Abstract
Up to 1800, before Jacobi was diverted into a simplistic distinction between understanding and reason, he had what amounted to the sketch of a potentially interesting theory of experience. The theory had its source in the Herzensmensch side of Jacobi’s persona. It was summed up in a formula “Wie die Triebe, so der Sinn; und wie der Sinn, so die Triebe,” which Jacobi used first to confront Lessing, and then Mendelssohn. In the Dialogue David Hume, he further argued that Kant’s categories can be derived a posteriori on the basis of a feeling of resistance which Hume had also recognized. Reason is but a form of life. However, without an adequate concept of precisely this very reason, such as Jacobi obviously lacked, the theory was vulnerable to the danger of both historicizing and naturalizing truth. These were consequences that Jacobi could not accept. It is no surprise that the original sketch of a theory went nowhere.
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Notes
- 1.
I have given an account of this career, placing it in historical context, in di Giovanni (1994 & 2009), an introductory monograph included in Jacobi (1994 & 2009). This last is hitherto cited as MPW, followed by a page number. The present chapter is the twin of another (“Jacobi and the Poets”) that shows how, according to Jacobi, speculative nihilism has an existential counterpart in a type of personality which is just as destructive at the level of lived human relations as metaphysical monism is at the conceptual. The two papers differ in intent. The present is concerned with the early Jacobi’s speculative theory of experience; the other, with Jacobi’s two novels, Allwill and Woldlemar. Nonetheless, both presuppose Jacobi’s understanding of Spinoza, of which I give an account in a first stage of both papers. In this, the two papers reflect each other, and in some places the present follows the earlier verbatim. It would have been disingenuous on my part to cover up an identical reading of Jacobi’s text, equally relevant to both papers, with superficial differences in wording.
- 2.
- 3.
There was a further reason for why, according to Hamann, Jacobi should not have engaged in discussion with Mendelssohn. As he wrote to him: “Certainly you [Jacobi] are to be blamed, and this is your unacknowledged guilt, that you have sought and presupposed truth in a Jew, a natural enemy of it” (Hamann 1955–1979, Vol. VI, Letter #939, p. 299). Translations of Hamann’s texts are mine.
- 4.
Cf. also, di Giovanni (2021), Chapter 4.1.
- 5.
“They had no philosophy, or rather, their philosophy was history” (MPW 238). Jacobi is referring to two Spartans who, as the story is recounted by Herodotus, refused to bow before Xerxes, the King of Persia, thus exposing themselves to death.
- 6.
The English translations of both texts, from original editions, and, in the case of the David Hume, with notes indicating the changes introduced in 1815, are in MPW.
- 7.
The comparison between Spinoza and Kant is Jacobi’s. Cf. MPW 218, Jacobi’s long footnote 30.
- 8.
In the David Hume, referring to the Spinoza-Letters, Jacobi says that “the faculty of thought is always a spectator, and cannot ever be a source of external action” (MPW 291).
- 9.
The “bodily” character of Trieb comes through clearly only in the David Hume, as we shall see further.
- 10.
Kant is mentioned in the Spinoza-Letters in one footnote. MPW 219, footnote 30.
- 11.
See Jacobi’s reaction, as described by him, to Kant’s Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764) and The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). Kant’s privileging of actuality over possibility is the point that especially attracted Jacobi (MPW 281–282; 284–285).
- 12.
Charles Bonnet (1720–1793), a widely known naturalist of the day; François Hemsterhuis (1721–1790), a popular elegant author.
- 13.
“Abstracted” and, accordingly, somewhat elaborated.
- 14.
Jacobi and Hamann associated the Aufklärer, the Enlightenment propagandists, with Berlin.
- 15.
Jacobi invokes Hume’s authority for this, citing his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section V, Part II (MPW 271).
- 16.
For Jacobi’s rather disjointed argument, see especially MPW 278–279, 290–293.
- 17.
Jacobi does not say this explicitly, but the implication is obvious.
- 18.
I am following the logic of Jacobi’s argument as it stands. However, there might have been other historical reasons for Hume disappearing at this point. As Jacobi advertises in the Prefatory Note, the present Dialogue was originally intended as three, only the first dedicated to David Hume (MPW 255).
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di Giovanni, G. (2022). “Wie die Triebe, so der Sinn; und wie der Sinn, so die Triebe”: Jacobi on Reason as a Form of Life. In: Kisner, M., Noller, J. (eds) The Concept of Drive in Classical German Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84160-7_6
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