ sentiment-based moral approval. These are internal conditions.
- 26.
This consequentialist approach to Mencius hardly explicates the moral difference between the governments of the Hegemon and the True king because the Hegemon may well promote the public welfare enough to make people pleased (7A13).
- 27.
Hume acknowledges that “no views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation” (EPM 7.11).
- 28.
Driver’s reading of Hume as a “objective consequentialist” hardly accounts for this category of self-regarding virtue (2001: 63). In contrast, the Mencian process of internal moral evaluation offers a virtue ethical assessment of actions’ consequences insofar as they are evaluated through the feasible resonance between the virtues of agents and spectators.
- 29.
Even when others’ vices arouse one’s feeling of shame and disdain, one seems to empathize with others and regard their vices as one’s own moral failures.
- 30.
Other-regarding Ren is internal to the heart but its actualization is noticeable by others because they can sympathize with such a virtue and perceive the effects of Ren-based actions.
- 31.
This view is encapsulated by a Latin proverb, “de gustibus non est disputandum (there is no disputation about taste).”
- 32.
For more detailed analysis of this chapter 6A7, see Choi 2018.
- 33.
Hume’s recognition of “great variety of taste” is supported by his following claim that “Men of the most confined knowledge” remark a difference of taste in “the narrow circle of their acquaintance,” of which sentiment would suffice for a standard of virtue toward a member’s characters (Hume 1987: 226–7).
- 34.
Hume remarks, “whatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-establish’d pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely of that passion” (T 3.3.2.13, original emphasis). According to Kate Abramson, this “greatness of mind” is “only a virtue for the virtuous” (Abramson 2002: 326).
- 35.
I have argued that the topics in Mencius 2A2 converge into the virtue of Yi (Choi 2019b). In his Enquiry, Hume explains greatness of mind, courage, philosophical tranquility, and part of natural benevolence are all based on due pride (EPM 7). Hume’s description of “philosophical tranquility” is worth comparing with Mencius’s notion of unperturbed hearts: “Of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed philosophical tranquility …. Conscious of his own virtue, say the philosophers, the sage elevates himself above every accident of life; and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on inferior mortals engaged in pursuit of honors, riches, reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment. These pretensions, no doubt, when stretched to the utmost, are by far too magnificent for human nature. They carry, however, a grandeur with them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes him with admiration. And the nearer we can approach in practice to this sublime tranquility and indifference …, the more secure enjoyment shall we attain within ourselves, and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the world. The philosophical tranquility may, indeed, be considered only as a branch of magnanimity” (EPM 7.16). One difference is that Hume thinks the sages despise ordinary people because they lack wisdom, while Mencius’s sages, because of their excellent Ren, would strive to care for ordinary people.
- 36.
Hume assigns to benevolence the role of regulating self-directed passions: “Courage and ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber” (T 3.3.3.2). Jacqueline Taylor argues the centrality of humanity in Hume’s virtue theory: “In the modern society that values justice and benevolence, our sense of humanity, and not pride alone, helps us to sustain the importance of human dignity” (Taylor 2015: 152).
- 37.
This is why Hume admits, “A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest” (EPM 5.8).
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Choi, D. (2023). Mencius and Hume. In: Xiao, Y., Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_33
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