Abstract
Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic of association, and as a result three possible versions of associative processing. This provides a framework that informs our understanding of association as a current and historical concept, including how various specific versions in different parts of psychology relate to one another. This framework can also guide debates over normative evaluations of actions produced by processes thought to be associative.
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Notes
For this reason, I set aside connectionism for now (briefly addressed in footnote 5 below), focusing on localist networks over distributed networks (see Dacey 2016a for arguments about why these should be distinguished as models of cognitive systems).
For full disclosure, I am personally skeptical of the distinction.
These correspond roughly with Papineau and Heyes’s (2006) two candidate distinctions mentioned above. More to come.
This discussion targets Skinner’s early views; his later views are arguably more nuanced.
Earlier, I set aside distributed connectionist networks, but they warrant comment here as a possible counter-example to this claim. While some versions of connectionism have claimed status as a general theory of mind, the debate about connectionism has shown the key features of those discussed; it was often accused of being a new version of associationism, which could not possibly explain rational thought (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988). As a result, connectionists were often at pains to emphasize that connectionism was not limited like old-fashioned associationism was. This was perhaps most colorfully put when Bechtel and Abrahamsen called connectionism “associationism with an intelligent face” (1991, see also Clark 1993).
I include unconscious sequences as ‘trains of thought.’ More specific phenomena in human psychology that can be included in these categories include memory retrieval (Gallo 2006), semantic memory (Collins and Quillian 1969; Collins and Loftus 1975; Anderson 1983; Anderson and Reder 1999), creativity (Mednick 1962; Simonton 1999; Bristol and Viskontas 2006), word learning (Smith 2000), and aspects of personality (McCabe and Fleeson 2012). These various specific theories are combined to cover all of human automatic processing in many versions of dual-process theory. Dual-process theories divide the mind into two distinct systems: one unconscious and automatic, and one consciously controllable. Simplicity and associativity are usually listed as one characteristic of the automatic system (e.g. Evans 2008; Stanovich and West 2000), and some even describe them as defining features of it (e.g. Kahneman 2003, 2011; Morewedge and Kahneman 2010; Sloman 1996; Darlow and Sloman 2010; Smith and DeCoster 1999).
Not directly anyway: if the associative process is situated among other processes in the right way, those other processes can have indirect influence (see Dickinson 2012).
Likely, the kind of information also matters. Perhaps some kinds of information require a complex learning system to be encoded (e.g. Halford et al. 1998; Penn and Povinelli 2007). We can only clarify this in the context of specific models. A similar point could be made about dynamical simplicity; perhaps some basic interactions are easier than others. Getting a grasp on these differences may motivate new additional dimensions to the simplicity space outlined here, though I leave that aside for now (see the conclusion).
At least, it is the dominant interpretation of Hume. His attitudes about the reality of the associative link may not be as simple as usually thought (Dacey 2015).
I describe views that possess one functional property, while explicitly rejecting the other. Many views have only discussed one side, but I choose these examples for clarity.
I here treat these two kinds of simplicity as equally important. It may be that there are various particular contexts in which one or the other is particularly at issue, or could be considered more important. This would be determined on a case by case basis.
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Acknowledgements
This paper has been in preparation for some time, and has gone through several permutations, so it may not be possible to thank everyone who has helped. Thanks (in alphabetical order) to David Balota, Cameron Buckner, Carl Craver, David Danks, Jan De Houwer, John Doris, Jennifer Gruhn, Steve Horst, Ron Mallon, Lauren Olin, Sarah Robins, and Lizzie Schechter for comments on drafts. Thanks to participants in forums in which this material was presented, including several presentations at Washington University in St. Louis, a brown-bag lunch talk at Carnegie Mellon University in fall 2012 (thanks to David Danks for the invitation), the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Spring 2013, and the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Summer 2015. Thanks to the Philosophy Departments at Washington University in St. Louis, Colby College, and Bates College for support. Finally, thanks to two anonymous reviewers. Apologies to any I may have missed.
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Dacey, M. Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association. Erkenn 84, 1207–1228 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0005-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0005-9