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Liberalism and individual preferences

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References

  1. Arrow, K. J.: Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd ed. (Wiley, New York, 1963).

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  3. Sen, A. K.: ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970), 152–7.

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  4. Suzumura, K.: ‘On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims’, Review of Economic Studies 45 (1978), 329–42.

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  1. University of Kent at Canterbury, Kent, England

    John Craven

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  1. John Craven
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Craven, J. Liberalism and individual preferences. Theor Decis 14, 351–360 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126173

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126173

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