Abstract
Kripke claims that certainkind terms, particularly natural kind terms,are, like names, rigid designators. However,kind terms are more complicated than names aseach is connected both to a principle ofinclusion and an extension. So, there is aquestion regarding what it is that rigidlydesignating kind terms rigidly designate. Inthis paper, I assume that there are rigidlydesignating kind terms and attempt to answerthe question as to what it is that they rigidlydesignate. I then use this analysis of rigidlydesignating kind terms to show how Kripke'sreasoning regarding the necessity of `Hesperusis Phosphorus' can be extended to statementsinvolving kind terms like `Water is H2O'and `Tigers are mammals'.
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Cordry, B.S. Necessity and Rigidly Designating Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 119, 243–264 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000030417.31730.37
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000030417.31730.37