Abstract
Michael Bratman's restricted two-tier approach to rationalizing the stability of intentions contrasts with an alternative view of planning, for which all of the following claims are made: (a) it shares with Bratman's restricted two-tier approach the virtue of reducing the magnitude of Smart's problem; (2) it, rather than the unrestricted two-tier approach, is what is argued for in McClennen (1990); (3) there does not appear to be anything in the central analysis that Bratman has provided of plans and intentions (both in his book,Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, and in the article “Planning and the Stability of Intention”) that precludes his adopting this alternative approach; and (4) it is an approach that neither requires nor encourages any distinction between the standards appropriate to artificial and to human intelligence.
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DeHelian, L., McClennen, E.F. Planning and the stability of intention: A comment. Mind Mach 3, 319–333 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00976285
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00976285