Abstract
In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they provide a characterization of social understanding as being essentially situated. However, embodied cognition explanations seem to be limited in scope insofar as they do not target the more sophisticated forms of emotion understanding that have traditionally been the main focus of mindreading explanations. In the second part of the article we discuss Goldie’s account of emotion understanding as a possible way to complement embodied cognition approaches without re-introducing the frame problem. We offer two suggestions that might further the integration of Goldie’s account of emotion understanding within the framework of embodied cognition.
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Notes
Most versions of TT and ST (with the exception of ‘implicit’ ST) are committed to Cognitivism, according to which cognition depends on an internal system that is dedicated to processing symbolic representations of states of affairs in the world or, in the case of social cognition, other people’s representations of the world. Proponents of EC, by contrast, claim that cognition emerges from the interaction between agent and environment. Social cognition is hence not considered to hinge on ‘meta-representation’, but rather on succesful embodied interaction with others. See Gallagher (2007) for a discussion of implicit ST, and De Bruin and Kästner (2012) for an analysis of the EC approach and its relation to Cognitivism.
Almost nothing, because Gallagher leaves open the possibility that we sometimes do invoke theoretical principles or engage in simulation routines in order to understand other agents, for instance, when our interactions break down and we have trouble understanding them. However, Gallagher argues that these cases are the exception rather than the rule, contrary to other proponents of EC (see e.g. De Jaegher 2008).
However, even though the infant’s understanding of the facial expression of the mother might be a case of ‘smart perception’, to use Gallagher’s terminology, it is arguably not very deep insofar it does not take into account the mother’s beliefs and desires.
It might be the case that the frame problem is actually double-layered. That is, some mindreading accounts of social understanding might require us to: (1) identify another agent’s situation out of an infinite number of possible situations, and (2) identify the correct explanation/prediction (by applying the right theoretical principle or choosing the right mental states to simulate), given that the behavior that is observed is compatible with an infinite number of belief-desire explanations, and the ascription of a belief-desire pair is compatible with an infinite number of behavior predictions. From an EC perspective, the first requirement does not apply because situations are typically shared between agents. The second requirement does not apply because emotion understanding is already achieved in affective perception, and does not need to take the form of a psychological explanation based on perception. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
It might be objected that some versions of ST in fact do claim that our understanding of another person's emotion is informed by what we know about this person. For example, Shanton and Goldman (2010, p. 532) write that “taking someone’s perspective here means adopting, as far as feasible and in light of what you know about her, the mental states she starts with”. However, this does not explain how we know which mental states ‘she starts with’. Goldman proposes that we need an additional folk psychological theory to solve this problem (see Goldman 2006, pp. 44–45). But it is not clear how this solves anything, because the appeal of theory gives rise to the question of how we know which theoretical principle to apply in a given situation (and thus invokes the frame problem for TT).
According to Goldie, there are three necessary conditions for empathy: first, I have to be aware of the other as a centre of consciousness distinct from myself; second, the other should be someone of whom I have a substantial characterization; third, I have a grasp of the narrative which I can imaginatively enact, with the other as narrator.
Goldie also discusses sympathy. Sympathy, for which Goldie thinks emotion understanding is necessary but not sufficient, is different from the imaginative capacities of empathy and in-his-shoes-imagining because it “does not involve a sharing of the other’s emotional experience. Rather, it involves feeling towards, recognition of, and a concern to alleviate the other’s difficulties …” (1999, p. 398).
Of course, EC-acccounts need to explain how we tend to deal with such cases of underdetermination in folk psychological practice. But on EC-accounts, this explanatory task does not involve solving the frame problem.
“… [emotion] understanding at the personal level cannot be explained by appealing to any of the other four notions—emotional contagion, empathy, in-his-shoes imagining, or sympathy: our capabilities to empathize, to in-his-shoes imagine, and to sympathize themselves presuppose some degree of understanding; and emotional contagion in itself yields no understanding.” (1999, p. 397).
Emotional contagion, by contrast, is generally regarded as involving a ‘vicarious sharing of affect’ or an emotional response in which the emotion is ‘congruent with the other’s emotional state or situation’ (Eisenberg and Strayer 1987, pp. 3–5).
Goldie (2000, p. 191) also claims that emotional contagion is also not sufficient for understanding others’ emotion or for the empathy or sympathy which might accompany it. However, for the purpose of this article we have restricted our discussion to the necessity condition.
On Hutto’s account, children are supposed to have already acquired some understanding of the core propositional attitude concepts, before they start to actively engage in narratives about reasons for action. As far as emotion understanding is concerned, our bet would be that children already have acquired some rudimentary emotion concepts prior to engagement in narrative practice. Here, one can think of core concepts of anger, fear, sadness, happiness or disgust—the so-called universal human emotions. However, we think that acquisition of more sophisticated and arguably more culture-dependent emotions, such as pride, guilt or shame, requires exposure and engagement with culture-specific, folk psychological narratives. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.
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de Bruin, L., Strijbos, D. & Slors, M. Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading. Topoi 33, 173–184 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9200-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9200-0