Abstract
There seem to be two clearly-defined camps in the debate over the problem of moral expertise. On the one hand are the “Professionals”, who reject the possibility entirely, usually because of the intractable diversity of ethical beliefs. On the other hand are the “Ethicists”, who criticise the Professionals for merely stipulating science as the most appropriate paradigm for discussions of expertise. While the subject matter and methodology of good ethical thinking is certainly different from that of good clinical thinking, they argue, this is no reason for rejecting the possibility of a distinctive kind of expertise in ethics, usually based on the idea of good justification. I want to argue that both are incorrect, partly because of the reasons given by one group against the other, but more importantly because both neglect what is most distinctive about ethics: that it is personal in a very specific way, without collapsing into relativism.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
D. Brink (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics CUP Cambridge
J. Crosthwaite (1982) ArticleTitle‘Moral expertise: A Problem in the Professional Ethics of Professional Ethicists’ in Bioethics 9 IssueID5 361–379
Curran C. (1978) ‘Abortion: Contemporary Debate in Philosophical and Religious Ethics’ in E. Reich (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, Free Press.
A. Jonsen (1993) ArticleTitle‘Commentary: Scofield as Socrates’ Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 IssueID4 434–438 Occurrence Handle11643217
C. Noble (1982) ArticleTitle‘Ethics and Experts’ Hastings Center Report 12 IssueID3 8–9
Rhees R. (1999) Moral Questions, D.Z. Phillips (ed.). London: Macmillan.
G. Scofield (1993) ArticleTitle‘Ethics Consultation: the Least Dangerous Profession’ Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 IssueID4 417–426 Occurrence Handle8148998 Occurrence Handle1:STN:280:ByuC1MbgsVQ%3D
G. Scofield (1995) ArticleTitle‘Ethics Consultation: the Most Dangerous Profession: a Reply to Critics’ Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 4 IssueID2 225–225 Occurrence Handle7655675 Occurrence Handle1:STN:280:ByqA1cvktFU%3D
Shalit R. (1997) ‘When We were Philosopher Kings’. The New Republic 28 April 1997.
Suter R. (1984) Are You Moral? University Press of America.
B. Weinstein (1994) ArticleTitle‘The Possibility of Ethical Expertise’ Theoretical Medicine 15 61–75 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00999220 Occurrence Handle8059434 Occurrence Handle1:STN:280:ByuA3sjjvF0%3D
Williams B. (1981) ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in: Moral Luck. CUP, Cambridge.
P. Winch (1972a) ‘Moral Integrity’ P. Winch (Eds) Ethics and Action Routledge & Kegan Paul London
P. Winch (1972b) ‘The Universalisability of Moral Judgements’, and ‘Moral Integrity’ P. Winch (Eds) Ethics and Action Routledge & Kegan Paul London
S. Yoder (1998) ArticleTitle‘The Nature of Ethical Expertise’ Hastings Center Report 28 IssueID6 11–19 Occurrence Handle9868604 Occurrence Handle1:STN:280:DyaK1M%2FosFCqtw%3D%3D
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cowley, C. A New Rejection of Moral Expertise. Med Health Care Philos 8, 273–279 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-005-1588-x
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-005-1588-x