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The Moral Duty Against Dogmatism

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue for a (pro tanto) moral duty against dogmatism: I argue that the social costs of a disagreement can give those who are party to it added moral reasons to reconsider their controversial beliefs and (so) not to be dogmatic. In Sect. 1, I motivate the idea that the social costs of disagreement may give rise to reasons to reconsider our beliefs by considering intuitive examples to that effect. I suggest that some of the stock intuitions that epistemologists of disagreement have depended on to make their arguments are implicitly influenced by social costs that are salient to the disagreements in their cases. In Sect. 2, I respond to a Practical Objection to my argument that political philosophers might be keen to press. According to this objection, the social costs of disagreement do not give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism because we can adequately address those costs just by compromising on how we act on our beliefs in the context of the disagreement. In Sect. 3, I address a contrasting objection to the moral duty against dogmatism that might be pressed by epistemologists, which I term the Truth Objection. This objection points out that the social costs of disagreement do nothing to affect the strength of the evidence for or against one’s contentious beliefs, and so complains that those who reconsider their beliefs just on account of the social costs of disagreement ‘cave in’ to social pressure in a problematic way. In the course of addressing the Truth Objection, I more carefully explain how the social costs of disagreement give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism by distinguishing between ‘truth-motivated’ and ‘truth-indifferent’ reasons for inquiry.

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Notes

  1. See Christensen (2009) for an overview. See also Christensen (2007, 2013), Elga (2007), Kelly (2005, 2010), Lackey (2008, 2010), Feldman (2007).

  2. See e.g. White (2009) for the thermometer analogy. Christensen (2009: 196) also makes use of a similar analogy involving watches. Enoch (2010) shares in the spirit of my worry here.

  3. Indeed, some disagreements may have social benefits. Disagreeing academic researchers, for instance, may publish articles advancing opposing views, and this disagreement may ultimately enhance rather than undermine the success of their respective careers.

  4. On one end of the spectrum, thorough conciliationists argue that parties to a peer disagreement should adjust their confidence in p so as to give equal weight to the other’s opposing view (Christensen 2007, 2013), Elga (2007)). At least in some cases, this may mean that disagreeing peers ought to suspend judgment about whether p. On the far other end of the spectrum, thorough dogmatists hold that neither party to a peer disagreement need adjust her confidence in p at all. Kelly (2010) briefly defends this most extreme version of the dogmatist claim. Others who defend positions on the dogmatist side of the spectrum include Kelly (2005), van Inwagen (1996), and Plantinga (2000).

  5. Some have recently characterized belief in a way that makes it rationally incoherent for someone who believes that p to also inquire about whether p? (see e.g., Friedman 2017, 2019). If one takes this view, then arguments for steadfastness are also arguments against the need to pursue further inquiry. However, I will assume that—at least if one adopts a dispositional understanding of belief—these two mental states need not necessarily be incompatible (Lee 2020). So, my argument leaves it open that reconsideration may be compatible with standing ‘steadfast’ on one’s beliefs in the sense relevant to epistemologists of disagreement.

  6. See e.g. Cusimano & Lombrozo (2021), Cooper et al (2008), van Prooijen and Krouwel (2017), Skitka et al. (2005, 2008), Tetlock et al. (2000), and Tetlock (2003). In one prominent study, Phillip Tetlock and colleagues (2000) presented participants with scenarios in which a hospital administrator was trying to choose between saving the life of little Johnny or saving $1 million for the hospital. Participants negatively evaluated the administrator who chose the money over the Johnny’s life as—among other things— bad, foolish, and immoral. In addition, however, participants also negatively evaluated the administrator who even thought about and evaluated the possibility of choosing the money over Johnny’s life.

  7. This example is from Christensen (2007: 193). It has no title in the original paper but is titled “Mental Math” in Christensen’s (2009) paper, where the example is repeated.

  8. Kelly (2005: 167). These cases have no title in Kelly’s original paper.

  9. An epistemic peer is, roughly, someone who is equally epistemically competent and who shares your evidence with respect to p. See Lackey (2010), King (2012) and Kelly (2005: 11, 3n.3) for helpful discussions.

  10. There may also be other practical considerations pertinent to these disagreements that influence our intuitions, but for the reasons I discuss at the end of Sect. 1, I take it that the social costs of disagreement constitute at least one of these considerations.

  11. Here is another case that may elicit a similar intuition:

    Solitary Math: You are an A student completing a mental math test. You are instructed to write just your answers to questions on a sheet of paper. Question #3 asks you to add 20% to a number and divide it in half. You calculate that the result is 45. You are confident in your result. On your way out, your friend asks you what you got on Question #3. You tell him you are confident it was 45. He reports that another classmate (who is also an A student) said he got 43 and that he, too, was confident in his result.

  12. I consider this in more detail in Sect. 2.1.

  13. Grimm (2011) calls a version of this ‘purist’ view about epistemic rationality the ‘orthodox’ position in epistemology.

  14. See e.g. Brown (2008a, 2008b) and Sosa (2015).

  15. For more on pragmatic encroachment, see Section 3.1.

  16. See (e.g.) Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haid (1999) and Russell, et al (2013). Tetlock et al. (2000) shows that we sometimes evaluate people negatively just for having considered disagreeing with us about a moral issue; they call this the “mere contemplation effect.” See also Tetlock (2003).

  17. According to Rawls, the “burdens of judgment”—roughly, the complexities and obstacles involved in ordinary reasoning about these issues—make it unlikely that disagreements concerning citizens’ comprehensive conceptions of the good will be resolved without the oppressive use of state power ( 1993: 36–38, 54–65). Tom and Taylor should also take into account that the process of inquiry could end up further polarizing them (Sunstein 2002; see also Mercier and Landemore 2012 for criticism and a response).

  18. In political philosophy, this kind of worry often arises in the contexts of debates about the role that religious reasons may play in citizens’ public political deliberations and in their decisions about how to vote. According to Rawls (1993/2005, 1997/2005, esp. 478-9), Quong (2011), and Audi (2000, 2011) religious citizens should (as a general rule) exercise ‘restraint’ in publicly offering religious reasons as bases for democratic legislation, and in voting on the basis of such reasons. In response to these claims about the need for religious restraint, Wolterstorff (1997: 105; 2012) raises the ‘integrity’ objection, one version of which claims that requirements of restraint undermine religious citizens’ ability to participate authentically in politics (see also Perry (1988: 181-2).

  19. This concern is reminiscent of feminist political theorists' like Okin’s (1989, 1999) and Yuracko’s (1995) worries that ‘private’ differences (regarding, e.g., women’s role in the family) will have negative ‘spill-over’ effects in the public, political domain.

  20. See footnote 16.

  21. See footnote 17.

  22. In this scenario, Tom and Taylor inquire further about their beliefs about Truman before adjusting how they ‘act on’ those beliefs in the sense that they do not settle to adjust to a compromise in a decisive and finalized way.

  23. Of course, a great deal more would need to be said about the exact conditions under which one would be so justified. For instance, the disagreeing party would need to be poised to act on his false belief in a way that would contribute to the occurrence of an injustice.

  24. These kinds of cases may provide the best candidates for examples of where the social costs of disagreement also give rise to a political obligation for parties to reconsider their contested beliefs. For further discussion, see Coetsee (ms).

  25. That is, she may be justified in requiring that all students at the school attend classes on sex education.

  26. Of course, more would need to be said about the precise conditions under which she would be so justified. For instance, the disagreeing party would need to be poised to act on his incorrect judgment about morality.

  27. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify how different accounts of epistemic normativity intersect with my arguments for reconsideration.

  28. See  Leary (2017), McCormick (2014), Reisner (2015), and Rinard (2019).

  29. See Fantl and McGrath (2009), Hawthorne (2004), and Kim (2017).

  30. This formulation draws on Fantl and McGrath (2009), chap. 4 (see especially p. 126).

  31. See footnote 14.

  32. Epistemic purists may differ on their interpretation of this point. Some evidentialists might hold that, so long as Tom’s inquiry reveals evidence that genuinely supports ¬T, there is nothing intrinsically defective with this style of inquiry (see e.g. Feldman 2005). However, reliabilists and virtue epistemologists may take more issue with this style of inquiry, since they may regard it as an unreliable process of belief-formation. For discussion see Baehr (2011), chap. 4.

  33. So long as Anna and her daughter disagree about the moral permissibility of abortion, after all, she will be disposed to pursue a course of action that constrains her daughter’s ability to execute her preferred plans and (additionally) this will likely result in tension or even resentment in their relationship.

  34. For discussion of how epistemic purists might assess this, see footnote 32.

  35. In cases where we ourselves bear the costs of our errors, there may be more leeway with respect to how epistemically ‘risky’ we are permitted to be with respect to belief and action, than in cases where the costs of our errors would be borne by others.

  36. Even if there would still be some value to Tom’s acting in accord with a misguided moral conviction about Truman, I take it that his acting in accord with convictions that align with the truth would be yet more valuable.

  37. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify this point and for suggesting the language of ‘self-directed’ and ‘other-directed’ inquiry.

  38. More generally, it may be that people are picking up on ideas implicit in the Truth-Motivated Argument for inquiry when—as mentioned in the introduction—they resist reconsidering their beliefs in the context of fiery moral and political debates: they may feel the need to double-down on further substantiating their own reasoning in part because they realize that there is ‘more for them to prove’ once they have been challenged in a practically consequential social context.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Ernest Sosa, Mark Satta, and Ruth Chang for helpful discussion and instructive comments on prior drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their insightful feedback.

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  1. Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, 221 Richmond Way, Richmond, VA, 23173, USA

    Marilie Coetsee

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Coetsee, M. The Moral Duty Against Dogmatism. J Ethics 26, 563–589 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-022-09405-6

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