Conclusion
I began by claiming that I simply wanted to undermine the plausibility of the appeal to appearances in matters of perceptual belief. Most of the arguments I have offered, however, have been more strongly stated, viz., I have apparently tried to eliminate them rather than simply render them less credible. But the notion of appearances is deeply entrenched, so much so that simply undermining their credibility may require overstating the case somewhat. The central theme of the above arguments is that appealing to appearances misleads us. The appeal misleads us into giving the wrong sorts of explanation, both with respect to the psychology of perceptual belief formation and the justification of perceptual beliefs. In short, appearances can be deceiving. And they probably are.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
A distant (if now unrecognizable) ancestor of this paper was first read at the 12th Annual Louisiana Philosophy Convention in October, 1988. Steve Fuller also offered comments on an intermediate version. I am especially grateful to Norton Nelkin who has read and commented on several versions. He should not be held complicit, however.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Crumley, J.S. Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64, 233–251 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365000
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365000