Abstract
The dialogue between Pūjanī (a bird-mother) and Brahmadatta (a king) is a lesser known episode in the Mahābhārata. This paper explores how Pūjanī’s voice is relevant when rethinking autonomy for feminist relational selves. I first unravel the different ‘stories’ that can be told through this single but multi-layered narrative. Then, by re-arranging their insights and using the idea of ‘normative authority’ proposed by Catriona Mackenzie (in a different context), I piece together a picture of autonomy foregrounding dependence on others and volatile emotionality––both of which are generally thought to be opposed to ‘being in control’ or being autonomous. This emerging picture of self-governance indicates how even selves constituted by relationships to others can exit relational situations that are or become harmful. I also show that the episode leaves behind ‘internalist’ conceptions of autonomy for more capacious notions of self-determination that incorporate the importance of structural changes for agentive freedom. This goes beyond the insights of the Mahābhārata in a self-reflexive move built into the story itself.
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Notes
All references to the Mahābhārata are from Pandit Ramchandrashastri Kinjawadekar (Ed.) The Mahābhārata with Bharata Bhawadeepa Commentary by Nilkantha. I have also relied heavily on the Hindi translations of Sahityachara Pandit Ramnarayandutt Shastri Pandey ‘Ram’ (n.d.), published by Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
The notion of autonomy as classically conceived is not a desiderata for many feminist theorists. But the conceptual cluster of ‘freedom,’ ‘self-determination,’ and ‘agency’ does signify a positive value that I try to capture through ‘autonomy.’ I use the concept to capture a sense of empowerment that can guard against a victimology and patronization of the dependent and the vulnerable.
See Jennifer McWeeney and Ashby Butnor (eds). 2014
Iris Young (1997, 22)
Lorraine Code (2011, 218)
Yadihāsti tadanyatra, yat ne hāsti, na tat kvacit (If something is here (i.e., in the Mahābhārata) it is elsewhere (in the world). If it is not here, then it is nowhere); 1.62.53
See Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber (Eds) (2016) who play with the metaphor of comparative philosophy being philosophy “without borders.”
According to Ramānuja, daiva signals God because the individual is powered by the paramātma or the Supreme Soul. However, the textual gloss on this crucial term, the ‘fifth factor (of action)’ (daivam caivātra pancamam), varies according to different commentators. For Śaṃkara, it is ‘gods, e.g. the sun etc. who nourish the sense organs such as the eyes…’ According to Nīlakanṭha it is ‘accumulated merits and sin assuming the form of deities which sustain the relevant sense-organs,’ according to Madhusūdana, ‘of the body, which is the locus of the agent, actions and instruments, the presiding deity is the Earth…, according to Abhinavagupta, “dharma and adharma, (unseen) merit and demerit.’ These are from Wasudev Laxman Śastrī Panśīkar Ed. (1983) XVIII.14. 694–695. From a contemporary point of view, daiva could well refer to the unaccounted for ‘surd’ in explanations of any action—in which case, it gestures to notions of luck and chance.
This can be traced to the Śvetāśvatara Upanişad (1.2)
Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” 99.
The text disconcertingly includes ‘women’ as one of the five causes of failures of trust. Besides past harms, the other causes are caste-hostility (which we will reference later), land or property, and insulting words.
We will have occasion to refer to her second test of appropriate trust later.
Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” 108.
Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgements of Value and Importance, 232
Ibid., 233.
Ibid., 243.
Ibid., 232.
It should be noted that mere experience of grief is not sufficient to establish the relational self. After all, one could argue that Brahmadatta too grieved the harm done to his son but ended up with a different self-construction. Much hangs on the way grief is processed and the critical consciousness brought to that experience. The explanation of how Pūjanī works with her grief as opposed to how the king handles it is explored in Vrinda Dalmiya (forthcoming, 2018)
I am obviously borrowing insights of critical race theorists who theorize identity in terms of intersectionality here. See, for example, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991). It should be noted, however, that unlike these scholars, the text naturalizes the differential power of groups as following from their ‘natures.’
This is Nīlakanṭha’s gloss on the episode. See Kinjawadekar (ed) 1979, 235
Catriona Mackenzie, “Three Dimensions of Autonomy” 35
There are fascinating possibilities of relating what are called adaptive preferences where women choose to perpetuate oppressive norms that are harmful to autonomy. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for pointing this out to me. To pursue this wider application of autonomy in the feminist context, see Khader (2012)
See his gloss on 12.139.48 (Anyatare apakārye, anyatareṇa bādhyesati…ato na āvaanyonyam viśvāsah) Kinjawadekar (ed) 1979, 237
Ibid., 128.
Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” 123.
This excellent question was raised by one of the blind reviewers.
See Marina A.L. Oshana, “Personal Autonomy and Society,” (1998) 95.
Ibid., 95.
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Acknowledgements
Versions of this paper were presented as the John C. Maraldo Lecture in Comparative Philosophy at the University of North Florida in April 2015 and at the Australian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, at Melbourne in July 2015. I acknowledge helpful comments from members of the audience. I am grateful for discussions with Arindam Chakrabarti and comments from Asha Mukherjee and the anonymous reviewers. I would particularly like to acknowledge Arindam’s help with the Sanskrit text.
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Dalmiya, V. A Case of Relational Autonomy in the Mahābhārata: the Story of Pūjanī. SOPHIA 58, 239–254 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0644-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0644-y