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On a theorem of Feferman

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In this paper I have argued that Feferman's theorem does not signify the existence of skeptic-satisfying consistency proofs. However, my argument for this is much different than other arguments (most particularly Resnik's) for the same claim. The argument that I give arises form an analysis of the notion of ‘expression’, according to which the specific character of that notion is seen as varying from one context of application (of a result of arithmetic metamathematics) to another.

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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Minnesota-Duluth, USA

    Michael Detlefsen

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  1. Michael Detlefsen
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Additional information

I want to thank Dale Gottlieb, Mike Resnik, John Corcoran, Nicolas Goodman and Stewart Shapiro for careful and helpful commentary on an ancestor of this paper that was delivered at the Western Division Meetings of the APA in 1977.

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Detlefsen, M. On a theorem of Feferman. Philos Stud 38, 129–140 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00374329

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00374329

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