Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency

  • Brief Communication
  • Published:
Neuroethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route to go meet her dealer.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. See Frankfurt [9], Fischer [10], and van Inwagen [11] for some classics in this debate. For my own work on the topic, see Di Nucci [12–15].

  2. And here I do not want to suggest that the Causal Theory of Action is right: there are plenty of interesting challenges to it: Frankfurt [16], Dreyfus [17], Hursthouse [18], Goldie [19], Zhu [20], Pollard [21, 22], Sartorio [23, 24], Alvarez [25], Collins [26], Dancy [27], and Stout [28] (see also Di Nucci [29–32]); not to mention the classics of the so-called Logical Connection argument against causalism, Anscombe [33], Hampshire [34], Melden [35], and von Wright [36].

  3. This is not the place to present and defend an alternative view, but the following would fit the bill: addiction is a compulsion because addicted behaviour is such that not performing it is more difficult than performing it. That may be a good way to characterise the compulsive character of addiction which does not depend on the implausible claim of irresistibility. But whether or not this alternative can be defended cannot be established here and this task will have to be left to another paper.

References

  1. Pickard, H. 2012. The purpose in chronic addiction. AJOB Neuroscience 3(2): 40–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes. Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Davidson, D. 1971. Agency. In Agent, action, and reason, ed. R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Davidson, D. 1973. Freedom to act. In Essays on freedom and action, ed. T. Honderich, 137–156. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Davidson, D. 1978. Intending. In Philosophy of history and action, ed. Y. Yovel. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bratman, M. 1984. Two faces of intention. Philosophical Review 93: 375–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Mele, A., and P.K. Moser. 1994. Intentional action. Nous 28: 39–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Fischer, J.M. 1994. The metaphysics of free will. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Van Inwagen, P. 1983. An essay on free will. New York: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Di Nucci, E. 2010. Refuting a Frankfurtian objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13(2): 207–213.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Di Nucci, E. 2011. Frankfurt counterexample defended. Analysis 71(1): 102–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Di Nucci, E. 2011. Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn. Philosophical Explorations 14(1): 117–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Di Nucci, E. 2012. Priming effects and free will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(5): 725–734.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Frankfurt, H. 1978. The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly 15(2): 157–162.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Dreyfus, H. 1988. The socratic and platonic bases of cognitivism. AI and Society 2(2): 99–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Hursthouse, R. 1991. Arational actions. Journal of Philosophy 88(2): 57–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Goldie, P. 2000. Explaining expressions of emotions. Mind 109(433): 25–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Zhu, J. 2004. Passive action and causalism. Philosophical Studies 119(3): 295–314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Pollard, B. 2003. Can virtuous actions be both habitual and rational? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6(4): 411–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Pollard, B. 2006. Explaining actions with habits. American Philosophical Quarterly 43(1): 57–68.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Sartorio, C. 2005. A new asymmetry between actions and omissions. Nous 39(3): 460–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Sartorio, C. 2009. Omissions and causalism. Nous 43(3): 513–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Alvarez, M. 2010. Kinds of reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  26. Collins, A.W. 1997. The psychological reality of reasons. Ratio 10(2): 108–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Dancy, J. 2000. Practical reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Stout, R. 1996. Things that happen because they should. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  29. Di Nucci, E. 2008. Mind out of action. Saarbrücken: VDM.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Di Nucci, E. 2009. Simply, false. Analysis 69(1): 69–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Di Nucci, E. 2011. Automatic actions: challenging causalism. Rationality Markets and Morals 2(1): 179–200.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Di Nucci, E. 2013. Mindlessness. Newcastle: CSP.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Hampshire, S. 1959. Thought and action. London: Chatto and Windus.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Melden, A.I. 1961. Free action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  36. von Wright, G.H. 1971. Explanation and understanding. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany

    Ezio Di Nucci

Authors
  1. Ezio Di Nucci
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ezio Di Nucci.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Di Nucci, E. Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency. Neuroethics 7, 105–107 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-013-9184-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-013-9184-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation