Abstract
The concept of lived experience plays a significant role in the social sciences in general and in philosophy in particular. The idea of lived experience as a social reality has been philosophized and given prime importance in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy. However, the work of Alfred Schutz, one of the phenomenologists on lived experience, has not been given adequate attention by either sociologists or philosophers. This paper attempts to understand how lived experiences are not merely individual or subjective experiences but are also collective or social. Firstly, it suggests that lived experiences need to be understood in a broader context, namely that of the social and inter-subjectivity, which can be found in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz. Thus, there is an attempt to show how Schutz’s philosophy broadly helps us understand lived experience as a social reality. Secondly, to justify how lived experiences are social and collective experiences, illustrations of the studies related to race, gender, and caste are given as a marker for lived experiences throughout the paper. So far, lived experience has been understood within the domain of individual or the subjective or merely in the first-person perspective. Hence, this paper provides some insights into investigating lived experience from the third-person perspective.
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Notes
In the existential and phenomenological traditions, lived experience has been understood mainly from the first-person point of view. For a detailed discussion of the same, see Todariya (2018).
This aspect can be seen in contemporary theorizing in India as well, such as the debates between Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai in the Cracked Mirror (2012).
Among Social Philosophers, Alfred Schutz was the first to engage with the idea of lived experience from a philosophical perspective. Therefore, it becomes very relevant to bring his ideas to the forefront of social science debates from the perspective of lived experience.
This work also refers to a previous article published by Springer in the Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research titled ‘the Problem of Lived Experience in The Cracked Mirror’ by Saurabh Todariya.
See for details Dilthey (1985). How lived experience is social can also be implicitly understood in the works of Simone de Beauvoir and other phenomenologists.
The thinkers whose philosophy can better help us understand how the social world is very close to human mind/consciousness are Plato, Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Max Weber, Dilthey, Schutz, Noam Chomsky, and Peter Winch.
At a time of interdisciplinary importance, this paper will help the students and researchers of sociology and philosophy to understand and engage with the idea of lived experience both from a methodological and epistemological perspective. To know the relevance of the relationship between philosophy and sociology, see further details in, Phenomenology, Language, and Sociology: Selected Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty edited by O’Neill (1974).
Durkheim (1982: 4).
Zaner (1961: 74).
Maurice Natanson has edited the book Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, with an introduction where he has mentioned Schutz’s position that human beings are a social being and rooted in an intersubjective world. See further, Schutz (1971: xxx).
In order to understand lived experience as social or collective in this paper three major examples have been pointed out such as race, gender, and caste.
Generally, the term ‘Dalit’ is used for the untouchable castes in India, but sometimes it is a contested term both in academics and society.
As quoted in Schutz (1970: 9). In these selected writings edited and with an introduction by Helmut R. Wagner, we find the discussion of Weber’s philosophy, particularly his views on social relationship.
See for an elaborate discussion on humiliation and lived experience, Guru (2009). Humiliation. Edited, Oxford University Press.
See for details in Simone De Beauvoir’s Second Sex (2011), where she has justified how gender is not natural but social. This also applies to the context of race and caste.
Schutz (1970: 8).
Schutz (1967: 86).
Ibid (1967: 57).
Gittler (1951: 361).
Schutz (1967: 142).
Ibid (1967: 143).
Gittler (1951: 358).
However, to make sense of lived experiences as social/collective experiences; inter-subjectivity has been considered here as a larger context which is opposed to an individual/subjective one.
Carrington (1979: 96). One can also see the work of Schutz which was edited and introduced by Maurice titled Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. Here Schutz has discussed the problem of inter-subjectivity, which lies in the typifications of the common sense world rather than in the formal or transcendental ego world.
As quoted in Carrington (1979: 96).
Ibid (1979: 95).
Zaner (1961: 71–72).
Schutz has tried to analyze lived experience in the context of inter-subjectivity. In other words, he has discussed how to make sense of each other’s lived experience. For details, see Schutz (1967: 101–105).
See for details, Beauvoir (2011). In her book Second Sex, she has discussed how gender/women are a socially constructed category.
See for details Dr. Ambedkar (2007). In Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar has made a point that caste is not ‘physical’ but is a ‘notion of mind.’ When you say caste is a notion of the mind, it’s directly related to your mind, consciousness, and intentionality. That is why, when we talk about caste as being of the mind, and consciousness, we also have to see all these attributes of caste in the context of society rather just merely in the context of the individual.
Fanon (2008: xviii).
Ibid (2008: viii).
See for details Schutz (1967). In Phenomenology of Social World, particularly in the chapter ‘inter-subjectivity,’ Schutz has discussed the inter-subjectivity of lived experience.
Fanon (2008: 1).
Dr. Ambedkar (2007: 19–20).
Irigaray (1993: 10).
Zaner (1961: 72–73).
Ibid (1961: 88).
Dirks (2001: 3–4).
Dr. Ambedkar (2007: 23–24).
Ibid (2007: 14–15).
Ibid (2007: 41).
Fanon uses the terms ‘phylogenetic’ and ‘ontogenetic’ to understand how the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. The term ‘phylogenetic’ was used in the context of individual, and the term ‘ontogenetic’ for the collective and social context. See for a detailed discussion of the above, Fanon (2008).
See Fanon (2008: 6).
Ibid (2008: 51).
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues about common/public language. See for details Wittgenstein (1972: 137).
See for details, Schutz (1971: xxvii).
Schutz (1967: 141).
See for details Beauvoir (2011).
Thapan (1995: 34–37).
Guru (2016: 143).
Butler (1993: 1).
Ibid (1993: 9).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Bhagat Oinam (JNU), for his guidance, suggestions, and comments on this paper. I am thankful to my external expert Dr. Prasenjit Biswas (NEHU) for his comments and questions on my dissertation, which has helped me to develop this paper. I would also like to thank Prof. Aakash Singh Rathore for going through my writing and his comments on the draft, further which helped me to work this paper.
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Deep, B. Lived Experience and the Idea of the Social in Alfred Schutz: A Phenomenological Study of Contemporary Relevance. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 37, 361–381 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00211-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00211-9