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Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two-person games

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References

  • Crawford, Vincent P.: 1982, ‘Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk, and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information’, Review of Economic Studies 49, 69–82.

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  • Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern: 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Wiley, New York.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Economics, University of California, 92093, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

    Vincent P. Crawford & Dennis E. Smallwood

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  1. Vincent P. Crawford
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  2. Dennis E. Smallwood
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Crawford, V.P., Smallwood, D.E. Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two-person games. Theor Decis 16, 225–232 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134647

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