Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

What About Natural Law in Hobbes? Dialogue Between the Natural Law and the Legal Positivist Hypothesis

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Jus Cogens Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Hobbes’ natural law theory has been discussed far and wide. Some interpreters ended up defining Hobbes as a natural law theorist, some others as a legal positivist. In this paper, I analyse the work of two important scholars, Howard Warrender and Norberto Bobbio, whose insights have stimulated an interesting debate about Hobbes’ political theory. Warrender gives God a central function in Hobbes’ political science. On his account, God is a lawmaker, his will is the source of a universal obligation, and civil order is necessary to give force to the natural law that is the expression of divine will. In Bobbio’s interpretation, Hobbes is the first legal positivist of Modern age, as natural law is only ever given content by the sovereign’s will. Finally, I ask which is natural law and God’s function in Hobbes’ political thought, questioning some contemporary scholars in order to clarify Hobbes’ modernity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Data Availability

Not applicable.

Notes

  1. Physical obligation, it seems to us, is what Hobbes describes in De Cive, XV, 7: “But there are two Species of naturall obligation, one when liberty is taken away by corporall impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe obey the common Lawes of their Creation […]” (Hobbes 1987, p. 187).

  2. Into this vein, we find: Hood 1964; Martinich 1992. Less recently, in a 1938 article, Alfred E. Taylor approaches a similar perspective and goes so far as to state that Hobbes’ work takes a deontological perspective that anticipates some Kantian theses. Hobbes distinguishes between the justice of actions and the justice of persons, and this distinction mirrors, according to Taylor, the Kantian distinction between action performed in simple accord with the law and action that proceeds from the law. Hobbes, however, would reduce the law that determines the action of the virtuous man to the only law that prescribes the fulfilment of a duly made promise. Despite this difference and despite Kant introducing the universalisation of the maxim, Kant and Hobbes agree on the imperative of the moral law, the law of right reason (Taylor 1938, 408–410). Taylor insists that the moral obligation to obey the law of nature precedes the institution of the civil sovereign and that therefore natural laws also oblige to the state of nature. Warrender also places S.P. Lamprecht (1940) in this vein: he distinguishes the nominalistic and therefore legalistic character of post-Hobbesian philosophy from what Hobbes actually advocated.

  3. Sabine 1964; Polin 1953; Mintz 1962; Polin 1981.

  4. Cfr. Hobbes 1928, I, XV, 13, 61; Hobbes 1987, II,16, 58.

  5. Such as covenants against the law, both of nature (Hobbes 1946, XIV, 23) and civil law, non-consensual covenants (Hobbes 1946, XIV, 22–23), covenants that commit to something impossible (Hobbes 1946, XIV, 24–25, Hobbes 1987, XVI, 18) covenants that compel the renunciation of the right of self-preservation (Hobbes 1946, XIV, 29), covenants that impose obligations on strangers (Hobbes 1928, II, III, 7), covenants that impose obligations in respect of things already involved in other covenants (Hobbes 1946, XIV, 28, Hobbes 1987, II, 17).

  6. Cf. Hobbes 1946, XIV, 18; Hobbes 1987, II, 11; XIII, 7; Hobbes 1928, I, XV, 10.

  7. Hobbes and Locke share an empirically-based account of the human condition but arrive at different conclusions (Sokolowski 2011, 103 ff).

  8. For this reason, Macpherson has described Hobbes’ state of nature as representing a “possessive” and therefore conflictual market society: an embryonic form of market society compared to the mature one represented in Locke’s natural society as an association of owners bound by mutual interests (Macpherson 1962).

  9. For a problematic account of vanity in Hobbes, cf. Strauss 1996, 13–15.

  10. War is no longer seen as the instrument for reacting to the infringement of the natural and divine order, as in pre-modern times, but as the normal condition in relation to which all human relations must be interpreted (cf. Biral 1999, 91).

  11. Cf. Hobbes 1987, IV, 9. This is a perspective that brings Hobbes very close to Carl Schmitt’s interpretation (Schmitt 1996).

  12. Riley highlights that in Hobbes sovereign power legitimacy is based on consent, but “it is difficult to see how consent could be morally binding or how authority could be granted if the will is not a moral agency or faculty”—since Hobbes speaks of will as an appetite, the last one in deliberation (Riley 1982, 25). In Riley interpretation, Hobbes does not distinguish between a physiological-psychological will and a moral or elective will. His definition of willing does not always seem to accord with some of his most relevant sentences about promises, duties, covenants, obligations, and the like arising from consent.

  13. Strauss and Voegelin point out that Hobbes reduced the summum bonum of politics and the finis ultimus of philosophy from the traditional telos (God and theoretical contemplation), to the will to avoid the summum malum (cf. Strauss 1996, 15–16; Voegelin 1987, 180–182).

  14. “True and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood” (Hobbes 1946, IV, 11, 21).

  15. Cf. Bobbio 2009, 65–67. Biral has a different opinion: “It would be erroneous to claim that utility, an element that varies from man to man and also changes ceaselessly for a single man, is the foundation of the laws of nature; they actually refer for their origin to the knowledge finally attained of the cause of the war of each against all” (Biral 1999, 95).

  16. According to Schmitt, the universal and representative rationality of the state institution cannot be deduced from the state of nature and is a Blitz rather than a passage (Schmitt 1996, 31).

  17. Bobbio and Strauss (1996) agree that Hobbes uses the notions of the earlier natural law theory even though he strategically reverses their meaning.

  18. Hobbes, De Cive, XIV, 23.

  19. Unlike Locke. Cf. Harrison 2003, 190–218.

  20. Carlo Galli (2009), on the other hand, argues that the political order that Hobbes inaugurates is founded only on its own absolute contingency. About Selbstbehauptung, cf. Blumenberg 1985.

References

  • Alfieri L (2021) L’ombra della sovranità. Da Hobbes a Canetti e ritorno. Treccani, Roma

  • Barry B (1968) Warrender and His Critics. Philosophy 164:117–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biral A (1999) Hobbes: la società senza governo. In: Biral A, Storia e critica della filosofia moderna. FrancoAngeli, Milano, pp. 83–142

  • Blumenberg H (1985) The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. The MIT Press, Cambrigde

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio N (1993) Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. The University of Chicago, Chicago-London

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio N (2009) Il giusnaturalismo moderno. Giappichelli, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio N (2011) Giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico. Laterza, Roma-Bari

  • Cooper KW (2022) Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame

    Google Scholar 

  • Galli C (2009) Ordine e contingenza. Linee di Lettura del “Leviatano”. In: Galli C, Contingenza e necessità nella ragione politica moderna. Laterza, Roma-Bari, pp. 38–71

  • Goldsmith MM (2007) Hobbes on Law. In: Springborg P (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridre, pp 274–304

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampton J (1986) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison TR (2003) Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion’s Masterpiece. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart HLA (1961) The Concept of Law. Clarendon, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes T (1928) The Elements of Law Natural & Politic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes T (1946) Leviathan. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes T (1987) De Cive. The English version. Claredon, Oxford

  • Hood FC (1964) The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kavka GS (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1945) General Theory of Law and State. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamprecht SP (1940) Hobbes and Hobbism. Am Polit Sci Rev XXXIV:31–53

  • Lloyd SA (1992) Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s “Leviathan”: the Power of Mind over Matter. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd SA (2009) Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cases in the Law of Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Locke J (1980) Second Treatise of Government. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis-Cambridge

  • Macpherson CB (1962) Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, Hobbes to Locke

  • Magri T (1976) review of Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Giornale Critico Della Filosofia Italiana LV 1:150

  • Martinich A (1992) The Two Gods of Leviathan. Religion and Politics in Thomas Hobbes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Mintz SI (1962) The Hunting of Leviathan. Seventeenth Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Murphy MC (1995) Was Hobbes a Legal Positivist? Ethics 105(4):846–873

  • Oakeshott M (1975) Hobbes and Civil Association. Blackwell, Oxford

  • Oakeshott M (1946) Introduction. In: Hobbes T, Leviathan. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

  • Polin R (1953) Politique et philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes. Puf, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Polin R (1981) Hobbes, Dieu et les hommes. Puf, Paris

  • Riley P (1982) Will and Political Legitimacy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London

  • Sabine GH (1964) A History of Political Theory. Holt, New York

  • Schino AL (1987) Tendenze della letteratura hobbesiana di lingua inglese degli ultimi venticinque anni. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica XVII: 159–198

  • Schmitt C (1996) The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Greenwood Press, Westport-London

  • Sokolowski AZ (2011) Metaphysical Problems, Political Solutions. Lexington Books, Lahnahm-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth

  • Stephen L (1904) Hobbes. Macmillan & Co., London

    Google Scholar 

  • Strauss L (1996) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London

  • Taylor AE (1938) The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes. Philosophy XIII: 406–424

  • Tönnies F (19253) Thomas Hobbes. Leben und Lehre. Frommann, Stuttgart

  • Voegelin E (1987) The New Science of Politics. The University of Chicago, Chicago-London

  • Warrender H (1957) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. His Theory of Obligation. Clarendon Press, Oxford

  • Watkins J (1973) Hobbes’s System of Ideas. Gower, London

  • Zagorin P (2009) Hobbes and the Law of Nature. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Letters, Philosophy, Communication, Università Degli Studi Di Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy

    Carlo Crosato

Authors
  1. Carlo Crosato
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Contributions

Carlo Crosato is the sole author of this paper.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Carlo Crosato.

Ethics declarations

Ethical Approval

Not applicable.

Informed Consent

Not applicable.

Competing Interests

The author declares no competing interests.

Research Involving Human Participants and/or Animals

Not applicable.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Crosato, C. What About Natural Law in Hobbes? Dialogue Between the Natural Law and the Legal Positivist Hypothesis. Jus Cogens 5, 195–227 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-023-00085-w

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-023-00085-w

Keywords

Search

Navigation