Conclusion
Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they are to find it at all. Lacking a GGD, NBPW is irrelevant; given a GGD, NBPW is superfluous.
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Chrzan, K. The irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense. Philosophia 17, 161–167 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02381656
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02381656