Journal of the History of Philosophy

Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro10A- 11B S. MARC COHEN PLATO'S Et~rt~reHRo is a clear example of a Socratic definitional dialogue. The concept to be defined is that of holiness or piety (z6 r the need for a definition is presented in a manner characteristic of the early dialogues. Euthyphro is about to prosecute his father on a charge of murder, Socrates expresses surprise at Euthyphro's action, and Euthyphro defends himself by saying that to prosecute his father is pious, whereas not to prosecute him would be impious. Socrates then wonders whether Euthyphro's knowledge of piety and impiety is sufficient to guarantee that he is not acting impiously in prosecuting his father. The trap has been set; Euthyphro's vanity is stung, and the search for a definition begins. The outcome of the search is also familiar; all of Euthyphro's efforts miscarry. The dialogue ends with no satisfactory definition of piety either produced or in the offing. The central argument in the dialogue is the one Socrates advances (10a-lib) against Euthyphro's definition of piety as "what all the gods love." The argument is interesting on several counts. First, the argument is sufficiently unclear as to warrant discussion of what its structure is. Second, it is at least open to question whether there is any interpretation or reconstruction of the argument according to which it is valid and non-fallacious. Third, there are a number of points of contemporary philosophical interest that inevitably arise in any adequate discussion of the argument. Fourth, the argument has been traditionally thought to have an important moral for contemporary ethical theory, and not just for ancient theology. Before beginning a detailed examination of the argument itself, I will comment briefly on the moral the argument has been traditionally thought to have? For Euthyphro, the question whether or not he ought to prosecute his father is to be settled by determining whether or not it would be pious for him to do so. Whether or not his doing so would be pious is determined by finding out whether t Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato the Man and his Work (London: Methuen, 1949), p. 151, and Robert G. Hoerber, "Plato's Euthyphro," Phronesis, III (1958), 95-107, esp. n. 1, p. 102, and p. 104. [1] 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY all the gods love it, or, as we might now say, approve of it. For Euthyphro, then, moral questions (such as "Ought I prosecute my father?") are settled by appeal to moral authorities--the gods. Euthyphro is offering an authoritarian normative ethical theory. But he apparently wishes to offer an authoritarian meta-ethical theory as well, since 'pious' is for him defined in terms of the approval of an authority. Moreover, Euthyphro's authorities must have been thought of by him to be pre-eminently wise and rational; after all, they are the gods. Their wisdom and rationality is part of what makes them moral authorities. It is their wisdom and rationality that enables them to perceive, where mere mortals may fail to perceive, whether a given act is pious. Socrates' argument may then be thought of as having the following force. If 'pious' is to be defined in terms of the gods' approval, then the piety of a given act cannot be that upon which the gods base their approval of it. If the gods' approval of a pious act has any rational basis, then, it must lie in their perception of some other features of the act. And then it is these features in terms of which 'pious' should be defined. In general, if one's normative ethics are authoritarian, and one's authorities are rational and use their rationality in forming moral judgments, then one's recta-ethics cannot also be authoritarian. I want to argue in support of this somewhat traditional interpretation of the Euthyphro. I shall try to show that Socrates" arguments should be taken as supporting this conclusion (indeed, that they cannot be taken to support anything else). Socrates begins his argument against Euthyphro's proposed definition by asking him this question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is...