Abstract
Examining the effect of hedge fund activism on gender diversity, we find that the number of female directors decreases after a firm is targeted by hedge fund activism. Using the employment history data from BoardEx, we find that activist hedge funds are more likely to appoint people with finance backgrounds to the boards of target firms. And the newly appointed finance background directors are almost all male because of the lack of diversity in the finance industry. The lack of gender diversity of the hedge funds’ networks and the lack of qualified female directors in the local area also help explain the impact of hedge fund activism on gender diversity on the board.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The countries that passed these regulations include at least Norway, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium. In the United States, California became the first state to mandate a board gender quota in 2018.
https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/281/original/ 2019_KF_DIVERSITY_REPORT-FINAL.pdf.
MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, is a region that consists of a city and surrounding communities that are linked by social and economic factors. Thus, we take one MSA as a local job market.
Brav et al. (2010) present three reasons. First, hedge fund managers have stronger financial incentives to make profits. Second, hedge funds are lightly regulated since they are not widely available to the public. Third, hedge funds face fewer conflicts of interest than some other institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds.
We thank Wei Jiang for sharing the data with us.
Our BoardEx is only available from 2000 to 2018. Because we need at least four years of post-event and before-event information to observe the effects of hedge fund activism, we only can check the activism from 2004 to 2014 in our studies.
These attributes could be related to the leaving and staying of directors on the board. Directors are more likely to leave the board if they will retire soon. Executive directors have more power on the board and are less likely to leave the board. Personal network size represents the ability of directors. The financial industry experience implies their possible connection with hedge funds.
Most of the differences are driven by differences across firms. However, after controlling for firm-year fixed effects, there is still a 6% pay gap between male and female directors, that is, male directors are paid 6% more than female directors in the same company in the same year.
References
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291–309.
Adams, R. B., & Funk, P. (2012). Beyond the glass ceiling: Does gender matter? Management Science, 58, 219–35.
Agarwal, S., Qian, W., Reeb, D. M., & Sing, T. F. (2016). Playing the boys game: Golf buddies and board diversity. American Economic Review, 106, 272–76.
Agrawal, A., & Lim, Y. (2020). The dark side of hedge fund activism: Evidence from employee pension plans. Working Paper, University of Alabama.
Ahern, K. (2012). Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 103, 530–50.
Akey, P., & Appel, I. (2020). Environmental externalities of activism. Working Paper, University of Toronto.
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2016). The product market effects of hedge fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 119, 226–48.
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. (2010). The impact of board diversity and gender composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97, 207–21.
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2009). Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK focus fund. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3093–129.
Ben-Amar, W., Chang, M., & McIlkenny, P. (2017). Board gender diversity and corporate response to sustainability initiatives: Evidence from the carbon disclosure project. Journal of Business Ethics, 142, 369–83.
Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Yonker, S. (2018). Board diversity, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 127, 588–612.
Bilimoria, D., & Piderit, S. K. (1994). Board committee membership: Effects of sex-based bias. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 1453–77.
Boyson, N. M., Gantchev, N., & Shivdasani, A. (2017). Activism mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 126, 54–73.
Boyson, N. M., & Pichler, P. (2019). Hostile resistance to hedge fund activism. Review of Financial Studies, 32, 771–817.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2015). The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, asset allocation, and labor outcomes. Review of Financial Studies, 28, 2723–69.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Kim, H., et al. (2010). Hedge fund activism: A review. Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 4, pp. 185–246.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S., & Tian, X. (2018). How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation? Journal of Financial Economics, 130, 237–64.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F., & Thomas, R. (2008). Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance. Journal of Finance, 63, 1729–75.
Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. (2008). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 435–51.
Chapple, L., & Humphrey, J. E. (2014). Does board gender diversity have a financial impact? Evidence using stock portfolio performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 122, 709–23.
Chen, G., Crossland, C., & Huang, S. (2016). Female board representation and corporate acquisition intensity. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 303–13.
Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Goergen, M. (2017). The impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts. Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 86–105.
Chen, T., Dong, H., & Lin, C. (2020). Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics, 135, 483–504.
Chu, Y., Huang, B., & Zhang, C. (2019). The color of hedge fund activism. Working Paper, UNC Charlotte.
Chu, Y., & Zhao, D. (2019). Green hedge fund activists. Working Paper, UNC Charlotte.
DesJardine, M. R., & Durand, R. (2020). Disentangling the effects of hedge fund activism on firm financial and social performance. Strategic Management Journal, 41, 1054–82.
Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019). Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 131, 693–714.
Feng, F. Z., Xu, Q., & Zhu, C. (2018). Caught in the crossfire: How the threat of hedge fund activism affects creditors. Working Paper, University of Notre Dame.
Field, L. C., Souther, M. E., & Yore, A. S. (2020). At the table but can’t break through the glass ceiling: Board leadership positions elude diverse directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 137, 787–814.
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Shen, Y. V., & Wu, Q. (2021). Do activist hedge funds target female CEOs? The role of CEO gender in hedge fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 141, 372–93.
Gantchev, N., Gredil, O. R., & Jotikasthira, C. (2019). Governance under the gun: Spillover effects of hedge fund activism. Review of Finance, 23, 1031–68.
Gormley, T. A., Gupta, V. K., Matsa, D. A., Mortal, S., & Yang, L. (2020). The big three and board gender diversity: The effectiveness of shareholder voice. Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis.
Greene, D., Intintoli, V. J., & Kahle, K. M. (2020). Do board gender quotas affect firm value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826. Journal of Corporate Finance 60.
Greenwood, R., & Schor, M. (2009). Investor activism and takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 362–75.
Gul, F. A., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A. C. (2011). Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51, 314–38.
Hartzmark, S. M., & Sussman, A. B. (2019). Do investors value sustainability? A natural experiment examining ranking and fund flows. Journal of Finance, 74, 2789–837.
Hauser, R. (2018). Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 128, 16–37.
Hwang, S., Shivdasani, A., & Simintzi, E. (2018). Mandating women on boards: Evidence from the United States. Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper.
Jiang, W., Li, T., & Mei, D. (2018). Influencing control: Jawboning in risk arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 73, 2635–75.
Kesner, I. F. (1988). Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender. Academy of Management Journal, 31, 66–84.
Kim, D., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Gender diversity on corporate boards: Do women contribute unique skills? American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 106, 267–71.
Klein, A., & Zur, E. (2011). The impact of hedge fund activism on the target firm’s existing bondholders. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1735–71.
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. The Review of Financial Studies, 26, 1561–605.
Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2014). Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 185–200.
Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. (2013). A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5, 136–69.
Post, C., & Byron, K. (2015). Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 58, 1546–71.
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016). Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 26–53.
Sunder, J., Sunder, S. V., & Wongsunwai, W. (2014). Debtholder responses to shareholder activism: Evidence from hedge fund interventions. Review of Financial Studies, 27, 3318–42.
Taylor, B. (2019). Why California Senate Bill 826 and gender quotas are unconstitutional shareholder activism as a better path to gender equality in the boardroom. Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 18:117–.
von Meyerinck, F., Niessen-Ruenzi, A., Schmid, M., & Davidoff Solomon, S. (2019). As California goes, so goes the nation? Board gender quotas and the legislation of non-economic values. Working Paper, University of St Gallen.
Wahid, A. S. (2019). The effects and the mechanisms of board gender diversity: Evidence from financial manipulation. Journal of Business Ethics, 159, 705–25.
Acknowledgements
Xinming Li gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China, Grant No. 72103106, the Ministry of Education of China, Grant No. 21YJC790067, and Liberal Arts Development Fund of Nankai University, No. ZX20220073.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Chu, Y., Li, X. & Zhao, D. Gender Diversity: From Wall Street to Main Street. J Bus Ethics 188, 151–168 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05328-w
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05328-w