The Family in Greek History (review)
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The purpose of Cynthia Patterson's book is to view family structures and family interests and ideals in the historical development of the Greek polis. In her study she takes us through nineteenth-century scholarship, the worlds of Homer and Hesiod, and the societies of Sparta, Gortyn, and Athens as well.
In chapter 1, "The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm of Greek Family History," she explores how Bachofen, Fustel de Coulanges, Henry Maine, Louis Morgan, and Friedrich Engels theorized that matriarchy gave way to patriarchy, patrilineality, and agnation. In this context monogamy was the instrument of the patriarchal state, which subjugated women and forced them into the private sphere of the household. This paradigm saw its way into the studies of Grote, whose political history overlooked the contributions of women in Greece; and into those of Mahaffy, who emphasized the social inferiority of women. It is a paradigm that has also influenced, in the twentieth century, the seminal studies on the Greek family by Lacey and Pomeroy. Needless to say, Patterson attempts to dispel this paradigm.
In chapter 2, "The Family in Homer and Hesiod," she emphasizes that there is no evidence of patrilineal clans in Homeric society. Public interest, rather, centered on marriage and the oikos, the individual household. In Hesiod the corporate clan was not heir to a man's possessions, and there is little attention given to lineage and ancestors.
In chapter 3, "Early Greek Law and the Family," Patterson looks at early law in Sparta, Gortyn, and Athens. For Sparta, she concludes that Spartan marriages [End Page 153] were the result of traditional household strategy, that is, property devolving to legitimate children. For Gortyn, the household was the center of social and economic order. There is no evidence of evolution from a clan-based society to one of private property. For pre-Solonian Athens, again there is no evidence of clans, while the extended kin group of Athens, the anchisteia, was nonagnatic. Solon restricted the bastard, or nothos, from the household, a move which brought the oikos into clearer focus. Patterson ends her discussion by stating that the public interest in securing a husband for an heiress was articulated through the anchisteia.
In chapter 4, "Marriage and Adultery in Democratic Athens," she turns her attention to how the polis was interested in the effects of adultery, or moicheia, on the household. She insists that although there was no formal definition of marriage, and although there were no certificates or registers, marriage was not vague because it was recognized through communally witnessed rituals. If marriage can be seen to have been a social process, we may dispel the widespread notion that it was vague. (On the other hand, I would counter, if we view marriage as social process, then during that process witnesses die or are called liars; marriage can come under attack.) Adultery received the public interest, she continues, because it was a violation of the women of the household--here clearly supporting the traditional definition of moicheia as pertaining to a man's kinswomen, not just his wife. This interconnection between household and polis is reflected by Plato's Laws, in which the state tries to reconcile its interest in the household with its concern for unruly passions.
With chapter 5, "Adultery Onstage and in Court," Patterson turns her attention to certain tragedies, comedies, and orations. By focusing on the Oresteia she concludes that Clytemnestra's adultery was a crime against the household. In Sophocles' Electra, the playwright is pessimistic as to whether the killing of Aegisthus can restore the household, while Euripides, in his Electra, points out how adultery can contaminate the next generation. In his comedies Aristophanes feels that punishment against adultery is justified. In the orations the moichos, such as Alcibiades, Agoratus, or Timarchus, is viewed as having sinned against the polis. With Aristotle, however, we find that the philosopher has less interest in the public consequences of adultery.
Aristotle's separation of household from politics is taken up again in chapter 6, "Public and...
