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Is What is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect

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Abstract

One aim of this article is to explore the connection between the Knobe effect and the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Additionally, we report evidence about a further generalization regarding probability judgments. We demonstrate that all effects can be found within German material, using ‘absichtlich’ [intentionally], ‘wissen’ [know] and ‘wahrscheinlich’ [likely]. As the explanations discussed with regard to the Knobe effect do not suffice to explicate the ESEE, we survey whether the characteristic asymmetry in knowledge judgments is caused by a differing perception of probabilities concerning the occurrence of the side-effects. Our findings show that a negative side-effect is judged more probable, even if the objective probabilities would suggest otherwise. We argue that the best explanation for these results is that the Knobe effect applies to the perception of probabilities as well: a probabilistic side-effect effect.

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Notes

  1. Mean = 28.66 SD = 9.92.

  2. Welch’s (1947) t-test: Intentionality: t(236.17) = −17.94, p < 0.001, d = 2.33. Knowledge: t(203.88) = −3.35, p < 0.001, d = 0.47.

  3. t(268) = −15.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.86.

  4. Welch’s t-test : Intentionality: t(256.96) = −12.95, p < 0.001, d = 1.62. Knowledge: t(235.11) = −3.13, p < 0.005, d = 0.41.

  5. Welch’s t-test: Profit story: t(229,83) = −4,75, p < 0.001, d = 0.63. Guideline story: t(224.97) = −2.974, p < 0.005, d = 0.40.

  6. Profit story: total effect: t(268) = 3.41, p < 0.001, direct effect: t(267) = 2, p < 0.05 indirect effect: 99 % C.I.: 0.87 – 8.82.

    Guideline story: total effect: t(268) = 3.17 p < 0.01 direct effect: t(267) = 2.49, p < 0.05 indirect effect: 99 % C.I. = 0.09 – 5.77.

  7. Profit story:

    Main effect: intentionality: F(1,269) = 0.14, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.002, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 0.87, p > 0.05.

    Interaction: intentionality: F(1,269) = 1.5, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 1.01, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 0.05, p > 0.05.

    Guideline story:

    Main effect: intentionality: F(1,269) = 0.4, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.52, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 0.35, p > 0.05.

    Interaction: intentionality: F(1,269) = 0.09, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.72, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 4, p > 0.05.

  8. Unfortunately Egré (2013) broad account cannot be elaborated here.

  9. Mean = 40.23 SD = 15.62.

  10. Film story:

    Main effect: intentionality: F(1,340) = 1.28, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.07, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 3.24, p > 0.05.

    Interaction: intentionality: F(1,340) = 0.81, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.03, p > 0.05; specific probability: F < 0.01, p > 0.05.

    Reorganization story:

    Main effect: intentionality: F(1,340) = 0.6.91, p < 0.01; knowledge: F = 0.09, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 0.87, p > 0.05.

    Interaction: intentionality: F(1,340) = 0.04, p > 0.05; knowledge: F = 0.04, p > 0.05; specific probability: F = 5.64, p = 0.018.

  11. Again, we used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) SPSS macro and calculated bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrap samples.

    Film story: total effect: t(339) = 6.43, p < 0.001, direct effect: t(338) = 5.75, p < 0.05 indirect effect: 99 % C.I.: 0.87 – 8.82.

    Reorganization story: total effect: t(339) = 3.17 p < 0.01 direct effect: t(338) = 2.49, p < 0.05 indirect effect: 99 % C.I. = 0.09 – 5.77.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Psychology: Applied Social Psychology and Consumer Research, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 7/C0717, 1010, Vienna, Austria

    Nikolaus Dalbauer

  2. Department of Applied Psychology: Applied Social Psychology and Consumer Research, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 7/B0613, 1010, Vienna, Austria

    Andreas Hergovich

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  1. Nikolaus Dalbauer
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Dalbauer, N., Hergovich, A. Is What is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Rev.Phil.Psych. 4, 639–657 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0156-1

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