1 Introduction

In his new book A Relational Moral Theory,Footnote 1 Thaddeus Metz considers that although many people will likely agree that some kind of enhancement (which we conceive as modifying or augmenting the human person) is acceptable, biotechnological enhancement (including moral biotechnological enhancement) is pro tanto problematic from the African relational perspective. His main contention is that enhancement is generally likely to contribute to social disharmony and, thus that authorizing or undergoing enhancements is likely to be a moral failure. In this article for the book symposium on Metz’s manuscript, we will contend that Metz’s conclusions regarding enhancement are mistaken. Primarily, we demonstrate how Metz’s criticism fails to convince. More precisely, we argue that (i) Metz’s consequentialist arguments are grounded on miscalculation or exaggeration of the consequennces of enhancement and, thereby, are insufficient to show that enhancement is wrong; (ii) there is nothing intrinsically wrong, from a Metzian deontology viewpoint, with enhancement; and (iii) the Metzian treatment of education suggests that he is already committed to some form of enhancement. The arguments in this paper for the book symposium, of course, do not suffice to show that enhancement is morally justified or even desirable and this is not, in fact, the goal of the paper. This would require a more complex paper outside this book symposium. Instead, what it shows is that the Metzian rationale not only fails to show that enhancement is morally wrong but also that Metzian ethics points towards accepting enhancement.

This thesis is different from previous research in at least three ways. Firstly, most African ethics has ignored the moral enhancement question and focused instead on questions about abortion, euthanasia, animals and the environment (Molefe 2020; Horsthemke 2015; Fayemi 2018). Secondly, in contrast with Metz who, broadly speaking, opposes enhancement, we demonstrate how his application of social harmony to object to enhancement contains many shortcomings and does not imply that enhancement is morally impermissible. Thirdly, although we neither provide nor aim to provide a full account of whether enhancement must be endorsed, we offer good reasons, within the Metzian rationale, to support enhancement. This is different from previous work because other perspectives that have provided good reasons to endorse enhancement are mostly informed by approaches dominant in the Global North (like utilitarianism) and, to the extent that we draw on values dominant in the Global South, our thesis differs from previous work.

To carry out this task, we have divided our article into five sections. In the first section, we explain the key tenets of Metzian ethics and contextualize them with African normative philosophy. The second section offers an overview of Metz’s perspectives on enhancement. In section three, we argue that the consequentialist objections raised by Metz fail. In section four, we explain that Metzian deontology does not demonstrate that there is anything intrinsically wrong with enhancement. In the fifth section, we demonstrate that Metz is, in fact, committed to enhancement. We do this by comparing biotechnological enhancement with education. These arguments suggest how social harmony, as conceptualized by Metz, appears not to be incompatible with biotechnological enhancement. However, we also acknowledge here that a more robust discussion will be required to defend biotechnological enhancement conclusively. This is beyond the scope of this present contribution to the Book Symposium, which primarily focuses on Metz’s argument against enhancement.

2 From African Social Harmony to Metzian Ethics

African philosophy has a tendency to be communitarian. Several representative African thinkers consider that community plays a fundamental role in morality. One example is the Nigerian theologian Pantaleon Iroegbu, who contends that “the purpose of our life is community-service and community-belongingness’ (Iroegbu 2005, 442). Famously, the founder of the Black Consciousness Movement, Steve Biko, affirmed: “Hence in all, we [Africans] do we always place Man first, and hence all our action is usually joint community oriented action rather than the individualism which is the hallmark of the capitalist approach”(Biko 1987, 46). The scholar George Silberbauer contends that “there was another value being pursued, namely the establishing and maintaining of harmonious relationships. Again and again in discussion and in general conversation, this stood out as a desired and enjoyed end in itself, often as the ultimate rationale for action”(Silberbauer 1993, 20). Another good example is the words of Desmond Tutu:

Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good. Anything that subverts, that undermines this sought-after good, is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good (Tutu 1999, 35).

Metz likewise defends a form of communitarian ethics and understands this concept of social harmony as friendliness. According to Metz, social harmony is the highest good and is interchangeable with friendship (Metz 2022a). He gives an original definition of the term: social harmony/friendship, in turn, is constituted by a combination of solidarity/good-will and identification. This combination of solidarity and identification is a new addition to the African concept of social harmony, which previous authors did not separate. In A Relational Moral Theory, Metz explains that both solidarity and identification have external and internal aspects. That is, in order for them to be realized, they require individuals to behave and feel in certain ways. With respect to solidarity, in behavioral terms, it requires that individuals act in ways that promote and honour the welfare and moral development of others. Additionally, it requires that one feels and has the disposition to act in this way. Regarding the behavioral requirements of identification, it implies that individuals act in ways that honour proximity and a sense of togetherness with others, acting as members of a group. Internally, identification requires that individuals feel and understand others via this sense of togetherness (Metz 2022a, 91–100). The Metzian view defended in A Relational Moral Theory conceives harmony as a combination of good-will and shared identity. What is important is for one to advance the interest of the community since this is how one realizes one’s good, value, personhood, and wholeness. The reader would also be correct to observe that Metzian ethics emphasizes the capacity for the relationship of good-will and shared identity and is a form of modal relationalism. This differs from another strand of relationism that exhorts individuals to properly exercise or actualize communal relations and is thus called moral relationalism (Metz 2022a, 106). The ethics of friendliness has many moral implications. In Metz’s view, friendliness implies that:

  • An act is right if and only if it respects individuals in virtue of their capacity to be party to harmonious ways of relating.

  • An act is wrong insofar as it degrades those with the capability of relating communally as subjects or objects.

  • An action is permissible if it treats beings as special in accordance with their ability to be friendly or to be befriended.

  • An action is impermissible to the extent that it disrespects beings with the ability to be part of relationships of identity and solidarity(Metz 2022a, 110).

The morality of actions is measured by whether they honour/respect friendship. Another way to put it is that acts that undermine friendship are morally impermissible (Metz 2022a, 110). For this reason, one has a duty to end actions that disregard friendship. Also, notice that Metz does not think that there is a moral obligation to maximize friendship, or promote the same however one can. Metz does not think consequences are irrelevant to morality. In this regard, Metz provides a more deontologically oriented interpretation of friendliness that acknowledges that certain ways of promoting friendliness are immoral in themselves despite their outcome. For example, in his previous work about African war ethics, Metz defends that war interventions cannot be justified simply for maximizing friendship but, instead, they should be constrained by procedures that honour friendship (Metz 2019). In this vein, one could not justifiably use unfriendliness, such as ill-will, to promote friendliness (harmony and social cohesion). One ought to treat those who have been friendly to one’s self in a friendly way and use proportional unfriendliness to end unfriendliness.

Further, Metz’s ethics of friendliness emphasizes an individual’s capacity, which is relevant for understanding his position on enhancement later. It becomes apparent by alluding to his concept of moral status. For Metz, the only beings with moral status are those who have the capacity to engage in friendship. Individuals can potentially be both subject and object of friendship. To be a subject of friendship means to be able to act and feel in ways that honour friendship. In turn, to be an object of friendship means to be a kind of being who is able to receive such acts. A pen or a stone, for example, cannot be objects of friendship. A crow can be an object but not a subject of friendship. According to Metz, if individuals have the capacity to be both objects and subjects of friendship, then they have a high and full moral status. Individuals have dignity by virtue of full moral status. Nonetheless, some beings – like the crow and most animals – can only be objects of friendship and, therefore, have a lower (and partial) moral status. From a Metzian viewpoint, the more moral status one has, the more moral consideration one deserves (Metz 2012, 2022a).

3 Metz on Enhancement

At this point, we should further clarify how we understand enhancement. Specifically, we have adopted the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ description of enhancement “as the practice of making targeted interventions at the molecular level of DNA or RNA function, deliberately to alter the structural or functional characteristics of biological entities. These entities include complex living organisms, such as humans and animals, tissues and cells in culture, and plants, bacteria and viruses” (Bioethics 2016, 7). This description is not significantly different from how Metz defines it. In A Relational Moral Theory, Metz describes enhancement as tinkering with a thing’s biology to improve it – say, make “it more beautiful, intelligent, strong, or the like” (Metz 2022a, 175). Elsewhere, Metz describes enhancement as giving an agent an ability beyond the norm by altering the agent’s DNA (Metz 2018). Enhancement encompasses the use of emerging and disruptive technologies, including pharmaceutical products, to boost, improve, augment or modify the human person or performance in various ways (that are not normally available in humans), not excluding cognitively, psychologically, morally or physically, as well as to treat, alleviate human suffering or control mood (ETAG 2009).

What the preceding implies is that there are different types of enhancement which include moral enhancement, cognitive, and physiological, to name a few. Some enhancement entails improving selected human traits like intelligence or capacities such as the capacity to run. Contrarily, the thinking about moral enhancement is that it leaves “the enhanced person with morally better motives (…) than she had previously” (Douglas 2008, 228). A clarification is required here. Reasonably, one goal of moral enhancement is increasing one’s moral status or turning the agent into one with an elevated moral status in society. Another goal could equally be actually making one act morally. Most proponents of moral enhancement – such as Thomas Douglas, Julian Savulescu, and Ingmar Persson (Douglas 2008, 2013; Persson and Savulescu 2008, 2010; Savulescu and Persson 2012) do not think either of these goals ought to be encouraged since they may likely undermine an individual’s free will. An individual’s moral agency lies in their free will. Suppose this is taken away from them; that is, suppose they can no longer exercise their freedom to act immorally. In that case, they can hardly be blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions. Instead, they contend that the goal of moral enhancement ought to lie in increasing an individual’s moral disposition (that is, the likelihood that they will act in morally permissible ways). For this reason, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson (2012) describe moral enhancement as a disposition that makes it more likely that one will arrive at the correct judgement of what it is right to do and more likely to act on that judgement.

Admittedly, Metz offers very little on the question of enhancement. As he states: “I lack a firm comprehensive view at present about what the relational moral theory entails for enhancements. I am not sure whether it would require moral ones [like increasing moral dispositions], and I also cannot say whether it would permit non-moral ones [like merely cognitive or physiological enhancements]” (Metz 2022a, 175). Metz concurs that there are instances when enhancement may be justified. For example, if there is a question of survival of the human species (but perhaps not an individual human), then enhancement is justified (Metz 2022a). In his own words, “If enhancements were required in order to keep the human race—or a transhuman species closely related to it—from going extinct, surely they would be justified” (Metz 2022a, 175). In short, from Metz’s viewpoint, for urgent purposes, it is more intuitive that enhancements be justified. Urgent purposes may include therapeutic purposes like preventing a disease (say, preventing the COVID-19 infection) or curing a condition like Alzheimer’s.

Nonetheless, according to the theory defended in A Relational Moral Theory by Metz, enhancement tends to be immoral when it is undertaken for less urgent purposes. Mostly, Metz is referring here to examples of enhancement that aim merely at improving a particular trait. For instance, improving intelligence in general, making someone who is good-looking downright gorgeous, or in the case of moral enhancement, giving a moral agent who already acts morally more moral capacity to act in the right way, are examples of enhancements that are less likely to meet basic needs (Metz 2022a, 175). Metz gives as examples of such less urgent purposes facilitating communal relationships if it entails going beyond the norm of friendliness or if it is pursued only because of an associated positional or competitive advantage.

Metz’s justification (2022a) is that these less urgent enhancements are unjustified since they would more likely interfere with an individual’s capacity for communal relationships in at least two ways. Firstly, they cause significant differences in abilities (including moral ones) in ways that would reasonably inhibit psychological identification in the same way as economic stratification. The more different people are, the less likely it will be that they will identify with one another. According to Metz, a degree of similarity between people is crucial for identification. When those with economic power enhance themselves, this will create more divisions in society and, thereby, undermine social harmony. Secondly, enhancement would allow a handful of people to possess superior abilities – including moral ones – thus undermining the value of experiencing the same fate that is entailed by the requirement of sharing a way of life. In Metz’s view, people need to share experiences because these are the fundamental conditions for developing a sense of togetherness with others. As Metz’s himself remarks:

The harder question is whether enhancements are justified for less urgent purposes….i suspect, though, that the relational moral theory provides pro tanto reason to doubt the permissibility of enhancing, even when it involves our moral agency…in particular, enhancement could threaten to make it harder for people to share a way of life…[it] would probably interfere with people’s ability to share a way of life, at least if some were substantially enhanced and others were not (Metz 2022a, 175–176).

Taking this on board, Metz has not specified anything intrinsic to enhancement that warrants it to be immoral other than the consequences of enhancement. Specifically, Metz does not oppose enhancement in principle. Rather, Metz is sceptical that enhancement really has a positive effect: enhancement will more likely lead to social disharmony/divisiveness, which has not been seriously considered in the ethical discourse on enhancement. In this way, while the interpretation of friendliness that he offers is deontological in nature, Metz’s reason for proscribing enhancement is consequentialist-based. Metz’s position on enhancement is grounded on a consequentialist rationale. On the one hand, Metz considers enhancement warranted when the consequences are too tragic and require an urgent response, such as the survival of the human species. On the other hand, Metz rejects that enhancement is morally justified in other non-urgent situations because in such situations it is more likely that they lead to socially disharmony/divisiveness rather than social harmony (the greatest value for Metz).

4 Metzian Ethics and Miscalculated Consequences

In light of this, the key question we interrogate is, does a consequentialist framing of social harmony oppose enhancement? This is besides whether deontological constraints ought not to be implemented to restrict certain forms of enhancement. Note that the arguments Metz advances against enhancement are somehow surprising. Although Metz defends a deontological moral theory in his book, he opposes enhancement on consequentialist grounds; so, for us to demonstrate that this is insufficient to show that enhancement is immoral, we must reply to the consequentialist rationale he offers. As mentioned, the concern he raises is that enhancement may cause distance between enhanced and unenhanced. More precisely, the concern is that the distribution of enhancements, including moral enhancements, such as making people more caring, will create distance because people identify with those who are similar to them and those who do not share the same fate.

However, it seems that Metz is simply being pessimistic regarding the outcomes of non-moral forms of enhancement towards morality (Metz 2022a). Although identification requires a degree of similarity, the level of similarity is minimal and is more tied to how someone is educated than to a natural disposition towards those who are similar to us. Regarding the level of similarity, we do not need to have the same intelligence, race, level of beauty or even be the same species to identify with others, share a sense of togetherness, or perform acts of good-will towards them. Routinely, we are able to identify with others simply in virtue of them having the capability to be communed with. In fact, Metz’s theory of moral status suggests this precisely when he contends that animals have a moral status because we are able to relate to them.

Moreover, we are possibly more likely to perform acts of good-will towards those who have something in common with us but have larger differences from us out of empathy (Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Ewuoso 2021). For example, we are more likely to aid a baby in need than an adult. Who we identify and share a sense of togetherness with is not a matter of nature but a matter of how we are socialized and how we understand the most important social categories in our lives. Some studies suggest that children from parents who promote species equality, for example, are more likely to identify strongly and share a sense of togetherness with their animal companions (Cole and Stewart 2016). Identification results from a process of learning grounded on which categories are made relevant to those learning. This is why, for example, parents hailing from more progressive circles try to read story books to children that contain inclusive content and language.

Another issue is that even if it is the case that we are mistaken about non-moral forms of technology, it is hard to see how enhancing individuals morally would make society more immoral, which is what Metz is suggesting. Metz’s implication is that by enhancing moral capabilities (mainly the capacity for identification and good-will), then people will be less solidarious and will not even identify with others. It is difficult to comprehend why he thinks this. Still, a likely reason is that he thinks there is something valuable in not just acting in the right way but also in knowing why and being emotionally driven to act in the right way; Metz probably believes that enhancement does not answer the latter two.

However, if this is what Metz believes, it mischaracterizes biotechnological enhancement. What biotechnological enhancement tends to do is precisely to emotionally increase our disposition to want to act morally. It is similar to a nudge which inclines us to do the right thing, but unlike a nudge, which is external to the agent, biotechnological enhancement disposes the agent from the inside. Further, by improving these moral capacities, individuals are also encouraged to understand why they should act in a certain way. Notice that most biotechnological enhancement does not imply that the agent will do good. Rather, it means that they will be more inclined towards virtues; that is, they will have a stable disposition towards the good. Equally, in the case of enhancement, particularly moral enhancement, notice that to have more moral people, even if their moral capability is significantly different from others, seems to be a good thing; this is also true for those with fewer moral capabilities. Morality is often learned by example, and Metz agrees with this; hence, having additional good examples will enhance everyone’s morality rather than diminish it.

Surely, in some situations, enhancement is unwarranted for consequentialist reasons. Suppose that enhancement is undertaken in ways that cause large differences in abilities or create a psychological non-identification between people. As an example, suppose the rich enhance themselves in ways that cause distance between themselves and the poor. In these cases, it would neither be an intrinsic problem with enhancement nor a failure of the moral ethic that mandates friendship. Rather, it would be the failure of individuals to be friendly.

5 Is Enhancement Intrinsically Wrong According to Metzian Deontology?

One potential set of objections against our argument is that we have fundamentally misunderstood Metzian ethics, and therefore, our criticism of Metz fails. More precisely, even though Metz did advance consequentialist arguments against enhancement, following the principle of charity, we must look at whether the Metzian deontological ethics is or is not compatible with enhancement. Particularly, we must show whether enhancement is (a) intrinsically wrong (in Metzian terms, intrinsically unfriendly) and (b) whether it is compatible with his principles.

For Metz, friendship/social harmony is the highest value. What matters the most is to honour friendship. However, a deontological approach implies that there are constraints to honour friendship. Friendliness must be promoted through friendly means and unfriendliness must be promoted through a proportional unfriendliness. For example, implementing capital punishment for an individual whose only crime is theft of a school bag will amount to using disproportional unfriendliness to end unfriendliness exhibited by another person. Similarly, suppose merely disarming a burglar would be sufficient to stop an active crime. In that case, killing the burglar would be unjustified from the Metzian deontological interpretation of harmony.

The deontological reading would also render certain forms of behavior immoral and unacceptable ways of promoting or honouring friendship. A crude example would be implementing a policy on infanticide to depopulate the planet. These methods would be an unacceptable way to promote friendship or friendliness since they inherently fail to respect others. To respect others is to perform acts that honour friendship. As quoted above:

  • An action is permissible if it treats beings as special in accordance with their ability to be friendly or to be befriended.

  • An action is impermissible to the extent that it disrespects beings with the ability to be part of relationships of identity and solidarity (Metz 2022a, 110).

Moreover, according to Metz, the stimulation of virtue is too important to be neglected. It is only through gaining certain habits through repetition that individuals are able to act in certain ways or develop virtue. For instance, it is by creating a routine in habits akin to courage that one becomes courageous (Metz 2022b). Thus, individuals should create habits that create and/or enhance virtues.

A key question for Metzian deontology, then, is whether there is something intrinsically unfriendly about enhancement. Now, there is nothing antithetical to enhancement in this relational ethics if this enhancement is done in a way that honors friendship. Enhancement can be carried out in friendly ways, embody friendly relations and, thereby, honour friendship. Enhancement would be intrinsically wrong only if it could not be carried out in a friendly way. So, intrinsically, there is nothing unfriendly about enhancement.

What Metz’s deontological ethics prescribes is that enhancement ought to be undertaken in ways that honor friendliness or at least do not undermine the same. Enhancement ought to be carried out in ways that respect individuals’ capacities and dispositions to friendly relations and friendly relations in the community. If enhancement is carried out this way, then there is nothing wrong with it. So, it also does not violate any of Metz’s principles. Indeed, it seems to respect the commitment to honor friendship to the extent that it can stimulate or facilitate the virtues necessary for social harmony. For example, suppose uncooperative and defiant/socially disruptive behaviour like temper tantrums or interrupting others could be edited out of one’s gene pool through editing technologies like Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic (CRISPR). This would be an acceptable way of facilitating the virtue of cooperation necessary for social harmony. Enhancement can also enhance individuals’ ability to be healthy as this can contribute positively to moral agency. It would be permissible if enhancement addressed ill-health, genetic defects, negative temperaments, or vices like compulsive lying that dishonour right relationships. Nonetheless, if enhancement dishonors positive communal relations, then it is indeed impermissible. The point is that there is nothing intrinsic to – or intrinsically unfriendly about – enhancement unless it is undertaken in ways that dishonor social harmony.

6 Metzian Ethics, Education and Enhancement

Within the Metzian ethical system, there are good reasons to support biotechnological enhancement, besides the failure of anti-enhancement consequentialist arguments and the compatibility between Metzian deontology and enhancement. Particularly, the fact that Metz is already committed to some form of enhancement with regard to other normative problems indicates that there are good reasons to also support biotechnological enhancement. To further this point, we will show in this section that Metz has already accepted some forms of enhancement with respect to education. It is important to note that, in his book, Metz treats education as a distinct practice from biotechnological enhancement. However, we wish to argue that there is no fundamental difference between biotechnological enhancement and education. Therefore, if Metz accepts enhancing individuals in education, he is also committed to biotechnological enhancement.

To recall, Metz opposes enhancement because it would create significant differences in abilities. This, in turn, would, according to Metz, lead to non-identification, and people would not experience the same fate, which is a requirement for sharing a way of life. Lacking identification and not sharing a way of life are a problem because they contribute to a sense of togetherness with others, which is what drives communal moral behavior. However, Metz does not oppose gaining extra skills when referring to education. ‘Nearly everyone agrees that students at a university must be taught the knowledge and skills that would make them competitive on the job market;’ (Metz 2022a, 201). Neither does Metz think that learning morality in university is wrong:

‘Whereas there is real debate amongst Western philosophers about whether universities should strive to make students morally better (…) there is little amongst African philosophers. Those working in the sub-Saharan tradition normally accept that one final end of education is the realization of personhood, where ‘personhood’ connotes good character (…) It is common to hold that the point of education is to develop wisdom, where wisdom is understood to be a mainly moral-practical trait—roughly an ability to navigate social relationships with good judgement’ (Metz 2022a, 207).

‘In the context of communal learning projects, instructors might highlight how to become more aware of implicit biases, how to identify and deal with conflicts of interest, and how to become more attuned to other people’s points of view and feelings’(Metz 2022a, 208) and ‘In addition, a university could teach students how to be cooperative within the institution and also facilitate cooperation beyond its confines. There are certain policies that, when routinely enforced by the state or otherwise adhered to, would enable people to avoid interfering with one another and would foster joint projects.’ (Metz 2022a, 209).

As it is clear from these quotes, Metz believes that improving people through education is important, to a great extent feasible and, amongst sub-Saharan African philosophers, more or less unanimous. Nonetheless, the difference is that he does not think that higher education will create dis-identification: ‘few doubt that public higher education ought to facilitate equal opportunity, which involves enabling those from lower economic classes to acquire the qualifications to make them eligible for jobs and the wealth attached to them.’ (Metz 2022a, 201).

Metz does not explicitly explain why education and enhancement are different, but we can scrutinize some possible reasons he could advance. Metz seems to think that interventions into human psychology that directly intend to engineer a person’s moral dispositions are not the same as education. Educating someone to make them more sociable and to engineer someone is not the same. There are at least three reasons why these may be different. Firstly, education requires efforts and engagement with others, which enhancement – at least biotechnological enhancement – does not. There is something valuable about those efforts because they help to form character. It does this because the character is built through experiencing difficulties and being resilient and solving them. Contrastingly, biotechnological enhancement makes everything too easy, and it is, therefore, inimical of character formation. Metz does not state this clearly but given that he attributes an important role to virtue, this could be the underlying reason for the differentiation.

With respect to this objection, one reply is that there is a misunderstanding regarding the effects of bioenhancement, at least moral bioenhancement. Bioenhancement does not eliminate efforts; it simply stimulates individuals in a certain direction. Precisely, enhancement is a small push for individuals to make the right choices. Additionally, enhancement does not only involve the use of biotechnology alone. There are traditional forms of (moral) enhancement that equally foster character. You may call these traditional forms non-biotechnological enhancement. Although these traditional means of betterment (like socialization, mentorship, training, upbringing, including education) may not be more effective than technological ones, Jona Specker and colleagues (2014), nonetheless contend that these traditional means are as old as the history of humans. Against this background, Metz is already committed to some forms of enhancement, non-bio-technological ones, given his view on education. Suppose, in Metz’s view, these traditional means of enhancement are not immoral when undertaken, even for less urgent purposes. In that case, enhancement may be undertaken for less urgent purposes and is not intrinsically immoral.

Yet, we acknowledge that the preceding does not yet imply that the caution Metz has regarding the morality of biotechnological enhancement is not warranted. Notice that Metz is concerned that this new technology will widen the gap between the enhanced and non-enhanced, and not necessarily because he believes that interventions into human psychology that directly intend to engineer a person’s moral disposition tend to be intrinsically immoral. In other words, enhancement may create a great gap between people because individuals would be too unequal. These unequal conditions are not favorable for honoring and promoting social harmony. The cases Metz is concerned about here are, for example, an enhanced individual who becomes super morally developed and another who is not so much: this, Metz believes, will create a difference between the two, undermining social harmony. Hence, it is important to clarify here that bio-technological enhancement could still be problematic even if other morally acceptable interventions like psychotherapy or Prozac produce,Footnote 2 in this case, moral enhancement as a side effect.

A second potential difference between education and biotechnological enhancement which Metz may raise is that enhancement brings about negative consequences, which education does not. Particularly, he can claim that in a non-ideal racialized world like ours, it is unlikely that these forms of enhancement would not reflect racial biases. A non-ideal look at non-moral enhancement reinforces Metz’s idea that divisiveness would result from these forms of enhancement. Although Metz does not explore it in depth and that, for him, it is a sub-category of social disharmony, it seems that the problem Metz identifies is a problem of distribution of enhancement in a non-ideal world. Due to the fact that we live in a non-ideal world where there are significant inequalities grounded on race, gender and class, as is the case with many new (expensive) technologies, those who would have the quickest access to them would likely be the scientists, the rich and the powerful, thus, exacerbating social inequalities. Take the example of race inequalities. The world today is not a post-racial one, and routinely those with power and wealth are white males. This means that if enhancement were indeed available, this would be undertaken by those already advantaged to further their privileges. The rich and powerful would likely be the ones taking advantage of enhancement technologies and becoming more intelligent, physically fit, healthier, etc., creating a greater gap and sense of divisiveness with others. This, in turn, would also likely further racial prejudice. Metz contends it is the case that people would probably not identify with others. In short, the problem that Metz sees is not so much inequality but the social disharmony potentially caused by enhancement. Note that the concern here differs slightly from the one we mentioned above. Before, the problem was that individuals would not identify with each other because they are too different. Now, instead, the issue is that the socio-economic gap will be greater with enhancement.

Regarding this problem of inequalities in a non-ideal world, note first that, as mentioned, on Metz’s account, there is nothing in the intrinsic properties of enhancement that makes it pro tanto problematic other than the potential consequences post-enhancement. This means that if there is an issue with enhancement, it is simply one of the consequences of enhancement. Indeed, the world is a non-ideal place and the concern enhancement – as is the case with any new but expensive tool – could widen inequalities ought to be taken seriously. We contend, however, that the deontological reading of the relational theory, which Metz himself offers, can usefully address the concerns around divisiveness without necessarily dooming the technology. For example, the requirement to share a way of life would imply that certain basic enhancements ought to be funded for all. You may call this a minimum threshold enhancement requirement that could ground a policy that requires individuals to enhance or strengthen their immune system, say, against coronavirus, even within non-public health emergency contexts. Additionally, suppose society is plagued by the presence of many kleptomaniacs/pathological liars and harmonious relationship is undermined because individuals are unable to trust one another. The minimum requirement could equally ground a policy that requires third parties and governments to fund enhancement, including moral ones, that grants individuals greater capacity to resist the temptation to steal; so that they are more honest, kinder, generous, and trust thrives in the society. Such minimum requirement would allow poor and low-income families to benefit from enhancement technologies and fosters harmony without necessarily dooming the technology.

Also regarding this concern, note that the issue of socio-economic differences is not exclusive to biotechnological enhancement and may apply to education. For example, the University of Cape Town (UCT) is a top South African university that many South Africans prioritize. It is often the case that companies prefer graduates of UCT, thus making it difficult for non-UCT students to enjoy a sense of togetherness with UCT students or believe that they can share the same success. However, it seems implausible to eliminate top schools and universities for the sake of sharing a way of life. As John Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice, it seems justifiable to promote those at the top, provided this will improve the situation of those at the bottom. Moreover, although Metz thinks he is not falling into the levelling-down objection, it seems this is what his arguments imply. Namely, by the distance, he is, in fact, making all worse off rather than making some better off. This argument is analogous to making every seeing person blind just to make everyone equal: just like in this case, the objection goes, Metz is willing to make everyone less capable just to make people more equal and thus able to share a way of life. Certainly, Metz is less worried about equality in itself, and more about sharing a particular way of life, but the implications of his view aid in lowering everyone down (Parfit 1997).

On top of this, the problems Metz identifies do not imply we do less – simply eschew enhancing – but do more. The key issue is a problem of inegalitarian distribution; hence, what ought to be done is not to ignore the issue and to bring in enhancement through a more egalitarian form of distribution. The most socially harmonious outcome is not to avoid enhancement but to promote enhancement with an egalitarian agenda because this is what would be the best way to promote social harmony. Problematic inequalities may be avoided if States guarantee the minimum provision for all or most to undergo certain forms and degrees of enhancement, with enhancement technologies widely and freely available for all humans. This will address significant inequalities among humans.

One other distinction that Metz may draw between enhancement and education is that there are authoritarian concerns with enhancement which do not exist with education. This enhancement technology will help form biopolitics, making individuals live according to certain norms, regulated and subjugated by their governments. We do not live in a post-racial society. Therefore, Foucault’s prediction in Society Must be Defended (2003: pp. 61f) regarding racial hierarchies may well become true, “the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage” and “[…] the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization.” Thus, the argument goes, the risk of authoritarianism with enhancement is much higher than with other practices, and, therefore, it should be avoided.

Regarding this problem of authoritarianism, the main problem with it is that it can be adapted to virtually anything. There is nothing special about biotechnological enhancement vis-à-vis other practices that may reinforce power or abuse. Education, music, art, the rule of law, etc. – like biotechnology – can all be misused as instruments of power. The mere fact that some technology or knowledge can be misused cannot be a sufficiently strong argument for not using it, as anything can be misused. What this entails is that technological developments can only take place in a free society, as any technology can be used by authoritarian regimes. This is outside our scope, but clearly, it must be a society where institutions can regulate power and there is a balance that limits power of different agents by, for example, having a strong civil society.

What’s more, it is reasonable for governments to require some degree of moral enhancement in a similar way that there is mandatory vaccination for certain kinds of diseases on the grounds of protecting public health. Equally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccination was a key condition for interaction and enrollment in many institutions (to limit infection). It seems reasonable that if we can prevent violent behaviour from certain individuals, this prevention ought to be required by governments. Restrictions of freedom are justified if these are necessary for the promotion of a greater good. For example, no-one seriously contests that traffic signs should not exist because they restrict the freedom of drivers to drive chaotically. Instead, people understand that this restriction of freedom is acceptable because of the positive social outcome it brings about (Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Metz 2021).

Nonetheless, the critic may contend that the problem is more one of degree rather than kind. More precisely, the problem with authoritarianism is that it allows to a much higher degree the risk of authoritarianism. This is because there are relevant differences between education and (moral) enhancement. Some types of enhancement – like germline gene enhancement – are irreversible, implying that enhanced traits will be passed on to future generations. Suppose scientists succeed in editing – through germline gene editing – psychopathic traits out of an individual’s gene pool (that is, if we accept that psychopathy has a genetic basis). Equally, suppose there are harmful modifications that may make a psychopath even more dangerous, though this is not intended. In that case, the new gene for this will be passed on to future generations. Yet education is not passed on to offspring in the same way that children inherit genes from their parents. Thus, the critic may rail against our view that moral enhancement ought to be impermissible because it restricts individual freedom to act immorally and, thereby, removes the value of individual choice. Evidently, it is objectionable to act on bad moral motives.

In reply, note first that we do not deny that some biotechnological enhancements are dangerous in this way. However, in broad terms, the objection exaggerates the impact of enhancement in its current form. Most of what can be done is to dispose individuals to act in a certain way. To dispose people rather than determine people is what moral enhancement tends to do; hence, the dystopian picture of people just doing what the government wants because they are enhanced is not realistic, and it is indeed too far from what biotechnological enhancement can do. In addition, it is doubtful that such a scenario is ever possible given that there are important environmental and cultural factors that influence morality as defended by different authors (Boros et al. 2020; Zhu 2023). That is, morality depends on context, and each situation may be different; it is unlikely that biotechnology can determine how individuals will act in each situation and even a minor moral improvement could have varying outcomes depending on each context (2014). That is, governments cannot realistically determine people because each context will drive people to do different things and unless computers can predict every situation, it is not possible to carry out this determinism. The point is that if Metz’s argument opposes enhancement grounded on the likely negative consequences of enhancement, then it fails because neither the current status of enhancement nor its likely development indicates that it will lead to such an authoritarian state of affairs.

To be clear, our point is not to simply compare enhancement with education. Instead, our argument is that education provides a good guide to demonstrate that Metz’s moral theory does not necessarily imply that enhancement is morally wrong. Metz is concerned with honouring and promoting social harmony and, as a condition for that, it is necessary that individuals go through certain situations that allow social harmony to flourish and virtues of character to be formed so that individuals can engage in social harmony. The analogy with education demonstrates that enhancement not only does not meaningfully impede such situations from occurring, but also it does not undermine the formation of virtues in any significant way. If we were to oppose the ways enhancement facilitates and improves moral behaviour, then we would have to also oppose education, given their high degree of similarity. This conclusion is absurd; therefore, there is no good reason, grounded on Metzian ethics, to oppose enhancement.

7 Conclusion

In this article, we have analyzed Metz’s views on biotechnological enhancement. Our core purpose in this book symposium was to evaluate Metz’s objections against moral enhancement. Metz is a deontologist but offers a consequentialist rationale to critique enhancement. In this paper for the book symposium, we replied to his consequentialist objections to enhancement by showing that he exaggerates or miscalculates the implications of enhancement. But we also went a bit further: although Metz has not offered any deontological rationale against enhancement, we probed on this possibility and demonstrated that enhancement not only is not intrinsically incompatible with enhancement, but also it coheres with Metz’s positions on other normative problems, such as education. The reader would be correct to observe that our argument only demonstrates that Metz’s objection to enhancement fails to be convincing and not that there are good reasons to support enhancement. Indeed, a comprehensive pro-enhancement thesis requires more robust justifications than we can afford in this contribution to the symposium on Metz’s Book. We defer the latter to a future article where we provide this robust justification.