Abstract
A central question for psychologists, economists, and philosophers is how human lives should be valued. Whereas egalitarian considerations give rise to models emphasizing that every life should be valued equally, empirical research has demonstrated that valuations of lives depend on a variety of factors that often do not conform to specific normative expectations. Such factors include emotional reactions to the victims and cognitive considerations leading to biased perceptions of lives at risk (e.g., attention, mental imagery, pseudo-inefficacy, and scope neglect). They can lead to a valuation function with decreasing marginal value and sometimes even decreasing absolute value as the number of victims increases. As a result, people spend more money to save an individual while at the same time being insensitive and apathetic to large losses of life, despite endorsing egalitarian norms. In this conceptual paper, we propose a descriptive model highlighting the role of different motivations and the conditions under which cognitions and emotions result in deviations from egalitarian normative valuations of human lives.
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Dickert, S., Västfjäll, D., Kleber, J. et al. Valuations of human lives: normative expectations and psychological mechanisms of (ir)rationality. Synthese 189 (Suppl 1), 95–105 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0137-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0137-4