1 Introduction

We believe it is time to review the interpretation of Deleuzian virtuality most commonly found in the philosophy of information and debates on the digital revolution, and precisely this is the aim of this paper. By analysing the virtuality concept outlined in The Actual and the Virtual, Deleuze’s probably most important work on the subject, we will attempt to answer the question if his idea of virtuality can be applied in the philosophy of information—among others to analyse virtual worlds as understood by computer scientists, computer users and philosophers of informatics (DeLanda, 2013).

In the most widespread version of Deleuzian virtuality, the concept itself as well as the accompanying idea of actuality are ontological. This has been propounded by, among others, Manuel DeLanda in his monograph Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (DeLanda, 2013); where he ascribes to Deleuze an anti-essentialistic and realistic ontology. DeLanda also notes that Deleuze borrowed the ontological distinction into actual and virtual from Henri Bergson. DeLanda refers to (Deleuze, 1991, pp. 96–97). See also (Deleuze, 2004, pp. 22–51; Deleuze & Loban, 2007). Slavoj Žižek also puts the ontological interpretation into the foreground, which can raise doubts, as, in Deleuze’s footsteps, he starts out from virtuality in physics. Also, his presentation is too simplified. Žižek claims that the ontological difference between the actual and virtual is analogous to the relation between a particle and the interaction between particles; this, however, does not offer proper insight into the functions and properties of virtual particles according to quantum field theory. Neither does Žižek present a correct picture of wave-particle duality, which in physics does not have to be related to virtuality, which in turn does not necessarily reduce to this dualism, as the Slovenian philosopher appears to believe. Contrary to physical theory, Žižek also seems to be saying that physical interactions and physical particles have different existence modes (Žižek, 2012, p. 4). This could be considered true only for a specific and philosophically rejected understanding of the term “mode of existence.” However, we can put all doubts about his reflections on virtual particles aside, as most important from our vantage point is that Žižek focuses on the ontological problem of virtuality.

It is a truism to say that Deleuze’s philosophy is difficult to interpret, and can even be viewed as ambiguous—in part due to its programmatic rejection of traditional philosophical concepts, which Deleuze considered to be outdated and inefficient. In effect, he set out to rebuild philosophy on completely new conceptual foundations. However, his unique use of concepts and abbreviated narrative make it difficult to single out one interpretation of his virtuality theory. Moreover, in his reflections on virtuality Deleuze makes frequent reference to contemporary advanced physics and mathematicsFootnote 1 (cf. Žižek, 2012, p. 4) which is probably why his virtuality conception is seen as naturally suited to explain virtuality in the IT world.

Those commentators and researchers who feel inspired by Deleuze’s virtuality theory in their own work [for example cf. Gaffney (2010), Lévy (1998), Rae (2014), Smith (2009)] chiefly focus on a short, very tight-knit text entitled The Actual and the Virtual, the fifth chapter of his book Dialogues (Deleuze, 2002). We are now returning to it—despite the fact that, in view of its omnipresence in literature, one can wonder if the Deleuzian virtuality conception has anything new to reveal. Our considerations do not embrace the Deleuzian virtuality comprehensively. As an anonymous reviewer of our paper rightly states: “Deleuze addresses the concept of the virtual (…) as early as the text on Bergsonism, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, returning to it again in his writings on cinema in the mid-1980s. (…) The concept of ‘virtual;’ in fact, runs through all of Deleuze's work.” However, an analysis of such an extensive subject goes beyond the scope of any standard journal paper. Besides in his certain texts Deleuze treats the problem of the virtual rather incidentally. In Difference and Repetition he defines the virtual only in Chapter 4 as the characteristic state of Ideas—taking the (epistemological) notion of Ideas from Immanuel Kant—and claims that it “possesses a full reality by itself,” “being opposed to the actual and not real” (Deleuze, 1994). Virtual objects presented in The Actual and the Virtual are different from those referred to in Difference and Repetition, but both they are epistemic and have the same mode of existence. Therefore we limit mainly to one Deleuze’s text– mostly referred to in philosophy of informatics and being representative—we believe—for all his works on virtuality.

We will strive to show that The Actual and the Virtual postulates an epistemological conception of virtuality, which, in more precise terms, is a theory of perception coupled with memory, a rather non-standards hypothesis among the many perception theories that have come down to us over history. Although the term “sense perception” does not appear in the text (only “perception” does), we go out from the assumption that this is what Deleuze is investigating, perhaps with the aim of extending the concept of perception to include memory. Deleuze’s theory is idealistic, and has related forerunners in modern epistemology—although it differs from them all significantly in several important aspects. Deleuze uses a rather original set of concepts, the most frequent ones being “virtual” and “actual,” appears to stand under the strong influence of Henri Bergson, and makes no reference to other epistemological traditions. He does not define the nature of the results of perception, and makes no mention at all of the linguistic (textual) expression of such results [cf. Ansell-Pearson (2005), Bluemink (2020), Braga (2019), Deleuze (1994), Lundy (2017)].

We analyse Deleuze’s views on virtuality from a possibly neutral position, especially avoiding any postmodernist entanglements (insofar as this is possible). Most importantly, we do not ask to what degree the French thinker’s reflections and conclusions agree with other postmodernist theories, either his own or those developed by others. Though at times hardly admissible, this neutral stance is methodically intentional, because it enables good insight into the general character of Deleuze’s theory. By separating it from postmodern hermetism, we are able to compare it with other virtuality conceptions. Freed from its postmodernist baggage, it becomes applicable in a variety of theoretical contexts—and this is what researchers do when they use it to examine the essence of computer-generated virtual objects and virtual reality.

2 Virtuality and the Multiplicities Theory

Deleuze ranks virtuality highly, linking it directly with the essence of philosophy, which he understands as a theory of multiplicities, each one consisting of actual and virtual elements (Buchanan, 2010; Kalaga, 2003). However, he does not mean philosophy should occupy itself with wholes that embrace entire spheres of reality in the Hegelian spirit; although in his view multiplicity is a system, it is not a whole. Deleuze explains the multiplicities idea with the help of mathematical concepts and theory:

An Idea [of multiplicity—MC, MM] is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity. Colour—or rather, the Idea of colour—is a three-dimensional multiplicity. By dimensions, we mean the variables or coordinates upon which a phenomenon depends; by continuity, we mean the set of relations between changes in these variables (…) by definition, we mean the elements reciprocally determined by these relations, elements which cannot change unless the multiplicity changes its order and its metric [quoted after DeLanda, from Deleuze (1994, p. 182)].

Manuel DeLanda states:

Its formal definition [of multiplicity—MC, MM] is highly technical, including elements from several different branches of mathematics: differential geometry, group theory and dynamical systems theory (DeLanda, 2013, p. 1).

The idea of multiplicity is related to the mathematical idea of manifold. In very simple terms, manifold is the generalisation of the concepts of curve and surface, and its simplest definition “A manifold is a topological space that is locally Euclidean” (Weisstein, 2016).

Deleuze says the exploration of multiplicities is the goal of philosophy, but makes no mention at all of what has been philosophy’s goal since Ionic times, and through various conceptions and theories over the ages right up to Edmund Husserl: to penetrate through these multiplicities (regardless of how complex the mathematical terms we use to explain them with are) and reach essences, and to find the few fundamental elements in the structure of the multiplicities. The main goal of, say, Husserl’s philosophy is the successive removal of reality’s outer layers in a process of phenomenological reduction, and the resulting disclosure of the essence of things. The most postulated and pursued goal of philosophy is to gain insight into the ground of reality [cf. e.g. Husserl (1982)].

Deleuze entrusts philosophy with the radically anti-fundamentalistic task of reversing Platonism. As he states in Logic of Sense: “To reverse Platonism” consists of “first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities” (DeLanda, 2013, p. 37; Deleuze, 2015, p. 53). Whereby he does not say which ontic (metaphysical) type of multiplicities are to be philosophy’s pursuit, nor does he state clearly whether they belong to the ontic sphere as a conglomerate of beings, or are products of the human consciousness, and therefore subjective constructs resulting from the activity of the subject (including its cognitive activity) and enclosed in the subject’s immanent sphere. As we said, DeLanda considers Deleuze’s ontology to be realistic; in a sense every ontology is, as ontology postulates the existence of objects which it qualifies as elements of reality. However, he fails to explain how this ontology enables ideal epistemic objects like virtual images and actual objects to form into what we regard as reality. Neither does he mention philosophy in the context of language—which would be an obvious anti-metaphysical (hence anti-ontological) declaration for a postmodernist.

Deleuze claims that each of the multiplicities that form the subject of philosophy consists of actual and virtual elements and every object is a combination of one of each. Here, virtuality is one of the two basic categories for examining multiplicities, the main goal of philosophy as such, and Deleuze also sees it as one of the main philosophical categories that enable insight into reality (however understood) (Hulse, 2008; Mullarkey, 2004): thus, virtuality is a basic and necessary attribute of all that exists, the material from which reality is created.

3 Perception Associated with Memory

After this general declaration about the goal of philosophy and the fundamental role of virtual and actual objects in its pursuit, Deleuze turns to a much narrower problem—perception—and does not return to the goals and tasks of philosophy in the here-analysed text. However, virtual and actual objects remain a central issue—only now as objects that are present and primary in perception associated with memory.

In his search for the nature of perception, Deleuze makes use of the concept of virtuality in physics, which he perhaps sees as a suggestion, a heuristic aid, a pointer, an inspiration, or an analogy—but the concept itself, the protoplast of the postmodern approach to virtuality, is only superficially discussed in The Actual and the Virtual.

In the simplest terms, virtual particles in physics are objects with a life-span so short that they cannot be detected experimentally, and therefore exist only in physical models and theories. In effect, some hold them for existing but essentially unobservable theoretical objects which belong to nature’s “furnishings,” and others for a theoretical, fictitious construct used in physical models for explanatory purposes. Thus, there are two views on the existence status of virtual particles: in one, they exist like other material objects in nature; in the other, they are a fiction that is useful for explanation. In the latter case they acquire a special ontic status—between existence and non-existence (they exist “because of” observable objects)—or a special ontic-epistemic one (their cognition is so unique that it is essentially impossible to say if they exist or not). However this may be, the mode of their existence is unclear to physicists just as it is to philosophers.

Deleuze’s characteristic of virtual particles is sparse—one can only assume that he focuses only on those of their properties that he deems important for his perception theory. His main focus is on their extremely short lifetime. In the footsteps of physicists, he defines virtual particles as particles whose emission, absorption, emergence and dissolution are momentary, lasting for a shorter period of time than is imaginable, and which are subject to the uncertainty principle (Deleuze, 2002, p. 148).He says that virtual images surround an actual object, die, and new virtual images are created—in his own words, clouds of virtual images create a “virtual cosmos” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 148). In the book’s footnote 9 he states that it is optics that takes the actual object and virtual image as the starting-point and shows under what conditions the actual object becomes virtual and the virtual image actual. And this is all he has to say about virtuality in physics (Deleuze, 2002, p. 158)—without any reference to related literature. One can, therefore, assume that this virtuality is a very broad matrix, an idea he bases upon loosely and which he transplants to the sphere of immanence.

Deleuze formulates his concept of virtuality together with a concept of the actual object: for him that what is virtual in inseverably linked to that what is actual. Virtual images and actual objects are present in perception and memory as ideal objects existing only in the immanent sphere (which Deleuze understands in a unique way: he does not relate it explicitly with the cognitive subject). Thus, in passing from the protoplast of virtuality—the concept of the virtual particle—to virtual objects present in perception, Deleuze passes from the physical object to the ideal object located in the immanence sphere. What further complicates matters is that, as we said earlier, the realistic ontological interpretation of virtuality in physics is not the only one as it is also sometimes considered a theoretical fiction (Jaeger, 2019).

Another shortcoming of Deleuze’s explication of perception concerns the terms “virtual image” and “virtual object”, which are not sufficiently distinguished. In effect, he identifies virtual images with objects created in perceptions associated with memory, and even calls memories virtual images:

It is the dramatic identity of their dynamics that makes a perception resemble a particle: an actual perception surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images, distributed on increasingly remote, increasingly large, moving circuits, which both make and unmake each other. These are memories of different sorts, but they are still called virtual images in that their speed or brevity subjects them too to a principle of the unconsciousness (Deleuze, 2002, pp. 148–149).

There is no ontic or epistemic difference between an actual object and virtual images (although the latter is less certain despite Deleuze’s assurances), nor any definite boundary between them:

The plane of immanence includes both the virtual and its actualization simultaneously, without there being assignable limit between the two (Deleuze, 2002, p. 149).

The immanence plane contains both that what is virtual and its actualisations. Here, virtual and actual objects do not have different existence modes, as they do in, for instance, Aristotle’s theory.Footnote 2 One could say that the actual (the object of perception) and the virtual (images of the object of perception contained in memory) have the same mode of existence—both are ideal and subjective. This qualification is, however, somewhat doubtful, as interpretations of Deleuze’s conclusions in traditional philosophical terminology are uncertain, and this also concerns subjectivity. Indeed, in evident opposition to the transcendental tradition, Deleuze makes no mention of the individual subject, although he does speak about unconsciousness, memory and perception—which, it would seem, are powers and instances typical for individual subjectivity.

In the immanence plane the actual object dissolves into a multiplicity of constantly emerging and disappearing virtual images, which elude all conscious reception because of the brevity of their existence.Footnote 3 As successive virtual images disintegrate and new ones appear, the actual object is surrounded by more and more different images—“flashes,” momentary depictions of memory that do not only, as in traditional perception theory, constitute the object of perception, but are also created by it. There is also movement in the opposite direction, when the virtual images approach the actual object (which, as the constituted object of perception, has its virtual equivalents in the memory). The virtual images are not very different from the actual object. Memory does not produce one stable image after the act of perception, but virtual images which appear at the same time the act of perception is taking place: “Memory is a virtual image contemporary with the actual object, its double, its ‘mirror image’” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 150). Thus, the actual (the constituted object of perception) coexists with the virtual (Deleuze, 2002, p. 150).

Virtual images are objects in the unconsciousness, a set of pictures that change over time and constitute the actual object: “… all the planes merge into one following the path which leads to the actual” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 150). This idea is close to the idea that the object is constituted in the subject’s consciousness from sensations, which appears in David Hume’s perception theory, according to which the object of perception is a bundle of impressions, as well as in other perception conceptions rooted in idealism and indirect realism. According to Deleuze the actual object is also constituted by virtual images, which are in turn constituted by the actual object. Thus, the constitution of perception objects (actual and virtual) is in this case bidirectional, a feedback loop.

Thus Deleuze formulates a perception theory that has predecessors in modern and contemporary epistemology. These earlier theories postulate sensual data, impressions and mental representations (physiological, created by the stimulation of the subject’s brain, or immaterial, mental) formed in the process of perception as the pre-linguistic—or, more generally, non-linguistic—results of perception. For Deleuze the actual object is analogous to the mentioned objects said to be created by perception in its diverse variants. Perception theories differ in their inquiry methods and conceptual apparatus, but none of those mentioned here, nor any existing today have used or use the concepts of virtuality and actuality—except Bergson’s. Deleuze, therefore, is not the pioneer of the virtuality conception (Esposito, 2007; Gray, 2013; Skagestad, 1998);Footnote 4 in modern-day philosophy, and took the idea to explain perception with the help of virtuality from none other than Bergson—although it must be said that both philosophers are rather distant from the mainstream approach to perception.Footnote 5

The existing perception theories, both idealistic and intermediately realistic, differ in the conceptual apparatus and terminology they use to describe the object that is constituted by the subject in perception, and one theory’s terminology and concepts are difficult, if not impossible, to translate into another’s. For example, the sensual data conception does not correspond directly to the concept of a virtual object or image in perception, or cognitivism’s concept of mental representation—all are too embedded in their respective theories.

4 The Uniqueness of Deleuze’s Perception Theory

Deleuze’s theory of perception differs from other modern-era and contemporary perception conceptions in several ways. It has a broader scope, because it embraces memory. Deleuze maintains that perceptions are inseverably bound to acts of memory, which Eliot Ross Albert, who translated the here-discussed text, explains in Bergson’s words as the “moment when the recollection (…) is capable of blending so well with the present perception that we cannot say where perception ends or where memory begins.”Footnote 6 Deleuze also refers to Bergson, as it is there that he finds the bond between perception and memory. The idea of perception he took over from Bergson says that memory is to perception what a mirror image is to the mirrored object. Bergson also says—and Deleuze accepts—that the object can be both touched and seen; it can act on us, and we can also act on it; it carries the promise of possible actions, and in this sense is actual.Footnote 7

Acts of perception occur so rapidly and are so brief, that they take place unconsciously. One can say that they have no time to penetrate to consciousness, because they disappear momentarily. Because of their volatility, their momentary formation and disappearance, Deleuze feels justified in seeing them as related the virtual particles described in quantum field theory. However, if acts of perception were to take place only unconsciously, this would run against our common knowledge about perception; there is no doubt that humans are conscious of their perceptions.

Deleuze does not address the problem of the transition of perception acts from unconsciousness to consciousness. One can assume that the term “unconsciousness” which appears once at the very end of the first paragraph of the here-discussed text found its way there contingently and is not one of its central ideas. What is a central idea, and present in several places in the text—as well as in other writings by Deleuze—is the conception of the immanence plane, i.e. immanence as such. If Deleuze relates his concept of immanence to its origin in transcendental philosophy, then—one can claim—it embraces consciousness. However, this is only a presumption, Deleuze himself never said so explicitly.

The Deleuzian conception of perception also differs from other philosophical perception theories in that it multiplies objects created in perception. Deleuze claims that the actual object is linked not to one virtual image, but streams of such images aligned in circuits, a concept he borrows from Bergson (Deleuze, 2002, p. 158, footnotes 8, 9). Actual objects emit and absorb virtual images, which are located in varying proximity to them, correspond with them and are probably copies—not necessarily faithful ones—of the object of perception that is constituting itself. The actual object is surrounded by a changing cloud of virtual images, whose emission, absorption, emergence and destruction takes place within a shorter time span than any the subject is able to imagine or grasp. In result, the actual object dissolves, changing in the immanence plane into a volatile cloud of virtual images, objects created in the unconscious memory. The subject is unable to perceive virtual images consciously owing to the short lifetime.

Dissolving virtual images renew themselves by emitting other, higher-ranking virtual images. They all form a continuous stream, and it is only a certain singularity that can dissect them into objects (Deleuze, 2002, p. 149). This singularity can be the human subject, who cuts up clouds of virtual images naturally aligned into a continuous stream of memories, or the forms in which the results of perception are presented.

Virtual images created in perceptions as images of the actual object’s memory act on the actual object. Virtual images function as subjects who actualise, or constitute, actual objects:

The actual is the complement or the product, the object of actualization, which has nothing but the virtual as its subject. Actualization belongs to the virtual (Deleuze, 2002, p. 149).

There is correspondence between actual objects and virtual images, they are inseverably bound to each other. This way, virtual images play the leading role in the constitution of the actual objects that are the objects of perception. The process of perception rests on, and is associated with, the process of memory.

According to Deleuze's view, perception creates not one (as postulated in most perception theories) but many of its objects, which change, disappear and produce others under the influence of a changing cloud of virtual images. These images are formed in perception, but are not its objects—actual objects are. The object of perception (the actual object) is not a material object in nature, but an object in the immanence plane. Deleuze says its images in vibrating memory—virtual images—act on it and transform it, form it in the process of its constitution. Therefore, there is no single object of perception, but a stream of objects constituted by a changing cloud of virtual images. The multiple constitution of the object of perception distinguishes the Deleuzian conception from other idealistic and realistic (within intermediate realism) perception theories. What it is not unique in is the bi-directional construction of the object of perception, i.e. the mutual influence on one another of the actual object and the virtual images that surround it.

Deleuze’s perception theory is idealistic, but this is an untypical idealism which marginalises—and even strives to eradicate—the participation of the cognitive subject. Whereas in other idealistic theories it is precisely the cognitive subject who is the main category, carries out acts of cognition and formulates perceptual knowledge. Deleuze appears to be striving towards a subjectless idealism, in which acts of perception are free of subjective conditionings, and therefore, in a sense, objective. If that is indeed his aim, then it is a rather doubtful one due to his introduction of the immanence plane, which is, after all, purely subjective (at least in the commonly accepted meanings of the term). It is ultimately uncertain whether Deleuze really wants to banish the cognitive subject—he seems to assume its existence implicitly by resorting to the immanence plane, in which he places both the actual object and virtual images, and by maintaining that virtual images are created and “take place” in the unconsciousness.

Also, Deleuze says that what occurs in perception associated with memory takes place in an epistemic void: neither the actual object nor the cloud of changing virtual images are openly “bound” to the subject, nor do we have any insight into how the subject creates and operates them. Thus, one can say that Deleuzian idealism is absolute: an idealism that not only rejects the “naivety” of realism, but also attempts to eliminate the real existence of the cognitive subject. One could conclude that virtual images are not created by the subject, but come into being, disappear and act on the actual object by themselves. The immanence plane itself is also subjectless, hence completely differently understood than it is in transcendental philosophy.

The main difference between Deleuze’s and most other perception theories lies in its employment of the concept of unconsciousness and transposition of the “centre” of perception (together with memory) to the unconscious sphere. Do actual objects also function in the unconsciousness, or does it only harbour virtual images—images of the memory? If the latter are copies of the former which surround them in close proximity, one may conclude that actual objects created in perception are located in the unconsciousness. This, however, leads to a serious dissonance with the common and necessary belief about conscious acts of perception.

Deleuze claims perception is inseverably tied to memory, and that in these acts the actual object is dynamically constituted by virtual images, and, reversely, virtual images are constituted by the actual object. The actual object is the object of perception, whereas virtual images are created in memory and mirror the object of perception:

memory is not an actual image which forms after the object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual perception of the object. Memory is a virtual image contemporary with the actual object, its double, its ‘mirror image’ (Deleuze, 2002, p. 150).

The actual object, i.e. the object of perception, is in coalescence with its virtual image (which belongs to memory), and simultaneously both are separate:

there is coalescence and division, or rather oscillation, a perpetual exchange between the actual object and its virtual image” (…) Owing to this constant exchange virtual images constantly become actual: “the virtual image never stops becoming actual.The virtual image absorbs all of a character’s actuality, at the same time as the actual character is no more than a virtuality (Deleuze, 2002, p. 150).

This means that the object of perception is permanently influenced by virtual images created in memory at the same time perception takes place, and that because of this exchange between perception and memory neither the object of perception nor the images formed in memory are constant, but endlessly constitute one another. More importantly, the difference between the virtual image and the actual object becomes unclear.

One cannot claim that virtual images and actual objects have different modes of existence. With some reservations (described below), one can say that both virtual images and actual objects are ideal objects which belong to the unconsciousness of the subject of perception, and possibly also to its conscious sphere—although this is only a tentative supposition. This is complicated by the fact that, as we have said earlier, Deleuze avoids the inclusion of the subjectivity category despite his constant reference to the immanence plane—which without a subject appears impossible, or at least enigmatic and different from the immanence sphere in transcendentalism. For the following reasons. First, the transcendental immanence sphere is unconditionally subjective, whereas Deleuze’s does not appear to be. Secondly, in transcendental philosophy the immanence sphere is conscious, and in Deleuze’s case mainly or exclusively unconscious. Thirdly, the immanence sphere is not only located in unconsciousness, but also in language:

The plane of immanence contains both actualization as the relationship of the virtual with other terms [italics—MC, MM], and even the actual as a termFootnote 8 [italics—MC, MM] with which the virtual is exchanged (Deleuze, 2002, p. 152).

Notably, this thesis, which appears towards the end of the analysed text, essentially changes and diffuses the content of Deleuze’s theory. If it were to play the major role in this conception, the immanence plane would have to be seen as consisting of linguistic terms and expressions and not as belonging to the sphere of unconsciousness or, perhaps, also consciousness.

To sum up, it must be said that the Deleuzian perception theory differs in several important aspects from other epistemological conceptions of perception. Deleuze’s concept of virtuality has little in common with virtuality in physics—he is merely loosely inspired by the concept of the virtual particle in quantum field theory, which he transplants to a totally different sphere, namely that of idealistically understood perception associated with memory.

5 Deleuzian Virtuality vs. Virtuality in Informatics

Finally, we arrive at a problem whose solution is the main objective of this paper. Is it possible to transpose the Deleuzian concept of virtuality to the philosophy of informatics and use it to explain the virtual objects and virtual worlds generated by computers? And how could this be done?

Deleuze sees virtual images as ephemerids, objects created in memory during the process of perception which disappear immediately. While actual objects are the objects of perception, not confined to a single constitution but constantly re-constituted in the process of perception under the influence of virtual images. Thus, actual objects are also inconstant, but do not appear to be ephemeral.

Such or similar properties are discernible in some of the virtual objects and worlds created by computers. Some computer-created virtual objects are ephemerids that appear and disappear in a moment, to be replaced by new ones generated by the creator (an individual or collective human subject and its computers). For example, computer design involves the creation of multiple versions of an object, which are constantly redesigned, improved, enriched, etc. (Hui, 2016; McCabe, 2019; Meijers, 2009, pp. 48–50). All these transitory phases are ephemeral, short-lived and disappear quickly, leaving behind only the “target” object, i.e., the final product, which is stable, relatively durable and not ephemeral.

Thus, virtual objects are universally ephemeral only in Deleuze’s theory, while computer-generated worlds and objects are not always like that—ephemerality is not their generic attribute. Some virtual worlds inhabit human consciousness—collective, and subsequently individual—over relatively long periods of time, and this extended presence produces relatively permanent cultural changes (e.g., the characters in computer games often become rather lasting elements of culture). Also in the above-mentioned case of computer-generated virtual worlds and objects, some objects are ephemeral, but some—the final effects of the designwork—are stable and relatively enduring.

Both Deleuzian and computer-created virtual objects act on the objects that generate them: the actual object, or the constituted object of perception in Deleuze’s theory, and the consciousness of the computer user in informatics contexts. In the latter case virtual worlds change their creators’ consciousnesses. Mutual interactions are a common feature which, to a limited degree, justifies the transition from the Deleuzian conception to computer-generated virtuality.

Computer-created virtual worlds are initiated and formed in their creators’ subjective consciousness, and then, by way of intersubjective communication, penetrate into collective consciousness, whereas Deleuzian virtual images are created unconsciously and remain in the unconscious. In effect, the first can be objectivised, i.e. transposed from individual subjective to collective consciousness. In this case objectivisation also means autonomisation in the understanding of Karl Popper’s three worlds theory (Popper, 1995, pp. 104, 148–150, 209), i.e. virtual objects and virtual worlds become independent of the computer programmers and users that create them. Deleuzian virtual objects are unconscious, therefore cannot be moved to collective consciousness to make them intersubjectively accessible and autonomous, or independent of individual unconsciousness. Whereby, as we said earlier, the presence of the subject in Deleuze’s perception theory is at best troublesome.

The unconscious character of virtual images postulated by Deleuze is probably the biggest obstacle in adapting his theory to the problem of computer-created virtual worlds. If we were to accept his claim that virtual worlds are unconscious, they would not be able to access individual consciousness, which would run contrary to the common intuitions and pre-philosophical beliefs about them, and the way they are perceived. It is precisely the presence of virtual worlds in both individual and collective consciousness that make them so essential to contemporary culture and the changing human cultural environment, and, in effect, allow them to transform the environment in which humans exist. Meant here is the virtualisation of the social and individual world, which tears the created human world away from material reality and direct interpersonal relations.

The origins of virtual worlds and objects in informatics are different than the genesis of virtual images in Deleuze’s conception. The first are created from the knowledge possessed by the subject (a computer specialist, graphic artist, designer, or even just computer users) who creates them with the help of software, while the second are created in perceptions as objects of memory that constitute the object of perception (the actual object). Virtual images and computer-generated virtual objects are not material, but are real. This similarity, however, is of secondary importance because of its generality.

In intuitive expositions the virtual worlds and objects constructed in informatics have a different existence mode that corresponding actualised objects, which can, for example, be the materialised equivalents of virtual objects. According to Deleuze, however, virtual images and actual objects are epistemic objects (and not primarily independent ones), and have the same existence mode—both belong to the immanence plane.

In conclusion, the virtual image with the properties given it by Deleuze and these properties’ context (a perception theory extended with memory) is not a good candidate for an explanation of the specifics of computer-created virtual worlds and their elements—virtual objects. In other words, the transposition of the Deleuzian conception of virtuality to the virtuality conception in informatics is ineffective—there are too many differences and too little similarity between them.