Abstract
Some theories in the philosophy of time combine a commitment to the existence of non-present regions of spacetime with the view that there is a perspective-independent present time. We call such theories 4D A-theories. There is a well-known objection to 4D A-theories, as follows: 4D A-theories entail that the vast majority of subjects across time believe falsely that they are present. But if the vast majority of subjects across time believe falsely that they are present, we do not know that we are present. We call this the Epistemic Objection to 4D A-theories. In this paper we do two things: first (Sect. 2), we describe and assess a number of different versions of the Epistemic Objection. We argue that there is only one version of the objection—the version due to Russell (Noûs 51:152–174, 2015) that we call the Safety Argument—that does not rely on implausible epistemic principles which entail radical scepticism. Second (Sect. 3), we raise objections to the main strategies adopted by 4D A-theorists in response to the Safety Argument. We conclude that the Epistemic Objection—in the form of the Safety Argument—remains a threat to 4D A-theories.
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Notes
Our use of ‘4D’ here is not meant to suggest a commitment on the part of the relevant theories to anti-endurantist theories of persistence (see especially Sider 2001), but simply to the existence of non-present regions of spacetime. Moreover, we allow that theories according to which (perspective-independent) presentness is non-fundamental still count as A-theories (GBT is one such theory).
We make no assumptions here about whether true, epistemically justified belief is sufficient (rather than simply necessary) for knowledge, or about precise the nature of epistemic justification—for example, whether epistemic justification entails knowledge (see e.g. Williamson (forthcoming in Dutant and Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon) for a defence of this view).
We assume that there are composite objects—mereological nihilists can change the example to suit their view.
We borrow this formulation from Weisberg (2015).
For ease of exposition, we speak here as if time is discrete rather than continuous.
Note that to accept E = K is not to deny that qualitative experience is a source of evidence—given that our qualitative experience is a source of knowledge, it follows from E = K that our qualitative experience is a source of evidence.
A non-temporary or permanent property is a property such that always, if something has it, it always has it (A∀x(Fx → AFx)).
This does not exclude the possibility that according to MST, the properties of e.g. being a dinosaur and of being blue are temporary properties. All that is required is that these properties ultimately involve bearing some relation to the present time, so that e.g. to be a dinosaur is just to be a dinosaur at a present time, and to be blue is just to be blue at a present time. We return to this idea below in Sect. 2.5.
Being non-sticky is one way—but of course, not the only way—for a property to be temporary.
4D A-theorists such as Forbes (2016) who argue that only present events are occurring (or happening) might resist this premise on the grounds that, on their view, we have good evidence that we are present only if we have good evidence that we are located at the time at which events are occurring (or at which ‘things are happening’). They could then argue that contrary to the relevant analogue of premise (4), we do have good evidence that we are located at the time at which events are occurring. We focus on the ‘traditional’ versions of 4D A-theories in the text, as these seem more vulnerable to the Evidence Argument.
Similarly, one might find it hard to believe that given MST, a subject could be causally impacted by the fact that she is located at the time which possesses fundamental presentness.
The two different versions of GBT that we describe in what follows correspond roughly to Perović’s (2019) ‘Dead Past Growing Block’ and ‘Fourdimensional Growing Block’ respectively.
It is not entirely clear whether the property of occurring is supposed to be a fundamental property on Forbes’ (2016) version of GBT—see especially Perović (2019, §3.2). However, given that Forbes provides no hint that the property is analysable on his view, we assume that it is intended to be taken as fundamental.
Although it is not usual to treat eventhood as a temporary property, it is clearly open to the defender of About Presentness to argue that to be an event is just to bear the event-at relation to a present time.
Note that this analysis of presentness (as a property of times) in terms of occurrence does not seem to be available to Forbes. It is essential to GBT that for a time t to be present is just for t to be the time than which there is no later (‘the last slice of the block’); but it is not the case that for a time t to be the time than which there is no later is just for t to be the time at which events are occurring.
Thank you to Theodore Sider (in correspondence) for suggesting this approach.
Relationalism (about spacetime) is, roughly, the view that spacetime points and regions reduce to the objects and events located at them; the competing view is (spacetime) Substantivalism, according to which spacetime points and regions exist independently of the objects and events located at them. See Nerlich (2003) for an overview of the issues.
We return to the question of how we should conceive of objects’ intrinsic natures given the 4D A-theory in Sect. 3.2 below.
Both Deasy and a Deasy-inspired GBTer could make an analogous response in defence of their own views, by arguing that it is of the nature of presentness (unlike glow) that it bears the relevant connections to properties such as believing that p. It should be clear how what we say in what follows would apply to this response.
As noted by Sider (2017, 790, fn.2).
We are very grateful to Universitas 21 for providing support for this project. We also thank UCD School of Philosophy, UCD Global, William Mulligan, Elaine Cregg, Özün Çentinkaya, Kerry Langsdale, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham.
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Deasy, D., Tallant, J. Hazardous Conditions Persist. Erkenn 87, 1635–1658 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00265-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00265-w