Skip to main content
Log in

Appearances can be deceiving

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Conclusion

I began by claiming that I simply wanted to undermine the plausibility of the appeal to appearances in matters of perceptual belief. Most of the arguments I have offered, however, have been more strongly stated, viz., I have apparently tried to eliminate them rather than simply render them less credible. But the notion of appearances is deeply entrenched, so much so that simply undermining their credibility may require overstating the case somewhat. The central theme of the above arguments is that appealing to appearances misleads us. The appeal misleads us into giving the wrong sorts of explanation, both with respect to the psychology of perceptual belief formation and the justification of perceptual beliefs. In short, appearances can be deceiving. And they probably are.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

A distant (if now unrecognizable) ancestor of this paper was first read at the 12th Annual Louisiana Philosophy Convention in October, 1988. Steve Fuller also offered comments on an intermediate version. I am especially grateful to Norton Nelkin who has read and commented on several versions. He should not be held complicit, however.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Crumley, J.S. Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64, 233–251 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365000

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365000

Keywords

Navigation