Abstract
In ``Revising the Logic of LogicalRevision'' (Philosophical Studies 99,211–227) J. Salerno attempts to undermineCrispin Wright's recent arguments forintuitionism, and to replace Wright andDummett's arguments with a revisionary argumentof his own. I show that Salerno's criticismsof Wright involve both attributing an inferenceto Wright that no intuitionist would make andfallaciously treating a negative universal asan existential negative. Then I show how verygeneral considerations about the nature ofwarrant undermine both Wright and Salerno'sarguments, when these arguments are applied todiscourses with defeasible warrants. WhileSalerno explicitly restricts his discussion tomathematics, Wright and Dummett intend theirrevisionary arguments to have much widerscope.
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Cogburn, J. Logical Revision Re-revisited: On the Wright/Salerno Case for Intuitionism. Philosophical Studies 110, 231–248 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020604427464
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020604427464