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Theory structuralism in a rigid framework

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Abstract

This paper develops the first parts of a logical framework for the empirical sciences, by means of a redefinition of theory structuralism as originally developed by Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller, and others, in the context of a ‘rigid’ logic as based on a fixed (therefore rigid) ontology. The paper defends a formal conception of the empirical sciences that has an irreducible ontological basis and is unable, in general, to provide purely structural characterizations of the domain of a theory. The extreme rationalist utopia of a characterization of the real world ‘up to isomorphism’, therefore, is rejected.

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Correspondence to Christian Damböck.

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Damböck, C. Theory structuralism in a rigid framework. Synthese 187, 693–713 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0009-3

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