Abstract
The Bungian philosophical system, with its constant focus on the demarcation between concepts and coherent material systems, is particularly helpful for introducing scientists and students to the ontology of biological systems. We illustrate this with the case of the debate about species as individuals, largely a concern for philosophers of biology rather than biologists themselves, but potentially confusing for the latter when engaging in philosophical reflection about their conceptions and practice. Bunge attains his goal of writing efficiently for readers outside the philosophical academic microcosm, and the Bungian system is worth more promotion for a large audience, particularly for introducing notions of modern systemist emergentist philosophy in biological scientific training.
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I thank Michael Matthews, Guillaume Lecointre and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this and earlier versions of this manuscript.
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Deleporte, P. The Systemist Emergentist View of Mahner and Bunge on ‘Species as Individuals’: What Use for Science and Education?. Sci & Educ 21, 1535–1544 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9438-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9438-8