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The author would like to thankRes Publica's anonymous readers for reading and most helpfully commenting on earlier drafts. The paper develops ideas first expressed in Phillip Cole, “Dangerous Philosophies”,Radical Philosophy 72 (1995), July/August, 44–46; and in “The Futility of Bioethics”, a paper presented at the Consensus in Bioethics conference, University of Central Lancashire (October 1996). However, it constitutes a substantial revision of those earlier ideas.
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Cole, P. Problems with “persons”. Res Publica 3, 165–183 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02333603
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02333603