Abstract
Prawitz has recently developed a theory of epistemic grounding that differs in many respects from his earlier semantics of arguments and proofs. An innovative approach to (valid) inferences yields a new conception of the intertwinement of the notions of valid inference and proof. We aim at singling out three reasons that may have led Prawitz to the ground-theoretic turn, i.e.: a better order in the explanation of the relation between valid inferences and proofs; a notion of valid inference based on which valid inferences and proofs are recognisable as such; a reconstruction of the deductive activity that makes inferences capable of yielding justification per se. These topics are discussed by Prawitz with reference to a very general and ancient question: why and how correct deduction has the epistemic power to compel us to accept its conclusions, provided its premises are justified? We conclude by remarking that, in spite of some improvements, the ground-theoretic approach shares with the previous one a problem of vacuous validity which, as Prawitz himself points out, blocks in both cases a satisfactory explanation of epistemic compulsion.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Cesare Cozzo, Gabriella Crocco, Ansten Klev, Enrico Moriconi, Dag Prawitz, Peter Schroeder-Heister, Göran Sundholm, Luca Tranchini and Gabriele Usberti for helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers, whose comments helped me to improve an earlier draft of this paper.
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d’Aragona, A.P. Proofs, Grounds and Empty Functions: Epistemic Compulsion in Prawitz’s Semantics. J Philos Logic 51, 249–281 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09621-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09621-9