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Notes
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackell Publishing Company, 1999), p. 21.
Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 16.
See, for example, Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtues, and Linda Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” in Virtue and Vice: Moral and Epistemic, edited by Heather Battaly (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2010).
While the early Confucians usually speak about men, I will use him and her interchangeably throughout this paper.
Scholars debate the centrality of roles to Confucian ethics. Some, such as Roger Ames (Confucian Role-Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), Henry Rosemont (Ames, Roger, and Henry Rosemont. The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical Translation of the “Xiaojing,” Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2009), Anthony Cua (Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles, and Ideals. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), and Sin yee Chan (“An Ethic of Loving: Ethical Particularism and the Engaged Perspective in Confucian Role-Ethics.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Michigan, 1993), argue that Confucian ethics is best understood in terms of roles. Others, such as Philip Ivanhoe (“The Shades of Confucius: Social Roles, Ethical Theory, and the Self.” In Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont Jr. Edited by Martha Chandler and Ronnie Littlejohn, New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008) contend that while Confucianism places significant emphasis on roles, it is still best understood as a virtue ethic. I articulate a middle position, one that argues roles are the primary moral concept, but also that virtues are intricately connected to roles. See Cheryl Cottine, “Roles, Relationships, and Chinese Ethics” (Ph.D. Dissertation. Indiana University, 2014).
We know very little about Kongzi as an historical figure, and much of what we do know comes from various stories within the Analects (Lunyu 論語), a collection of sayings and short stories about Kongzi and his disciples. Clearly an eclectic volume with numerous voices and layers, the Analects provides a vibrant picture of Confucius as master and establishes the foundation for Confucian understandings of moral development and politics. For a discussion of textual issues see Anne Cheng, “Lun Yu 論語,” in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, edited by Michael Loewe, 313–323 (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China, 1993). I quote from Edward Slingerland’s good translation of the Lunyu unless otherwise noted (Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003]). The Chinese text provided comes from the D.C. Lau ICS concordance series (2006), which is based on the Song Dynasty edition of the Chongkan Songben Lunyu zhushu. When citing the Analects I will reference chapter/page/line/passage and section (e.g. 2/3/14–15/2.8). For in-line citations I will simply refer to the chapter and section number.
Mengzi was one of only two early Chinese thinkers bequeathed a Latinized name—Kongzi or Confucius being the other. The text bearing his name, Mencius, appears to be a fairly coherent collection of stories about Mengzi’s teachings, disciples, and encounters with government officials. While it is unclear if the text was written by Mengzi himself or if it is a collection of stories by his disciples, we do know that the text underwent revision in the second century C.E. by Zhao Qi, who also wrote an extensive commentary on the text (See, Mencius, translated by Irene Bloom with an Introduction by Philip Ivanhoe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. ix–xi, for more details about the life and work of Mengzi).
I largely follow Bryan Van Norden’s translation of the text, unless otherwise noted. See Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2008). The Chinese provided comes from the D.C. Lau ICS concordance series (2006), which is based on the Song Dynasty edition of the Chongkan Songben Mengzi Zhushu. The Mengzi is comprised of seven pairs of books—each pair having a part A and a part B. Each book also has chapters. The standard way of referencing this text is to cite book/part/chapter (e.g. 3A4). I follow this citation practice for all inline citations for ease of reference. When citing the Mengzi I will reference chapter/page/line/standard reference (e.g. 3/3/20/3A4).
Xunzi lived at the end of the Warring States period, possibly surviving to see the Qin unification of China in 221 B.C.E. As one of the two primary transmitters of Confucius’s thought (the other being Mengzi), Xunzi was influential in shaping Confucianism from his time forward. While his views were eventually overshadowed by Mengzi’s interpretation of Confucian doctrine and conception of self-cultivation, Xunzi’s thought offers insightful criticisms of what he perceives as naïve understandings of human nature, and provides a complex means of understanding the relationship between past and present and between humans, nature, and the cosmos. See Aaron Stalnaker, Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006), for an excellent analysis of Xunzi’s thought.
I largely follow Eric Hutton’s translation of the text, unless otherwise noted. See 荀子 Xunzi: The Complete Text, translated by Eric Hutton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). The Chinese provided comes from the D.C. Lau ICS concordance series (2006), which is based on the Sibu Congkan edition of the text. When citing the Xunzi I will reference chapter/page/line/page of Hutton’s translation. (e.g. 3/10/6–10/19).
Philip Ivanhoe, “Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the Xunzi,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, edited by T.C. Kline III and Philip Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000), p. 244.
Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 30, emphasis in the original.
For a detailed analysis of Murdoch’s moral theory see, Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Amy Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the “Analects:” The Good Person is That (New York: Routledge, 2012).
Confucius is the primary example of a total exemplar, and his disciple Zilu is the primary example of a partial exemplar. Ibid., chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
In the Han Dynasty (ca. 145-86 B.C.E), historians used the term fa to denote a group of thinkers now known as “legalists”—theorists who insisted that laws were the best (or only) means of controlling the people and organizing the state.
Translation is my own.
For good discussions of these issues see Eric Hutton, “Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and its Implications for Virtue Ethics,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2008): 423–453; and his “Moral Reasoning in Aristotle and Xunzi,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 3 (September 2002): pp. 355–384.
The past sage kings Yao, Shun, and Yu stand as beacons—to use a Xunzian metaphor—which ought to guide present deliberations about appropriate political and moral activities. More importantly, Yao and Shun are described as possessing complete virtue and as sages who ruled benevolently. The early Confucians often refer to the ways of Yao and Shun (and less frequently Yu) when they are arguing for the correct way of governing or referring to appropriate and good governmental policies.
Translation modified from Hutton.
The “Daxue” is a chapter from the Liji, which is one of the five Confucian classics. Essentially, the Liji is a text that documents in detail the huge array of ritually appropriate behavior and practices, and was likely compiled in the Han (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.). For a more detailed discussion of the classics, see Michael Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). For a more detailed analysis of the Liji’s textual history and for an insightful discussion of various dimensions of the Liji see Michael Ing, The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Translations of passages coming from the Liji will be my own unless otherwise noted. The Chinese provided comes from the CHANT online database, which also utilizes the D.C. Lau ICS concordance series, which is based on the Chongkan Songben Liji zhushu edition of the text. When citing the Liji I will reference chapter and section of the text. (e.g. Liji, “Zhongyong,” 32.14).
Amy Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the “Analects,” p. 64.
Erin Cline, “Confucian Ethics, Public Policy, and the Nurse-Family Partnership,” Dao 11 (2012), p. 353.
Cline makes a similar observation. Ibid., pp. 338.
Translation is my own.
Translation is my own.
Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, translated by Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 14.
The five relationships at the heart of the Ru social world are the relationships between parents and children, husband and wife, older and younger siblings, rulers and ministers, and friends. See Mengzi 3A4 for this list and the virtue that he identifies as corresponding to each role-relation.
I developed this interpretation in conversation with Susan Blake and Aaron Stalnaker.
Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the “Analects,” p. 131.
Analects 7.22 reads, “When three people walk, there will always be a teacher among them. Focus on those who are good and seek to emulate them, and focus on those who are bad in order to be reminded of what needs to be changed in myself.” 三人行, 必有我師焉, 擇其善者而從之, 其不善者而改之 (7/16/19/7.22). This translation is slightly modified from Slingerland, p. 71.
Following James Legge’s translation. Legge, Li Chi: Book of Rites: An Encyclopedia of Ancient Ceremonial Usages, Religious Creeds, and Social Institutions, vol. II (New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1967), p. 87.
In 4A18 Mengzi comments that demanding goodness of one’s children can harm the relationship. He writes, “To demand goodness is the Way of friends. For fathers and sons to demand goodness is a great harm to kindness.” 責善、朋友之道也; 父子責善, 賊恩之大者 (Mengzi, 8/44/22/4B30). He makes a similar point in 4B30 arguing that, “The ancients instructed each other’s sons. Fathers and sons did not demand goodness of one another. If the one demands goodness of the other, then they will become estranged. There is nothing more inauspicious than for them to become estranged.” 古者易子而教之, 父子之間不責善。責善則離, 離則不祥莫大焉 (Mengzi, 7/39/2–3/4A18).
This text bears the name of Guan Zhong, a seventh-century B.C.E minister of the state of Qi. While likely the author of some of the text, it is unlikely he authored it all. The Guanzi is an eclectic text containing within it writings on early political and economic theory; short writings associated with the Huang-Lao school of Daoism; naturalistic and yin-yang texts; and texts that could be Confucian, to name some styles of writing represented. It is generally accepted that the text came into its present form during the time of the Jixia academy which existed at the end of the Warring States period. For a discussion of the text’s history see W. Allyn Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China: A Study and Translation Vol. 1 (Boston: Cheng & Tsui Company, 2001).
I follow W. Allyn Rickett’s translation of the text in Volume 2 of the series cited above, citing chapter and page found in Rickett. The Chinese text comes from the online text project, http://ctext.org/guanzi.
Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the “Analects,” p. 148.
See Amy Olberding for an insightful discussion of Zilu and the virtue of transparency. Ibid, chapter 6.
See Eirik Lang Harris, “The Nature of the Virtues in Light of the Early Confucian Tradition,” in Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously, edited by Kam-Por Yu, Julia Tao, and Philip Ivanhoe (New York: SUNY, 2010); Philip Ivanhoe, “The Shades of Confucius,” and Confucian Moral Self Cultivation (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000); Bryan Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).
I would like to thank Susan Blake, Sarah Dees, Diane Fruchtman, Constance Furey, Michael Ing, Richard Miller, William Smith, and Aaron Stalnaker for helpful comments on drafts of this article. An anonymous reviewer also provided helpful comments and critiques which helped make this paper stronger. I also thank the audience at the International Society for Comparative Philosophy for providing thoughtful questions and comments to an earlier version of this paper.
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Cottine, C. Role Modeling in an Early Confucian Context. J Value Inquiry 50, 797–819 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9576-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9576-3