The Pluralist

William E. Connolly is keenly aware of the criticisms which can be brought against an advocate of pluralism. Between the extremes of syncretism and complete unilateralism, he seeks a politically and religiously plausible “multidimensional” pluralism that allows genuine commitment to a position while demanding receptivity of others. This “bicameral” stance is unique because Connolly grounds his pluralism in an orientation needed in a world after 9/11, preemptive wars, and nationally sponsored denials of human rights (12–14), and the deeply pluralistic structures of the universe and time. Pluralism is then a work of apologetics. Connolly gives an argument for the existence of a universe which cannot be fully encompassed by any one position that he hopes will resonate with different people and lead them to a pluralist position (9), thereby creating a pluralist “multitude” (141) capable of making theory a reality built upon the pluralistic shoulders of the world’s population.

Connolly begins his search by exploring the tendency toward evil within faiths. The Augustinian form in which one position is authoritative for all is rejected as a solution to the problem because it too easily “sets up future violence on behalf of territorial unilateralism” (30). Spinoza’s alternative is an “ethic of cultivation” (20) that allows many people to read one text and develop moral action in different ways. However, Connolly rejects secularism and wants all faiths expressed publically, meaning that it is necessary to deal with the conflicting claims of different positions. His proposed solution is an “existential faith” (25) composed of explicitly expressed creeds and their sensibilities embodied in public conduct. When different creeds meet, there is often a visceral reaction of disgust toward the practices of others. This public encounter is necessary to reach a “bicameral orientation” which allows a person to practice his faith as if it were the only natural way to proceed, while also coming to terms with the fact that it is not (31). Avoiding the problem of evil in this way necessarily means risking a bit of your own identity when visceral reactions are overcome and the sensibilities with which creeds are expressed no longer exclude the practices of others.

By detaching his multidimensional pluralism from relativism, Connolly brings to the fore what may be an uncomfortable but unavoidable aspect of nonrelative pluralism. “For example, a pluralistic society inculcates the virtue [End Page 125] of relational modesty between proponents of different faiths and creeds, and it seeks to limits the power of those who would overthrow diversity in the name of religious unitarianism” (40–41). It seems that Connolly’s pluralism must harbor exclusive elements. Among the features making multidimensional pluralism different from relativism is the fact that it sets limits to tolerance and is willing to “fight militarily against the continuation of yet others” (42). However, violence is undesirable, and he suggests that diversity in areas outside of religion such as gender and marriage relations should be officially promoted by governments. This official recognition would give these minorities the leverage needed for “creedal ventilation” of faiths (61) so that publically expressed faiths will eventually be understood as many minorities relying on one another. With all positions on equal footing, any part of a group could resist attempts by some to establish unilateralism so that variety could be maintained.

The value of diversity is present in Connolly’s previous work on the inherent instability of identities and here rests on a sense of mystery in the universe that individuals should embrace in their own faith. He introduces the philosophy of William James, who argued that the universe is made of “litter” (73) so that even the most comprehensive perceptions made about reality will be incomplete. James vigorously defended his notion of litter while also being modest about its standing—something he hoped all beliefs about the universe could mirror. Connolly’s own argument is similar. His defense of pluralism requires modesty due to the incomplete nature of different beliefs. These incomplete positions are further complicated by Bergson’s concept of time as becoming in which past memories and present perceptions meet with unexpected...