Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to sketch a dialectical approach on scientific representations and their role in scientific cognition. In my understanding, scientific representations can be construed as ‘tools’ mediating scientific cognition. These ‘tools’ are products of our cognitive activity, by which we signify which features of certain objects or states of affairs should be embodied in abstractive representations of them. In such a context, I explore the merits of bringing some ideas of thinkers whose work is underestimated in the relevant discussion nowadays (such as K. Marx, E.V. Ilyenkov, L.S. Vygotsky, M. Wartofsky) in dialogue with currently discussed approaches.
I would like to thank Paul Teller, Theodore Arabatzis, Stathis Psillos and two anonymous referees for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_38
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Notes
- 1.
Nersessian (1999) suggests that the term “model-based reasoning” (MBR) indicates the construction and manipulation of various kinds of representations. Magnani (2004) argues that “many model-based ways of reasoning are performed in a manipulative way by using external tools and mediators”. An interesting aspect of the discussion about manipulative abduction regards “the relationship between unexpressed knowledge and external representations”. He further states that, in any case, much of MBR and abduction (both theoretical and manipulative) is about “their ability to extract and render explicit a certain amount of important information, unexpressed at the level of available data”. Bringing my understanding of scientific representations as artifacts mediating scientific cognition in discussion with Magnani’s understanding of epistemic mediators is an interesting topic for further research.
- 2.
An anonymous referee suggested that one could counter-argue that if something is sensuously imperceptible then nothing can falsify the thesis for its existence. But if nothing can falsify the existence of ideal phenomena then it turns out that the thesis that ideal phenomena exist objectively is no different from religious theses. I am thankful for this comment. However, falsifiability is not a criterion of existence. In any case, theories in which abstractions are embedded are empirically falsifiable, hence they are not like religious theories. I would also like to take advantage of the opportunity to countersign Ghins’ assertion that success in scientific representation relies on the supposed truth of some predicative assertions (cf. Ghins’ contribution to this volume). I argue that Ghins’ point could also inform an answer to the worry about falsifiability. If (a) Ilyenkov’s approach to ideality is applicable to scientific representations, (b) the success of the inferences drawn by the scientists who employ scientific representations in their inquiries relies on the supposed truth of the relevant predicative assertions and (c) this assertions are falsifiable, then the worry about falsifiability is answered in an indirect way. At a more fundamental level, in Ilyenkov’s (and mine) line of reasoning, there is nothing beyond the mind-independent world, the objective reality of which is the domain of our subjective cognitive efforts. On this basis, ideality is being objectified in human activity (through which our forms of thought are embedded into the structure of the environment) and our theoretical understanding of the outcomes of this activity is expressed in forms which are falsifiable.
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Kilakos, D. (2016). Ideality, Symbolic Mediation and Scientific Cognition: The Tool-Like Function of Scientific Representations. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_11
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