Abstract
This article argues that understanding the dangers and risks of authoritarian populism in consolidated constitutional democracies requires analysis of the forms of pluralism and status anxieties that emerge in civil and economic society, in a context of profound political, socioeconomic, and cultural change. This paper has two basic theses. The first is that when societies become deeply divided, and segmental pluralism maps onto affective party political polarization, generalized social solidarity is imperiled, as is commitment to democratic norms, social justice, and liberal democratic constitutionalism. The second, is that populist political entrepreneurs excel in fomenting social antagonisms by framing shifts in the forms of social pluralism in ways that foster deep political polarization, generalized distrust and a politics of resentment against “elites,” “the establishment,” “the oligarchy,” and “outsiders.” Why populist offers resonate requires a social theoretical analysis of status/solidarity and class issues and a direct response to them. I draw on Polanyi and Habermas to develop an explanatory approach to the current crisis and the populist responses it triggers. I navigate between two inadequate approaches: that of the Hofstadter consensus school which construes status concerns and populism as retrograde, anti-modern, paranoid and meriting no direct response; and that of the neo-Marxist tradition that acknowledges the mobilizing power of “cultural factors” and status anxieties but deems them to be epiphenomena of the deeper story of economic distributive injustice. I reject this assessment and seek to take up the status/solidarity issues in ways that take them seriously, challenge populist framing and provide alternative direct responses to them. I reject the narrative frames of left populists who foment polarization and I try to present an alternative narrative framing for a future democratic politics that draws on the best in politically liberal, constitutionalist, democratic, and socialist traditions.
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Notes
See Huq and Ginsburg, “How to lose a constitutional democracy,” for a discussion of three institutional predicates necessary for democratic engagement, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2901776; Arato (2018); Greskovitz (2015); Blokker (2013); Landau (2013), comparing Hungary, Egypt and Venezuela; Scheppele (2018). The literature on democratic backsliding under populist regimes in Latin America has become pertinent again. Linz and Stepan (1978).
Zakaria (1997), coining the term that was then adopted by Viktor Orban, the authoritarian populist leader of Hungary. See the analysis of democratic decay through the mechanisms of “constitutional retrogression,” i.e., via slow, apparently legal and democratic means, in Huq and Ginsburg, “How to lose a constitutional democracy.”.
Recent right-wing challenges to democratic norms can be traced to Newt Gingrich becoming Speaker of the House in 1994 when the Republican Party won its first House majority in forty years. Under his leadership, the party’s new hardball approach involved aversion to compromise, willingness to obstruct legislation, and friend/enemy rhetoric. The Tea Party radicalized this approach after the 2008 Obama election. President Trump and the Republican majority in Congress continue it. See Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 146–172.
Frankel (2017), first published in 1941 in German.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 8. Such norms are also important for ordinary individuals and civil society. Segmental pluralism undermines them.
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 24–25.
Ibid, 6, 13.
Ibid, 1, 35–37.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 41ff.
Ibid, 8–9. For the term “constitutional hardball,” see Mark Tushnet (2004).
By “economic society” I mean the associations, cooperatives, unions, institutional forms of voice, local, and national organizations that emerge around labor and production. For civil society see, Cohen and Arato (1992).
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 37, stressing the importance of the commitment of gatekeepers to democratic norms and downplaying role of the political culture. Huq and Ginsburg (2018), 76, analyzing political institutional factors but concluding without analysis that public support for the norms and conventions of democratic politics is the critical factor to democracy’s survival.
Arato and Cohen (2017), 283–295.
The politics of resentment is a form of identity politics tantamount to scapegoating. Cramer (2016), 9.
Ibid. paraphrasing Cramer (2016).
Gidron and Hall (2017).
See the discussion in Stepan and Linz, Breakdown of democratic regimes, 3–14.
Gest, The new minority, 20–38.
Ibid.; see also Hochschild, Strangers in their own land, 135–207.
de Tocqueville (2000), 287.
Arato, (2016) Chap. 6; Arato and Cohen, “Civil society, religion and populism,” 285–289; Arato, “How we got here”.
Gest, The new minority; Hochschild, Strangers in their own land; Williams, White working class. These authors focus on the white working class, but in the USA, the working class (those without a college degree) are made up of people from many races and ethnicities.
Arato, “How we got here”.
Ibid.; Urbinati (2014).
Andrew Arato, “How we got here”.
On hyper-globalization, see Rodrik, The globalization paradox. Hyper-globalization undermines domestic rules protecting the environment, labor, or other features of social public policy. Globalization need not have this consequence, but without proper regulatory rules, it does.
Those adversely affected include working people of all races although the emphasis of authoritarian populists is on the white working class.
Polanyi (1944); Habermas (1981). For an analysis of democratizing movements for the defense, modernization, and democratization of civil and political society and the reflexive continuation of the welfare state that drew on Polanyi and Habermas, see Cohen and Arato (1992). We did not thematize the anti-democratic, illiberal counter-movements defending traditional social hierarchies at that time.
Polyani, ibid. The gold standard was the institution that internationalized the logic of the self-regulating market in international trade.
Ibid.; see also Szombati, The revolt of the provinces, 7–8.
Habermas, The theory of communicative action, I.
Cohen and Arato (1992) discussing the national level; Rodrik, The globalization paradox; Piketty (2013), 471–540, discussing the international and global level.
Arato and Cohen, “Civil society, populism and religion”.
See Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), 6–21, for the concept populism as a thin-centered ideology that links to host ideologies.
Ibid, 2; Gallie (1955–1956).
See Arato and Cohen, “Civil society, religion and populism,” 285–289, and Arato, “How we got here,” op. cit.
Jaeger (2017).
Arato, “Political theology”; Arato and Cohen, “Civil society, populism and religion,” 285–289.
This ideal type is a composite of elements of various authors: Elements 1, 3, 4, and 5 are drawn from Laclau (2007). A good discussion of elements 2 and 6 can be found in Canovan (2007); Moffitt (2016) cogently discusses elements 7–9; for elements 2 and 10, see Mudde’s Populism, and for general discussions of how populism distorts democracy see Rosanvallon (2010) and Urbinati’s Democracy disfigured.
Finchelstein (2017).
Arato, “How we got here”.
Arato and Cohen, “Civil society, populism and religion,” 285–289.
Hofstadter, The age of reform; Hofstadter, (1964), Chap. 1. For a discussion of the pluralist/consensus school, see Anton Jaeger, “The semantic drift”.
Arato and Cohen, “Civil society populism and religion,” 283–287.
Ibid.
For example, Viktor Organ in Hungary.
Finchelstein (2017).
Mouffe (2000), 1–16; Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism, 81–83, arguing that populism is essentially democratic and inconsistent with democracy’s liberal dimensions, i.e., limitations on the “will of the people” or democratic majorities.
Lefort, “The question of democracy and permanence of the theologico-politico?” in Democracy and political theory; Arato, “Political theology”.
Ibid.
Urbinati, Democracy disfigured, 1–81.
Cohen and Arato, Civil society and political theory; Arato, “How we got here”.
Arato, “How we got here”.
Ibid.
Piketty, Capital in the twenty-first century, 113–199.
Rodrik, The globalization paradox; Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents.
Manin, Representative government, 218–236.
Ibid. and Arato, “How we got here”.
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How democracies die, 38–39, 41–43.
Ibid.
Ibid, 7.
Urbinati, “The revolt against intermediary bodies,” 477–485.
Theda Skocpol, Diminished democracy, 175–254.
Skocpol and Williamson (2016).
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Urbinati, “Intermediary bodies”.
Piketty (2018); see also Gest, The new minority, 198–200.
Cohen and Arato, Civil society and political theory. Piketty (2014).
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the twenty-first century.
Arato, “How we got here”.
I focus on the USA, but the analysis also pertains to democracies in Western Europe.
Gest, The new minority, 6–7.
Ibid., citing the U.S. Census Bureau, “Millennials outnumber baby boomers and are far more diverse,” Census Bureau Reports, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-113.html.
Ibid.
See Daniel Markovitz, “The meritocracy trap” on file with the author.
Gest, The new minority, 6–7, 21, 15–17.
Cramer, The politics of resentment, 5–9.
Feldman (2005), 150–185.
Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, “Populism as a problem of social integration,” Working Paper, 9, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hall/files/gidron_hallmpsa2018.pdf.
Ibid.
Ibid, 9–10.
Feldman, Divided by God, 150–185.
Pew Research Center (2014).
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); the 1965 Voting Rights Act (https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=100. Feldman, Divided by God, 150–185, on legal secularism.
Feldman, Divided by God, 186–219, on the rise of the rise of the Evangelical Christian Right. See also Dochuk (2011).
Ibid.
Dawson and Bobo (2009).
Nicholas A. Valentino and Kirill Zhirko, “Blue is black and red is white? Racialized schemas of U.S. partisan coalitions and their consequences,” manuscript on file with the author.
Ibid, 10–15.
Skocpol and Williamson argue in The tea party, 70, that Tea Party supporters and activists do not fit the stereotype of unreconstructed racists.
Hochschild, Strangers in the land, 215–218.
Ibid.
Gest, The new minority, 132–135.
Thompson (1966), 10.
Gest, The New Minority, 16–17, 138–139.
Ibid, 139.
Ibid.
Ibid, 3–7.
Gidron and Hall, “The politics of social status,” 9.
Ibid.
Gidron and Hall, “Populism as a problem of social integration,” 8–9.
Thomas Piketty, “Brahmin Left vs. Merchant Right”, piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf.
Hofstadter, The age of reform. For a discussion of the consensus school, see Jaeger, “The semantic drift,” 313.
Hofstadter, “The paranoid style,” 155.
Jaeger, “The semantic drift,” 313, discussing Hofstadter’s The age of reform.
Ibid, 314–315.
Postel, The populist vision, 3–22, 269–289, arguing that the populists sought an alternative, more just version of capitalism.
Ibid.
Rogin (1967).
Ibid.; Herzog (2011).
Postel, The populist vision, 269–289.
Jaeger, “The semantic drift,” 313–320.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 54–74.
Cramer, The politics of resentment.
Lipset (1960).
See Berman (1997). Berman notes that in a context in which political society (parties) is unresponsive to the concerns of key social groups, social trust and generalized solidarity will disintegrate even in civil societies where associationalism is well developed but organizational belonging is highly segmented and discontent about the political system, prevalent. Such a social political structure is democracy undermining, not democracy reinforcing, and lends itself to populist mobilization.
Valentino and Zhirkov, “Blue is black.” See also Levitsky and Ziblatt, “How democracies die”, 115–117.
Cramer, The politics of resentment, 9. Cramer, however, did not link the politics of resentment to a theoretical analysis of authoritarian populism as I do.
Stanley (2015).
Hochschild, Strangers in their own land, 150–151.
Hofstadter, “Paranoid style,” 82.
Valentino and Zhirkov, “Blue is Black”; Mason, “I disrespectfully agree”; Mason, “A cross cutting calm.”
Laclau in On populist reason argued that the populist approach is to construct a chain of equivalences that links a number disparate, conflicting demands, and disconnected local identities together through a hegemonic signifier in order to construct, via a chain of equivalences, a relatively consolidated political identity of the “friend” component of the friend/enemy frontier, fill the empty signifier of “the people” with substantive content, and make a specific part of the population stand for the whole.
Hochschild, Strangers in their own land, 150–151.
Paraphrasing Gest, The new minority, 16.
Paraphrasing Rodrik (2018); Piketty, 304–335.
Ibid, 32.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Daniel Miller, “Beyond belief: political identity and evangelical support for Donald Trump,” Constellations (forthcoming), *13.
Ibid.
Gorski supports the later position (Gorski 2016). But see Michele Margolis, “Who is trying to make America great again? Evangelical support for Donald Trump”, arguing that real evangelicals, with a high number of evangelical religious beliefs, did and do support Trump and the Republican party but that the identity is not fused.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 45–82; Cramer, The politics of resentment, 111–169; Hochschild, Strangers in their own land, 146–153.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 56–59; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez, “The Koch Network,” 681–699.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 56–59.
Ibid.
Cramer, The politics of resentment, 13–14.
Ibid., 16, 164.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 102–110.
The recent split between the Koch Brothers who support free trade and immigration and Trump who does not is a case in point. See NY Times August 2 2018.
Mayer, Dark money.
Though this is a racialized code that has a long tradition going back at least to the 1964 Goldwater campaign, it also targets New Deal progressivism and stigmatizes not only African Americans but also “free loaders,” the lazy and the undeserving among youth of every race. Hochschild, Strangers in their own land, 148–151; Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 64–68, 81–82; Cramer, The politics of resentment, 167.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 84–120; Jane Myer, Dark money.
Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party, 210–215. See Dark money for other active billionaires funding right-wing republican candidates and policy agendas.
Ibid., 200–201; Cramer, The politics of resentment, 167.
Gidron and Hall, “Populism as a problem of social integration,” 9.
Gest, The new minority, 198–200; Williams, White working class, 109–127.
Mouffe, For a left populism, 1–38.
Ibid, 22–24.
Mouffe, The democratic paradox.
Ibid, 10–16, 70.
Nancy Fraser’s version of left populism relies on socialism as a host ideology and differs in some respects from that of Mouffe, but it too reinforces old orthodoxies, has an elective affinity with authoritarianism, and misplaces the blame for the class cluelessness of political parties since the 1980s onto the new social movements. See Fraser’s “From progressive neo-liberalism to Trump and beyond,” “The end of progressive neo-liberalism” op. cit., and “Progressive neo-liberalism vs. reactionary populism: a Hobson’s choice” (Fraser 2017c), 40–48.
See Polanyi’s The great transformation and the foreword by Joseph E. Stiglitz (vii–xvii) and introduction by Fred R. Bloch (xviii–xxxviii) to the second paperback edition (Boston: Beacon Press 2001). See also Fraser (2017d).
Piketty, Capital in the 21st century; Rodrik, The globalization paradox.
“Class cluelessness” is Williams’ term in White working class. But recall that de-industrialization first hit the inner cities in the late 1970s, destroying the manufacturing well-paying jobs that workers of various racial and ethnic backgrounds relied on.
Paraphrasing Gest, The new minority, 199.
Ibid., 195ff; WiIliams, White working class, 100ff.
Gest, ibid.
Mayer, Dark money.
Skocpol and Williamson, The tea party, 54–82.
Mettler (2011), 40, 121–123.
Ibid.; Levitsky and Ziblatt, How democracies fail, 28–29, 204–231; Williams, White working class, 100–126.
Levitsky and Ziblatt, ibid, 204–231.
Scheiber (2018), analyzing labor unrest by teachers, nurses, doctors, and professors whose voices and expertise have been ignored in reform projects and managerial decisions and even in hiring of untrained people to do professional jobs. This can be framed as an issue of public esteem and against economic colonization of professional calling and vocation.
Robertson (2018).
Pew, Religious landscape survey.
Piketty, Capital in the 21st century, proposes a global tax. See Pistor, The code of capital (forthcoming, manuscript on file with the author) for a superb analysis of the role of law, domestic, international, and global in constructing capital in ways that prioritize markets over governments and the interests of firms over public-oriented social policy, along with other suggestions for reform.
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Cohen, J.L. Populism and the Politics of Resentment. Jus Cogens 1, 5–39 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-019-00009-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-019-00009-7