Abstract
This chapter describes Paul Ricoeur’s influential reading of Ideen I and then describes how phenomenology can be undertaken not merely as a form of theoretical analysis but as a reflective practice as well.
For more details see N. Depraz, Plus sur Husserl. Une phénoménologieexpérientielle (Paris: Atlande, 2009), 122–131.
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Notes
- 1.
E. Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie (I) (Paris: Gallimard, coll. Tel, 1950); French trans. P. Ricœur, translator’s Introduction, p. XII; English translation, Edmund Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). Translation of Ricoeur’s Introduction in Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 13, hereafter cited as “ET.”
- 2.
Op. cit., p. XIII; ET, p. 14.
- 3.
“Let us set this complex relationship of logic and phenomenology aside for the moment, since the third part of this introduction will be devoted to the historical problem of the passage from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas” (xv; ET, p. 16). Cf. “III. Naissance des Ideen,” xxxi–xxxix; ET, 28–34.
- 4.
Op. cit., x; ET, 16.
- 5.
P. Ricœur, Philosophie de la volonté, t. 1: Le volontaire et l’involontaire (Paris: Seuil, 1950).
- 6.
xix; ET, 19
- 7.
xx; ET, 20.
- 8.
P. Ricœur, La métaphor vive, Paris, Le Seuil, 1975.
- 9.
P. Ricœur, Du texte à l’action, Essais d’herméneutique II (Paris: Le Seuil, 1968).
- 10.
P. XXI, XXXI; ET, 21.
- 11.
I. Kern, Husserl und Kant (Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1964); J. M. Broekman, Phänomenologie und Egologie (Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1965); E. Marbach, Das Problem des Ichs (Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1974); R. Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1964).
- 12.
K. Schuhmann & B. Smith, “Against Idealism: J. Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I,” 20th Century Philosophy, online, 1985; E. Ströker, Husserls transzendentale Phänomenologie, Frankfurt (Klostermann, 1987); J. Drummond & L. Embree, The Phenomenology of the Noema (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992).
- 13.
J.-F. Lavigne, Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie. La genèse de l’idéalisme transcendantal phénoménologique dans la recherche et l’enseignement de Husserl (1900–1913) (Paris: PUF, coll. Epiméthée, 2005).
- 14.
See also J.-F. Lavigne, Accéder au transcendantal ? Réductions phénoménologiques et idéalisme transcendantal dans les Idées directrices…I de Husserl (Paris: Vrin, 2009).
- 15.
N. Depraz, Husserl: lire en phénoménologue les Idées directrices…I (Paris: P.U.F./CNED, 2008); Plus sur Husserl: une phénoménologie expérientielle (Paris: éditions Atlande, 2009).
- 16.
On this matter, see N. Depraz, “Lire et écrire en phénoménologue: Sartre et l’accès au vécu ‘en première personne,’” in: L’écriture et la lecture: des phénomènes-miroir. L’exemple de Sartre, ed. N. Parant et N. Depraz (PURH, forthcoming).
- 17.
On this matter, P. Vermersch, L’entretien d’explicitation (Paris: ESF, 1994 (2008)), and Cl. Petitmengin ed., Ten Years of Viewing from Within: The Legacy of Francisco Varela, Journal of Consciousness Studies Imprint Academic, 2009); more specifically, N. Depraz, “The ‘Failing’ of Meaning. A few Steps into a First-person Phenomenological Practice,” op. cit., 90–117.
- 18.
N. Depraz, “Husserl and the Idea of a ‘First-person Phenomenology’: Self-givenness, First-person Givenness and First-person Method,” (The article was first presented as a talk in the framework of a Conference organized by Dan Zahavi for the 150th Anniversary of Husserl’s death at Copenhagen, Institute for Subjectivity Research, October, 9–10, 2009; it is currently submitted to Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences).
- 19.
Hua III, 45; fr. trans., 81.
- 20.
See N. Depraz, Lire Husserl en phénoménologue, Idées directrices pour une phenomenology I (Paris: CNED/PUF, 2008), 53–54.
- 21.
Hua XI, Fr. trans, 221.
- 22.
Cf. my manuscript about attention, Section I, V. B. “Un contrepoint phénoménologique: l’exemplarité, une universalité située,” which describes the operativity of the eidetic variation, as much as the alternative way suggested by Pierre Vermersch, where the empiricist dimention a contrario is able to create new dimensions ad plays a motor role in the categorical process. See P. Vermersch, “Describing the practice of introspection,” Ten Years of Viewing from Within, op. cit., 20–58.
- 23.
Hua III, 48.
- 24.
Hua III, 48–49; English trans., 51: “Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me…. I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the veranda, into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly ‘know of’ as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness.”
- 25.
N. Depraz, Lire Husserl en phénoménologue, op. cit., 59–61.
- 26.
N. Depraz, “Where is the Phenomenology of Attention Husserl intended to Perform: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Description,” Continental Philosophy Review, Special Issue “Attention Between Theory and Practice,” ed. N. Depraz and A. Steinbock (2004); fr. Trans, Husserl, ed. J. Benoist (Paris: Cerf, 2008).
- 27.
Hua III, 50, English trans., 53: “In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact. … Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the ‘table’ with its ‘books,’ the ‘drinking glass,’ the ‘vase,’ the ‘piano, etc.”
- 28.
Ibid. “[The world] is contingently ‘on hand’ for me and I myself am a member of it.”
- 29.
N. Depraz, “The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis,” The View from Within: First-person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue, ed. F. J. Varela & J. Shear (1999).
- 30.
For more details, see my article mentioned above, “Where is the Phenomenology of Attention Husserl Intended to Perform?”
- 31.
Hua III, 198–190; English trans., 222: “We spoke metaphorically of the pure Ego’s ‘mental regard’ or the ‘rays of its regard,’ of its adverting toward and turning away from.”
- 32.
N. Depraz, Lire Husserl en phénoménologue, op. cit., 159–161.
- 33.
Hua III, 190; English trans., 223: “The ray of the pure Ego’s regard sometimes goes through one noetic stratum and sometimes through another. Or (as, e.g., in the case of remembering within remembering through one encasement-level or another … Within the total field … we sometimes look at a whole, a tree, perhaps, which is perceptually present … Suddenly we turn our regard to an object of memory which ‘comes to mind’: Instead of going through the perceptual noesis, … the regard goes through a remembering noesis into a word of memory; it wanders about in this world, passes over into memories of other degrees or into worlds of phantasy, and so forth.”
- 34.
Hua III, 201, English trans., 235: “… that at each step we faithfully describe what we, from our point of view and after the most serious study, actually see. Our procedure is that of an explorer journeying through an unknown part of the world, and carefully describing what is presented … Such an explorer can rightfully be filled with the sure confidence that he gives utterance to what, … because it is the faithful expression of something seen, will always retain its value … With a like conviction, in the sequel we propose to be faithful describers of phenomenological structures …” Let us also mention that Ricœur translates quite interestingly “treuer Darsteller” (“faithful describers”) with the expression “témoin fidèle.”
- 35.
N. Depraz, Lire Husserl en phénoménologue, op. cit., 164–166.
- 36.
Hua III, 221, fr. Trans., 366.
- 37.
Ibid. English trans., 257: “Here, as throughout phenomenology, one must have the courage to accept what is really to be seen in the phenomenon precisely as it presents itself rather than interpreting it away, and to honestly describe it. All theories must be directed accordingly.”
- 38.
LU V, §40, 491.
- 39.
Hua XXIII, n°20: “Phastasie-Neutralität,” 574, 580, 583–584. See also pp. 75 and 135.
- 40.
N. Depraz, Lire Husserl en phénoménologue, op. cit., 180–182.
- 41.
Hua III, 48–49; English trans., 51: “Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me…. I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the veranda, into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly ‘know of’ as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness.”
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Depraz, N. (2013). Paul Ricoeur and the Praxis of Phenomenology. In: Embree, L., Nenon, T. (eds) Husserl’s Ideen. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5213-9_23
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