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The free will defence and natural evil

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References

  1. The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 202–221.

  2. “The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defence”, Analysis 38 (2), 110–112.

  3. “Natural Evil and the Free Will Defence”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984), 49–56.

  4. “Moral Evil without Consequences?”, Analysis 39 (1), 58–60.

  5. “Is the Free Will Defence Irrelevant?”, Religious Studies 18, 355–364. Dilley does not object to the notion that one could not acquire a concept of evil in a world without natural evil, but rather to my presuming that Boër was proposing a world without natural evil. I offer a response to Dilley in “In Defence of Free Will Theodicy”, Religious Studies, forthcoming.

  6. “World without Evil”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984), 161–170.

  7. Causing Death and Saving Lives (London and New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 79.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Saint David's University College, University of Wales, SA48 7ED, Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales

    Michael J. Coughlan

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  1. Michael J. Coughlan
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Coughlan, M.J. The free will defence and natural evil. Int J Philos Relig 20, 93–108 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141014

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