Abstract
This article examines the translator, Rongzom’s (fl. late 11th/early 12th c.), scholastic philosophical defense of early Dzokchen (rdzogs pa chen po) or “Great Perfection.” As our earliest instance of religious apologia in Tibet, this examination contributes to a growing body of knowledge about the Tibetan assimilation of post-tenth century of Vajrayāna Buddhism and the indigenous response to the forces of cultural transformation shaping the late eleventh/early twelfth century Tibet. Traditional authorities and academics have identified Dzokchen as a Tibetan tradition of Buddhism that drew intense criticism at the time from renaissance agents. This paper explores the primary Tibetan response by describing Rongzom’s philosophical defense of Great Perfection. As such, it illuminates the intellectual and ideological context of the milieu as it evinces Rongzom’s innovation and mastery of Indian systems of logic, language, and epistemology in the Dzokchen approach to the Buddhist path.
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Notes
For a brief overview of the context for the formation of Old and New Schools of Tibetan Buddhism, and the neoconservative skepticism and criticism of Old School Buddhist lineages and autochthonous composition of authoritative Buddhist literature, in particular, see Sur 2017a, pp. 4–9.
Gold (2007, p. 6). As Davidson (2005) describes it, one idea animating the period was that true buddhadharma could be found in Kashmir and India. This is contrasted by Rongzom and Stein (2009); the latter records, in his work on Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī, that in Kashmir at the time, Buddhism and Kashmiri religion had “to a great extent amalgamated” (9). Cf. Davidson 2005, pp. 232–233.
Davidson (2005) describes the ideology of the Great Perfection “to be so distant from normative Indian ideas... that no cluster of ideas in Indian scriptures could possibly fit the range of” its theory and praxis (228). In fact, that is precisely what Rongzom’s treatise envisions: a cluster of texts, tropes, and symbols within Indian scriptures as a framework for Tibetan Dzokchen within the classical Buddhist framework.
Davidson (2005, p. 211). Here, I am contrasting Rongzom’s scholastic philosophy with visionary gter ma literature.
Davidson (2005) describes Rongzom as both “one of the most learned Tibetans of the latter half of the eleventh century” (232) and “the influential Nyingma of his day” (p. 262). It should be recalled, however, that in Rongzom’s time, there was no “Old School.” Designating him “Old School” or “Nyingma” without qualification is thus, strictly speaking, anachronistic.
Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos. In Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung ’bum (1999). Vol. 1, pp. 417–555. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang. My argument that chapter four of ThCh constitutes the heart of Rongzom’s defense rests on my view that chapters one through three are undergirding and grounding chapter four, which constitutes the core of the apology.
Rongzom’s treatise represents the era’s premier philosophical response to critics. Prior to Rongzom’s scholastic and polemical presentations, Dzokchen literature was a poetic, aphoristic, and largely eschewing the normative nomenclatures of Buddhist philosophy (abhidharma) and the South Asian tradition of logic and epistemology (pramāṇa).
Hugon (2012, p. 98). Cf. Hugon (2016.) Scholars have described this milieu as a “pre-classical” period of logical and epistemological discourse (cf. van der Kuijp, 1989 and Hugon, 2015), when the theory of rationality stemming from Dharmakīrti, especially his Pramāṇaviniścaya, was emphasized in Tibetan scholasticism.
The emergence of sectarian identity is linked to physical institutions. Around 1072, important monasteries, such as gSang phu ne’u thog and Sa skya, were established. The primary seat of Bön scholasticism, gYas ru dben sa kha, was founded in 1072 (Klein & Wangyal, 2006, pp. 13–14).
Proponents of the New Buddhisms held lineage to be the criteria par excellence of authenticity. Rongzom’s own ideas about religious authority, however, place reasoning and “open-mindedness” (blo gzu bo) above geographical provenance or even charismatic authority. According to his explanation of the “witness” (sākṣin, dpang po) in KCG, literature can be invested with authority via revelation, a recognized religious authority, and reasoning (Sur, 2015, pp. 42–44). Saying that an intellect (blo) remains gzu bo is saying that it does not experience attachment to a given perspective (phyogs zhen med pa.../ DYSG 701a). Moreover, Rongzom did not consider anything un-Indian to be un-Buddhist (Wangchuk 2002, p. 282).
This view is summed up in Rongzom’s KCG: sentient beings revolve in cyclical existence due to fixation on dualistic mental constructs that keep us tethered to the ideation that binds us (gzung ’dzin spros la ’chel ba yis// rnam rtog zhags pas so sor bcing// (RZSB 1.245.14–15).
This triad correlates to the zhilamdré (gzhi lam ʼbras) or “ground, path, fruition” framework. In the broadest terms, the “ground, path, and fruit” (*āśrayamārgaphala, gzhi lam ʼbras) framework is, according to Dungkar (1794, s.v.), used in two senses. In the first sense of the phrase, the ground corresponds to conventional and ultimate reality, the path corresponds to the method (compassion) and insight (direct perception of the true nature of reality), and the fruit corresponds to all the qualities that are included within the buddha ground. In the second sense, the term is applied to the view, meditation, and fruit of all the vehicles. Here, the ground is a decisive resolution of the view, the path is gained through meditative experience, and the fruit is the attainment of buddhahood (dang po gzhi kun rdzob bden pa dang/ don dam bden pa gnyis/ ’bras bu sangs rgyas kyi sas bsdus pa’i yon tan rnams yin/ gnyis pa theg pa thams cad kyi lta sgo [sic] ’bras gsum la sbyar ba ste/ gzhi lta ba gtan la phab pa/ lam sgom pas nyams su blangs pa/ ’bras bu byang chub thob pa bcas so/.
ThCh 1.417.10-14.
As the triad makes clear, the question of the given behind appearance is not particularly relevant here. In fact, Rongzom’s discourse works to dissolve rather than resolve any question of the given. Moreover, if, following Duckworth (2019, p. 38 passim) we think of Buddhist ontology as analytical concern for objects as such (gnas tshul spyod pa) and phenomenology as analytical concern for appearances as such (snang tshul), we ought to recognize they are practically inseparable (loc. cit). This sets the question of what lies behind phenomenological appearance (snang ba)—i.e. “the given”—beyond the scope of necessary topics. It appears soteriologically irrelevant.
Rongzom’s philosophical method throughout ThCh, which has been characterized as “inclusivist” by scholars (e.g., Almogi 2009; Higgins, 2012; Wangchuk, 2002) following Schmithausen’s definition of inclusivism from an earlier work, given in a different Buddhist context (1981, p. 223), is not, strictly speaking, inclusivist in the Schmithausen’s sense of the term. As noted in Sur (2015), rather, if Rongzom’s method is to be described in inclusivistic terms—and there are compelling reasons to do so—it should be recognized as an integrative inclusivism, characterized not by chauvinistic subordination of inferior philosophical others (á la Schmithausen’s definition). Rather, it functions largely to “reconcile and harmonise” the Great Perfection approach to the path with others (cf. Wangchuk 2004, p. 191 nn. 76–7). Yes, Great Perfection constitutes the consummation of Buddhist approaches to the path; but not because it represents the singularly “right view” that has vanquished all other “wrong views.”
ThCh: ’di’ ltar nyon mongs pa zhes bya ba ’dî’i [BM, Msg, Nth = ’di] mtshan nyid rdzas su grub pa zhig yin te/ des ’gro’ ba rnams bcings par gyurd tam/ ’on te spang bar bya ba’i rdzas myed kyang bcings pa lta bur snang bar ’gyur ba zhig yin zhe na/ (RZSB 417.14-17). In the very next sentence, he offers the answer: “it should be recognized that there is no actual real entity that is to be abandoned in those afflicted” (nyon mongs pa rnams la ni spang bar bya ba’i rdzas kyi mtshan nyid myed par shes so/ RZSB 417.17-18).
Chapter one presents an inclusivistic Dzokchen style of reading doctrines associated with Hearers (śrāvaka, nyan thos), Solitary Conquerors (pratyeka-jīna, rang rgyal), Practitioners of Yoga (yogācāra, rnal 'byor spyod pa), as well as both Proponents of the Middle Way (madhyamaka, dbu ma) and Secret Mantra (guhyamantra, sangs sngags). As Rongzom’s analysis in lTa ba'i brjed byang makes clear (RZSB 2.9.16–10.2), each respective system does not, in and of it’s own views, resolve the view of equality at the heart of Dzokchen (cf. Almogi 2010, p. 1342).
That is, read presuming the radical equality of any and all illusory mere appearances. As I argued previously, if there is a doctrine set forth in Rongzom’s text, it is hermeneutical rather than propositional in the strict sense (Sur, 2015, n.b. 44–48 et passim)—a style of reading and interpreting Buddhist literature rather than a distinct system, which may be part of the reason why, for example, there is no closed set of “special Mahāyāna” scriptures; primary criteria for this category, Rongzom writes, is a premium on the buddha ground as pure dharmadhātu and the indivisibility of the two truths (RZSB 1.41.8–11).
This focus on the creeping of dravya or rdzas—the phenomenological given of a svabhāva percept (Cox 2004, p. 560)—is atypical for Dzokchen literature. Its primacy here is a reminder this text is constructed in concert with the interests of logical epistemology on the one hand and concern for influence of Vaibhāṣika on the other (see Rongzom’s discussion in lTa ba'i brjed byang, RZSB 2.8.3–9.7). In general, Rongzom writes, “dravya are characterized by dynamicism, qualifications, and aggregation” (rdzas spyi'i mtshan nyid du bya ba dang ldan pa/ yon tan dang ldan pa/ 'du ba'i rgyur gyur pa'o// (RZSB 2.9.7–8). When Rongzom describes the term dravya in etymological terms, he draws on its close association with material wealth, a pun with cognitive and sensual intimations (Apte 843 s.v. dravyam), writing: “dravya is a term labeling that which is seized upon” (RZSB dra bya ces pa'i sgras yongs su gzung bar [cf. parigraha] bya ba ste/ 2.9.9–10). This description of dravya has cognitive and psychological suggestions inasmuch as the perception of dravya correlates to the apprehension of material value per se (RZSB 2.9.9–12). In Indian philosophy, more generally, dravya is used in the work of Dharmakīrti, to designate an ontological ultimate qua causal efficacy (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 66). Thus, in the phrase, “this is an N95 mask,” the demonstrative pronoun designates the basis or subject of which being [an N95 mask] is composed. Such bases are designated substances (rdzas, dravya) by Vaiśeṣikas and excluded or distinguished (vyāvṛtta) by Buddhists. Dreyfus adds: “the term subject [dharmin] is accepted by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers as ontologically neutral” (158); we also note that, in the prāmāṇika system, argument can only take place after both parties accept the existence of the subject, at least provisionally (Dunne 2004, p. 19 n. 3). Hugon reports (private communication) a “standard Buddhist view” promulgated by Sa skya paṇḍita as dravya=vastu=vyāvṛtta , though the term vyāvṛtta may be taken as “something real, or as a vyāvṛtti (a conceptual exclusion that only slightly differs from vyāvṛtti in that it rejects all other options).” On the problem of vyāvṛtta, see Hugon (2017).
This position, taken literally, collapses the path structure of the Buddhist project, which is classically organized around what a Buddhist should accept (e.g., the fourth noble truth) and what a Buddhist is to reject (e.g., the second noble truth). Moreover, such a trope works to collapse the structure of the binary so well-known from Buddhist sources such as Udāna 8,3, which was stipulated at the top of the text.
The theme of phenomenological appearance/perception (snang ba) is, according to Rongzom, the presumed and shared basis of inter-Buddhist debates, a theme echoed in other writings, illustrated through the so-called black snake discourse (RZSB 1.459.05–24, cf. Sur 2017a, 2017b, pp. 19–20, 90–91); rhetorically, it is linked with the Dharmakīrtian valorization of direct perception (cf. RZSB 2.68.02-10). In short, the black snake discourse tells us that theory shapes perceptual, cognitive, and psychological dimensions of sentient being, a point not unlike that made ad Pramāṇavārttika 1.58, which states that when a dog, a libertine, and a yogin gaze upon the same female corpse, the dog sees food, the lecher sees a woman, and the yogin sees a corpse (Eltschinger et al., 2018, p. 53; cf. Dunne 2004, p. 185: anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati/ yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ/).
I am translating the Tibetan tshul, corresponding to the Sanskrit naya, variously as style, approach to the path, etc. Wangchuk (2007) states that “the use of ‘mode’ or ‘method’ (tshul) in place of ‘vehicle’ (theg pa) is in agreement with Indian sources, where naya and yāna have been used interchangeably, the former being seemingly even more prevalent than the latter” (117).
ThCh: rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul sgyu ma lta bu mthard phyin pa dang sgyu ma'i ming 'dzind pa'i theg pa gzhan rnams/ shan dbye' ba bstan pa (RZSB 1.477). For Rongzom, the term rdzogs chen is multivalent (Sur, 2017a, 2017b, pp. 105–110). Here, the reference to Dzokchen is as a vehicle (yāna, theg pa), a claim that would certainly raise the eyebrows of New School critics.
Dreyfus (1997, pp. 159–160).
In apoha-theory, “distinguishers” consist in the mere epistemic preclusion of the typologically discordant.
Dhamakīrti’s exclusionary epistemology of conception, labeled apoha-theory, is concerned to deny that language and concepts work “in an affirmative manner” (vidhirūpa) (Dunne, 2004, p. 114). On this view, conceptual generalities, or universals, are unreal yet capable of providing knowledge of causality and thereby real particulars. For a summary of this theory, see Dunne (2004, pp. 116–126). In short, a valid universal is comprised of two subcomponents: the appearing mental image that is not distributed (ananvaya) and the mere exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of the appearing object (artha)—i.e., that which is not-not-x—that is. Dunne adds: “lacking distribution, the image alone cannot be the universal. But on Dharmakirti’s theory qualities [i.e., predicated attributes], a negation cannot exist in distinction from that which it qualifies; therefore, the negation alone also cannot be the universal. The universal must therefore be an image that we construe in terms of a particular type of negation, namely, the exclusion of that which does not have the expected effects” (119).
Dunne (2004, p. 355 n. 5).
Eltschinger et al. (2018, 55. PV 1, 59): tatrāpi cānyavyāvṛttir anyavyāvṛtta ity api/ śabdāś ca niścayāś caiva saṃketam anurundhate / /(Gnoli 1960, p. 32; cf. Dunne 2004, p. 173 n. 44); Tibetan: de la'ang gzhan las ldog pa dang/ gzhan las log pa zhes bya ba'i sgra dang nges pa nyid dag ni/ brda yi rjes su byed pa in// (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 500 n. 26).
For translation of the svavṛtti passage, see Dunne (2004, p. 172 n. 44).
Cf. Hugon (2008): sgra'i rkyen tha dad pa de phan nam byed ldan nam/ yin byed la sogs pa gang gis brjod kyang chos dang chos can brjod pa las ma 'das par ston te/ dper na ba lang dkar po zhes brjod pasi khyad par gzhan mi spong la/ ba lang gi dkar po zhes brjod na spong ba bzhin no// (p. 472).
Eltschinger et al. (2018, 56. PV 1, 60): dvayor ekābhidhāne ‘pi vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī/ bhimman artham ivānveti vācye leśaviśeṣataḥ / /(Gnoli, 1960, p. 32; cf. Dunne, 2004, p. 173 n. 44); Tibetan: gnyis kas gcig gcig brjod mod kyi/ brjod bya’i shan [= gzhan?] gyi khyad par gyis/ rnam dbye tha dad ‘byed pa yis/ tha dad don bzhin sgrub par bye// (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 176 n. 26).
Dunne (2004, pp. 172–173 n. 44). Commenting upon this verse, Dreyfus (1997) writes: “there is no need for two elements to account for expressions such as ‘a cow being impermanent.’ When somebody asks whether this cow is permanent, we answer that the cow is impermanent. The difference between the predicate expression (chos brjod kyi sgra) ‘being impermanent’ and the subject expression (chos can brjod pa'i sgra) ‘a cow’ is merely grammatical and reflects no real distinction. There is only one object to which we are referring, a cow, and it can be described in several ways” (183).
Eltschinger et al. (2018, p. 57. PV 1, 61): bhedāntarapratikṣepāpratikṣepau tayor dvayoḥ/ saṃketabhedasya padaṃ jñātṛvāñcānurodhinaḥ / /(Gnoli 1960, p. 33); Tibetan: khyad par gzhan ni spong ba dang/ mi spong ba dag de gnyis kyi/ brda yi bye brag rtogs pa po/ 'dod pa'i rjes su byed pa'i gzhi// (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 506 n. 52).
Commenting upon this verse, Dreyfus writes: “different ways of describing the same thing are expressions of the hearer’s interests and the speaker’s intentions. We could just consider a cow as a cow. We might also wonder aloud whether a cow is impermanent or not. We would then be told about ‘a cow being impermanent.’ This way of presenting things just answers our qualm. It also excludes other characteristics from the field of inquiry. Or, we may inquire about the cow in relation to its other characteristics. We then talk about ‘the cow’s impermanence.’ In any case, there is only a cow and its characteristics. There is no separate ‘impermanence,’ for the only entity observed is a cow” (1997, p. 184).
Eltschinger et al. (2018, 59. PV 1, 62): bhedo 'yam eva sarvatra dravyabhāvābhidhāyinoḥ/ śabdayor na tayor vācye viśeṣas tena kaṣcana / /(Gnoli, 1960, p. 33); Tibetan: kun la rdzas dang dngos brjod pa’i/ sgra yi khyad par de nyid do/ de phyir de dag bjod bya la/ khyad par gang yang yod ma yin/.
On her use of the term of gris to describe some proofs as “ambiguous,” Hugon (2008) writes: « Ainsi, lorsqu'on examine si le concept « gris » est une instance semblable ou dissemblable dans la preuve de la présence de feu sur la montagne, autrement dit si « gris » (sans spécification) possède ou non du feu, le concept « gris », en tant qu'il recouvre aussi bien des instances de fumée que des instances qui ne sont pas de la fumée - et par conséquent aussi bien des instances qui possèdent du feu que des instances qui n'en possèdent pas - est dit être un « phénomène qui est les deux » (gnyi ga'i chos) » (pp. 345–346). That is, instrument conditions determine whether an epistemic event is “ambiguous” (literally, “grey”) gris or “knowable.” When the reason property is present both similar and dissimilar classes, it is gris. Both ambiguous and knowable proofs form exclusions: ambiguous proofs form an excluded; and knowable proofs form an exclusion.
Hugon (2008, p. 701 n. 69) (emphasis mine).
Eltschinger et al. (2018, 60. PV 1, 63): jijñāpayiṣur arthaṃ taṃ taddhitena kṛtāpi/ anyena vā yadi brūyād bhedo nāsti tato 'paraḥ / /(Gnoli, 1960, p. 34); Tibetan: don de shes par byed 'dod pas/ de la phan pa'am byed ldan nam/ gal te gzhan gyis brjod kyang rung/ de las khyad par gzhan med do/ (Hugon 2008, p. 472). Here, I follow Hugon's (2008) translation (p. 473).
Hugon (2008, p. 576).
ThCh: dngos po bsgrub pa hi snyed pa'ang mdo rnam pa gnyis su 'dus te/ 'di ltar yod par sgrub pa dang/ dmigs par sgrub pa'o// de dag gi gzhi yang rnam pa gnyis te/ gcig pa dang tha dad pa'o// de dag gi gzhi yang rnam pa gnyis te/ ngo bo nyid dang khyad par ro// (482.6–9).
In Dharmakīrti’s system, for example, a socio-linguistic construct or convention (samvṛti) is described in terms of a recognition (pratyabhijñāna) of a whole or singular [object] (eka, ekākāra, abhinnākāra) (Eltschinger et al., 2018, p. 159).
ThCh: de la ngo bo gcig yod par bsgrub pa gang zhe na/ spyi rdzas su yod par 'dod kyang rung/ btags pa'i yod par 'dod kyang rung ste/ spyi gcig la ngo bo nyid du ma yod pa las/'di ngo bo nyid gcig du yod do zhes/ (484.22–4).
ThCh: bkar te ngo bo nyid [485] gcig yin par bsgrub pa ni/ spyi la rten pa myed par ngo bo nyid du mar gnas pa rnams las ltos te/ bzlog nas bkar te 'di ngo bo nyid gcig yin no zhes yin par sgrub par byed do/ (484.24–485.3).”
ThCh: 'di ltar chos dang chos can bdag nyid gcig par sgrub par byed pa na/ ngo bo nyid gcig par sgrub ste/ ud pa la'ang de nyid sngon po'ang de nyid bum pa'ang de nyid byas pa'ang de nyid ces ngo bo nyid gcig du sgrub par byed do// (485.4–7).
ThCh: chos dang chos can ngo bo nyid du gcig par yang bsgrub par byed do/ 'di' ltar sngon po'ang ud pa nyid rtsub pa'ang ud pa la nyid/ byas pa'ang bum pa nyid mi rtag pa'am bum pa nyid ces bsdus te ngo bo nyid cig du bsgrub par byed de/ (485.7–9).
ThCh: tshul 'di nyid la'ang yod pa dang yin pa'i tshul gnyi' gar sgrub par byed do// de la ngo bo nyid tha dad yod par bsgrub pa na/ spyi las phye ste sgrub par byed do// yin par sgrub pa na gcig las bzlog ste sgrub par byed do// (485.9–12).
ThCh: de la chos gcig du sgrub par byed pa na// bkar te bsgrub par byed pa'i tshe// bum pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de'i cha shas ma lus par chu 'dzin par byed pa yin byas pa yin mi rtag pa yin no zhes khyad par gzhan spang shing chos gcig las bzlog nas sgrub bo// chos dang chos can gnyis chos gcig par sgrub par byed na/ ngo bo nyid phyogs su byas nas de'i cha shas ma lus par chos gcig du sgrub par byed do/ (485.12–16).
ThCh: 'o na rang gis rang la gnod pa'i grub mtha' de dag su zhig sgrub par byed ce na/ 'di ni grub mtha' 'dzind pa rang rang gi blo dri ma myed par mthong ba rnams kyis skyon myed par bsgrubs pa yin mod kyi/ de bas blo zab cing yangs pa rnams kyis bltas na| chu brnyogs pa bzhin du rang gis rang nyams par byas pa mthong ba brjod pa yin no// (434.9–12).
ThCh: kho bo cag ni rigs pa dri ma myed pa yod par mi smra ste/ 'on kyang dri ma che chung gi bye brag yod pas chung bas che ba sun 'byin par nus so/ rigs pa dri ma myed pa gcig gis shes bya'i mthar phyin par byed pa zhig yod na/ rgyal ba rnams kyis bka' thams cad du de nyid thog mar ci'i phyir mi bstan te/ de lta'ang ma yin/ rigs pa la rten cing phan mi 'dogs pa'ang ma yin te/ dper na skyes bu lam ring bor 'gro bar 'dod na/ mig rgyang dang po dang gom pa dang pos mthar phyin pa'ang ma yin/ de la ma rten par yang ma yin/ (RZSB 1.491.02-491.08).
Sur (2020, p. 243, n.b. nn.108–9).
This is a key term in Indian philosophy. To understand the paronomasia at work here, recall pakṣa may be rendered as philosophical topic, subject, proposition, similar class of phenomenon, among others. In the narrowest terms, a pakṣa is a subject inferred via argument to be qualified by an attributed property (sādhya) by virtue of a reason (hetu) (Ganeri 2001, p. 29). For example, in the context of the trairūpya formulation of valid inferences propounded by Dignāga, which Eltschinger thinks may have “originated in the pre-Vasubandhu *Tarkaśāstra (2013, p. 231 n. 133), when one infers the existence of fire on the mountain through the presence of smoke on the mountain, “the mountain” is the pakṣa (Westerhoff, 2018, p. 226). It is also used figuratively when, as when it denotes “a proposition consisting of the sādhyadharmin and sādhyadharma; however, since the sādhyadharmin is a part (ekadeśa) of that proposition, the term pakṣa (proposition) may be used as a metaphor (upacāra) for the sādhyadharmin or ‘subject’” (Dunne, 2004, p. 27 n. 31). Prāmāṇika discourse only allows for argument “about the truth of a proposition (pratijñā) if one begins by accepting (at least provisionally) the existence of that proposition’s pakṣa (dharmin) (19 n. 13)—mere provisionality, in this context, amounting to the presumption of an ontologically neutral commitment to what is phenomenologically significant.”
Within the classical karma-samsara-moksha worldview, though, citta is literally opposed to the antidotal nature of a mind composed of gnostic insight (jñāna, prajñā). That is, citta and bodhi distinguish, respectively, sattva from buddha. Nevertheless, in classical Indian Mahāyāna and Buddhist tantra, citta, the ordinary discursive, thematic mind, may be described as luminous (prabhassara); e.g., Bodhicaryāvatāra 9, 103 and Kālacakratantra (Wallace 2001, p. 171). On luminosity in the Pali, see Anālayo (2017); cf. Bodhi (2012, p. 1598 n. 45).
The language here mentions nothing of “good karma” (las 'phro can) or “merit” (bsod nams). In technical terms, “faith” (sraddhā, dad pa) is counted among the ten mental factors characterizing any virtuous mental state enumerated in the Abhidharmakośa s.v. kuśala mahābhūmikā; and it is considered one of five pure faculties (śraddhā-indriya, dad pa'i dbang po) comprising one of thirty-seven limbs of awakening. Typically, faith undergirds sustained effort in practicing the path (vīrya, brtson 'grus) and is considered integral to two of the seven types of soteriological personalities described in Abhidharma literature—i.e., those following faith (śraddhānusārin, dad pas rjes su 'brang ba), which is contrasted with those who follow the doctrine (dharmānusārin, chos kyi rjes su 'brang ba), and those who are devoted through faith (śraddhādhimukta, dad pas mos pa). According to Rongzom’s apology, people can penetrate (rtogs) Dzokchen—that is, gain awakening—with a minimum of instruction if they are a person with faith (dad pa'i gang zag). In fact, in ThCh, awakening is understood in terms of the absence of cognitivity in any ordinary sense. In explaining his use of the phrase seeing the truth or seeing reality, Rongzom writes: “‘seeing the truth’ is also a phrase for seeing no phenomena at all” (bden pa mthong ba zhes bya ba 'di 'ang/ chos gang yang ma mthong ba'i tshig bla dwags te/ RZSB 1.534.23–4). Rongzom locates this type of view in superior texts such as Gaṇḍavyūha.
This classic Buddhist move may be compared to Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka 8,19, which emphasizes that a barbarian must first be approached in barbaric terms, before he can be, if you will, “civilized” (nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ yathā | na laukikam ṛte lokaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ tathā ||; Tibetan: ji ltar kla klo skad gzhan gyis/ gzhung bar mi nus de bzhin du// 'jig rten pa yi ma gtogs par/ 'jig rten gzhung bar nus ma yin).
Davidson’s (2005) description of Rongzom stressing reason over faith is incorrect. Faith in the present context is not “the technique for those who cannot other otherwise enter the rdzogs chen method” (p. 425). Precisely the opposite, in fact. People of faith (dad pa'i gang zag rnams) access Dzokchen through nothing more than the condensed teaching. On Rongzom’s view, it is reasoning, relative to view, that is oafish.
I leave pakṣa untranslated here because I am reading it, as noted below, as paronomasia at work in the slippage between this term’s inter-related nuances—“philosophical topic,” “subject,” “epistemological category,” “similarity,” “orientation,” “position,” and the like. ThCh: de ltar stond pa'i rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul 'di yang mdor bsdus te bstan na/ chos thams cad kyi rtsa ba ni sems dang sems snang ba tsam du 'dus la/ sems kyi rang bzhin nyid byang chub yin pas byang chub kyi sems zhes bya'o// bstan par bya ba ni 'di tsam las myed la/ rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul la dad pa'i gang zag rnams kyang/ 'di nyid bstan pa tsam gyis rtogs shing 'jug par 'gyur ba yin na/ 'on kyang sgra'i bstand chos dang/ rigs pa'i bstan chos la mngon par zhen pa'i gang zag dag 'di snyam du/ bdag cag gi grub pa'i mtha' 'di dag ni/ sgra'i don dang rigs pas grub pa' yin la/ rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul ni rigs pa dang 'gal te/ gang rigs pa dang 'gal ba de ni blang bar bya ba ma yin no snyam du sems te/ rdzogs pa chen po yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che dang 'dra ba 'di lta bu spangs nas/ nor bu 'ching bu dang 'dra ba'i grub mtha' na tshogs la zhen pa'i gang zag la/ rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul tshul las grags pa'i thig le dang che ba la stsogs pa'i skad rnams bzhag ste/ spyir grags pa'i skad kyis rigs pa'i tshul phyogs 'ga' bshad do (RZSB 1.477.13–24).
The term abhiniveśa connotes personal devotion, intellectual determination (Monier-Williams s.v.) and is used to describe “attachment, intentness, being occupied with, adherence to... attachment, love, fondness, affection” (Apte, 1992, p. 175).
As a stock phrase, rigs pa’i bstan bcos may attach to a variety of scientific categories, such as bzo rigs pa, gso ba rigs pa, etc. Among closely related terms, śabdaśāstra reminds us of the well-known term śabdavidyā, which names one of the five Indian Buddhist “sciences” or “domains of knowledge” (pañcavidyāsthāna, rigs pa’i gnas lnga). In this context, śabdavidyā may refer to the “ancillary sciences” associated with language: “poetics, prosody, lexicography and dramaturgy” (van der Kuijp, 1996a, 1996b, p. 393). For a history of Sanskrit grammatical literature in Tibet, see Verhagen 2004. On Tibetan conceptions of pertinent grammatical sources, see Gold (2007) and Verhagen (2017).
The Tibetan term sgra'i bstan bcos renders both śabdhaśāstra and vyākaraṇaśāstra (e.g., Tōh. 4920 and Tōh. 4351). Rongzom composed several works classified as śabdhaśāstra, such as his Commentary on Ācārya Smṛtijñānakīrti’s grammar (RZSB, Vol. 2, pp. 413–455) and a rtags 'jug commentary (RZSB 2.238.15). On rigs pa'i bstan bcos in the context of rang bzhin kyi gtan tshig (svabhāvahetu), which I study in a forthcoming essay, see Rongzom's Guhyagarbha commentary (RZSB 1.30.7–31.5). Though we treat the two as aimed at different camps, a direct connection is drawn between śabdhaśāstra and pramāṇa in Tōh. 0211: Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa (bsTan 'gyur, Vol. 66, 733.18–21).
In his commentary on Guhyagarbha (RZSB 1.102.9–20), Rongzom discusses the subjective and objective valences of Tibetan term rigs pa and its corresponding Sanskrit translations, nyāya and yukti.
E.g., Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra, Śrāvakabhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, etc.
In another text, Rongzom lists the genres again, but with śabda explicitly linked with pramāṇa (RZSB 2.31.24–32.1). In Tibetan literature, sgra'i bstan bcos include Thon mi saṁ bho ṭa’s eight grammatical treatises as well as works considered and authoritative or valid (pramāṇa, tshad ma) and organized around agent (kartṛ, byed pa po), activity (kriya, bya ba), and instrument (karaṇa, byed pa). On this figure and his grammatical work, see Miller (1963). On the use agent, activity, and object (las) in classical Tibetan, see Tillemans, Tom Johannes Frank, and Derek Dane Herforth, 1989.
Since chapter four of ThCh sets forth rdzogs chen, a tantric tradition, in rationalist epistemological idiom, it is tempting to wonder if Rongzom's skepticism is linked with ideas associated with the discourse traditions emerging from centers such as gSang phu Ne'u thog or the ideas transmitted in the works attributed to the twelfth century figure, Phya pa, whose thinking, as noted above, was criticized for its “pronounced partiality to the Vaibhāṣika-s” (op. cit., p. 63). A doxographical text attributed to mChad kha ba'i grub mtha' ye shes rdo rje (1101–1175) connects the Madhyamaka figure, Candrakīrti, to the “central Vaibhāṣikas” (bslob dpon zla ba grags pas ni dbus ba bye brag smra ba dang mthun par gsungs so/ p. 240). Pascale Hugon (private communication) informs me this critical designation revolves his use of a three-fold typology of the unconditioned ('dus ma byas) rather than the four-fold typology associated with Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas. In any case, Rongzom laments the influence of Vaibhāṣika theories concerning objects in his day.
Karmay describes Rongzom's fourth chapter in terms of Dzokchen being “immune to logic” (p. 129). Three points: First, this conflates the purvapakṣa with the paksa, thus valorizing the position of Rongzom's audience. Pace Karmay, it is the skeptical audience of logicians asserting Dzokchen is irrational (rigs pa dang 'gal) that Rongzom is responding to. Second, the metaphor of immunity is inapt. Immunity (read: rdzogs chen) is a type of separation from or resistance to some viral invasion (read: rationality). But Rongzom's chapter—and his broader philosophical method works to show that logical discourse is integrated into, or, in some significant sense, explicates Dzokchen. Thus, Dzokchen is not so much separate from or resistant to the infective agent of rationality as it is amenable to, sometimes dependent upon, and on a horizon with, the occasionally useful tool of rationality, which is, in the end, left behind. Third, Rongzom himself states at the end of chapter four, that the presentation on Dzokchen in the next chapter “does not improve upon” what was presented in of chapter four (RZSB 1.481.11–13). In this sense, Rongzom is not trying to divorce or separate Dzokchen from logic. He is positioning Dzokchen as the culmination of the path logic enacts.
I return to this topos in conclusion.
One concern here is the question of whether and to what degree, or not, Rongzom is articulating the bodhi-citta relation in terms that would satisfy Buddhist epistemologist concerned with the nature of valid pervasion relations in a syllogistic statement, for whom the pervasion (vyāpti) relation obtained between inferential reasons (hetu) and property predicated (sādhya) in a valid inference (anumāna) cannot be reduced to either spacio-temporal coincidence (sahabhāva) or the semantics of grammatical cases (vibhakti). It must be a necessary (avinābhāvaniyama) and natural relation (svabhāvapratibandha) obtained between svabhāva properties á la Dharmakīrti. This requirement structures the “nomological 'rule' or restriction (niyama) whereby evidence does not occur (na bhavati) without (vinā) a predicate” (Dunne, 2004, p. 150). For Dharmakīrti, a “natural relation” is required between evidence and the property predicated (p. 151). Typically, there are two types: relation via causal production (tadutpatti, de'i 'byung 'brel) and relation via identity (tādātmya, bdag gcig 'brel) (p. 152). Adjudicating the position here would take us afield, further into the Indian and Tibetan reception and interpretations of Dharmakīrti, each reference in Rongzom’s work and its context, and further away from the broader contours of the apology, which concern us here.
Here, I only draw attention to a similarity. I do not claim Rongzom is formulating his work vis-a-vis the so-called tshul gsum.
ThCh: sems kyi rang bzhin nyid byang chub yin pas byang chub kyî sems zhes bya'o/ (RZSB 1.477.14–15). Re the Tibetan zhes bya'o: some might read the prayoga as merely marking a convention: citta “is referred to as bodhicitta...”. I am reading it as merely marking the reference: called “bodhicitta.” In KCG, Rongzom roots this view of the relation between bodhi and citta in the Prajñāpāramitā text tradition (RZSB 1.46.9–10. We also note the same idea in the tantric Stages of the Path text attributed to Acārya Buddhaguhya (Buddhagupta, p. 29).
A more formal idiom might read: (the subject, pakṣa/dharmin), the nature of citta, is (the predicate/sādhyadharma) “bodhi-citta” because (evidence/hetu) it is bodhi.
By comparison, Klong chen pa's explanation treats each of the Tibetan term's semantic elements; byang, chub, and sems: “It is byang because it is timelessly immaculate, unsullied by conditioned existence; it is chub because enlightened qualities are spontaneously present, beyond cause and effect; it is sems because self-knowing awareness is luminous pure essence; everything is subsumed and completely pure within byang chub sems” (Longchen, 2001, p. 125). Chos dbyings mdzod (W8LS68033): // ye nas dri med 'khor bas ma gos byang// yon tan lhun grub rgyu 'bras 'das pas chub// rang rig snying po 'od gsal dag pas sems// byang chub sems su kun 'dus rnam par dag// (52.5–6).
See etymologies in KCG (RZSB 1.46.3-10) and lTa phreng (RZSB 1.313.13–314.2). Though Rongzom's explanation of bodhicitta is not unlike one found in Tōh. 2503, Kosalālaṃkāratattvasaṁgrahaṭīka (as per Wangchuk, 2007, p. 205), an arguably earlier instance of this view is found outside the perfection of wisdom genre in Tōh. 96, the sūtrānta discourse entitled Mañjuśrīvikrīḍita, translated into Tibetan by Surendrabodhi and Ye shes sde. Though no Sanskrit is extent, terminus ante quem is provided by the Chinese translation completed by Dharmarakṣa in 314 ce (Taishō 817).
As objects, bodhi and citta are basically the same insofar as they are observed to be distinct entities. Yet, as appearance, they do not coincide. Their relationship is fluid because neither is absolute. Inasmuch as there is mental appearance, there is no bodhi. When bodhi appears, citta does not. The delusive nature of mental appearance means it is confusion. In terms of essential nature, the grounding of one uproots the reality of the other. Thus, what appears in the ordinary mind (citta) is delusive because its essential nature is not the way it appears. The nature of appearance/perception should be recognized as essential nature because “the essential nature of the ordinary mind has no basis in [some objective] reality” (sems kyi ngo bo nyid ni gtad mi grub bo zhes shes par bya'o/ RZSB 1.479.5–15).
ThCh: de ltar sems dang byang chub kyi rang bzhin tha dad du bzhag pa 'di ni dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid yin te/ ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid ni gnyis myed do// snang ba ni gnyi' ga dus gcig du mi ldan no/ (RZSB 1.478.10-478.12).
The classical karma-saṃsāra-mokṣa worldview is predicated upon, inter alia, a rather fundamental literal distinction between the mind of an ordinary being (sattva, sems can) and whatever is awakening (bodhi, byang chub).
In epistemological terms, objective supports and conceptual frameworks, characterized by cognitive discriminations, correlate with modes of inference (anumāna, rjes dpag). This type of non-observation (anupalambha, ma dmigs pa) works to advance conventional existential notions. Appearances, which are characterized by sensation or feeling (vedanā, tshor ba), correlate to direct perceptions (pratyakṣa, mngon sum) and work in attributive predication of conventions. Essential nature, qualified by stainless insight (*amalaprajñā/vimalaprajñā, dri med shes rab), works to advance conventional notions about what is real (RZSB 1.478.12–15). Thus, we have three experiential dimensions (spyod yul), each of which may be given in objective, subjective, or essential terms, which, not unlike the three natures discourse given in Asaṅga, are themselves mutually implicating (see note below). Objects appear. Appearance may be objectified, and so on. Moreover, the logical conclusion of this rationalistic analysis is to say that the most real relation between citta + bodhi resolves their inseparable identity. Here, Rongzom's rhetoric enacts a shift away from classical epistemology's soteriological concern for conventions to a tantric soteriology's epistemological concern for ultimates.
Inference, in epistemological terms, requires a valid reason property, which is the epistemic instrument composing inferential understanding). A valid reason property is structured by both a pervasion element and a site element. The former is characterized by the absence of opposition (viruddha, 'gal ba) and inconclusion (anaikāntika, ma nges pa). Opposition occurs when the reason property is present in the dissimilar class (vipakṣa, mi mthun phyogs) and absent from the similar class (sapakṣa, mthun phyogs); inconclusion occurs when the reason property is common to both classes. The site element is valid when characterized by the presence of the reason property—that is, the site element of the reason property is structured by the absence of a reason that is not established or otherwise accepted (asiddha). The epistemological warrant for an inference is a proper pervasion that renders the inference epistemically compelling or necessary.
“The perspective offered by objective supports and conceptual frameworks, which are the jurisdiction of inference, has no capacity to remove the states of perceptual distortion that root our stress and confusion. The perspective offered in phenomenological appearance, though capable of eliminating distortions, cannot remove the confusion. Confusion is dissolved at the level of essential nature. In this sense, pursuing discriminative awareness structured by objective frameworks in the conceptual, propositional domain of experience comprises an inferior approach to the path; pursuing sensations in the flow of bare perception is a mediocre approach to the path; and pursuing awareness of stainless insight is superior” (RZSB 478.17–22).
Following Asaṅga (see Hanson 1998, p. 216), the explanation of relations between the ālayavijñāna and the three natures explicates relations between people and their worlds.
Hanson 219.
RZSB 1.478.22–479.5.
RZSB 1.420.22–421.1.
Rongzom's typology of identity comprises a three-fold elaboration of one the four types of realization (rtogs pa rnam bzhi), which, along with the three purities (dag pa gsum), four equalities (mnyam pa bzhi), and the logic of great nature (bdag nyid chen po’i gtan tshigs) constitute the “axioms” of Mahāyoga tantra. The poetry that opens chapter eleven of the Guhyagarbha-tantra treating the gaṅacakra-maṇdala extolls a pure view via four types of realization: unitary identity (literally “single cause”; rgyu gcig pa), semantics (yig 'bru), blessings (byin gyis brlab pa), and direct perception (mngon sum). In general, the Mahāyoga describes two paths: the path of release and the path of method. The four types of realization are given in context of the path of release. Rongzom's three-tiered identicality fits into the first realization of unitary identity. Cf. Garson (2004, pp. 334–335). See also bKa' gyur, Vol. 102, pp. 303.20–302.1). Cf. KCG (RZSB 1.178.13–16). Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa 'dus pa'i mdo chen po references rDo rje bkod pa as a source for the rgyu gcig pa. On Bön epistemology, which shares some significant overlap with what we see here, and the use of this term, see Klein and Wangyal (2006, p. 203 n. 53).
The four types of realization are a means for recognizing the primordially perfected nature of phenomena (RZSB 1.178.20). In his explanation of unitary identity (rgyu gcig pa), Rongzom unpacks the term's two semantic elements, rgyu + gcig, writing that in general the term, rgyu (Sanskrit: hetu), is used in the sense of causal basis, efficacious circumstance, syllogism, or reality. Here, it is used in the sense of reality (or being). The Tibetan term gcig (here a metaphor for “identity”) refers to either comparable, numerical, or indistinguishable identity. In this case, we are treating indistinguishable identity insofar as all phenomena are realized to consist in an inseparable reality, which means subject and predicate are not observed as [separate] elements, but are said to be realized as a unified identity (de la rgyu zhes bya ba ni spyir skyed par byed pa'i sa bon dang/ rten grogs dang gtan tshigs dang/ mtshad nyid rnams la 'jug go// de las 'dir mtshan nyid la gzung [179] bar bya'o// gcig ces bya ba yang spyir mtshung pa dang grangs dang dbyer med pa rnams la 'jug ste/ 'dir dbyer med pa la gzung bar bya ste/ de bas na chos thams cad mtshan nyid dbyer med par rtogs pas/ chos dang chos can mi dmigs pa ni rgyu gcig par rtogs pa zhes bya'o/ (178.23–179.4). lTa phreng adds that the realization of unitary identity is the realization of the inseparability of the two truths because it (i) sees the non-separability of all phenomena due to the fact they are ultimately unborn and conventionally illusory; (ii) understands the unborn, causally capable illusions that appear to the mind; and (iii) realizes that the absence of essential nature marking the illusory amounts to a realization of the inseparability of the two truths—i.e., their unitary nature (RZSB 1.296.9–12).
Comparable identity, which can be used to resolve bodhicitta, recalls relations between genus/species (spyi bye brag). Rongzom's example takes a pillar and a vase. Though obviously different in functional terms (e.g., one holding up a canopy, the other retaining fluid), they share a comparable identity because both are instances of the larger class of products by virtue of fabrication (kṛtakatva, byas pa nyid) being considered elemental to their being. They share a comparable identity insofar as fabrication is fundamental to their being (rten gzhi'i bye brag). And they both can be observed as objects that are basically the same insofar as they are products. Just being in hell epitomizes suffering and a buddha epitomizes bliss, though they are identical insofar as neither comprises any real self or solid reality. In this sense, comparable identity is not unlike emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid) insofar as it forms a significant metacategory without, ideally, occluding pragmatic distinctions. Cf. RZSB 479.23–480.9.
On this term, see Schmithausen (1981, p. 233 n. 122).
It is a phrase that figures the isolation of one type of pratyeka-jīna. Like an Indian rhino's single horn, the pratyetka-buddha arises and resides alone in the world, unlike, for example, the parrot-like (ne co lta bu) pratyeka. Whether the term refers to the rhino or the rhino's horn (the Indian rhino, unlike its African cousin, has only one horn) depends on interpretation. See the translator's note at https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.1.03.than.html.
Tibetan dictionaries typically define the Indian variety of rhinos (bse ru) in terms of being a wrinkled and leathery (hairless) herbivorous mammal shaped not unlike an ox with a single horn (cf. DYSG s.v.).
ThCh: de la grangs kyi gcig pa gang zhe na/ dper na bse' ru lta bu zhes bya ba/ ri dwags bse' la rwa gnyis lhag cig skyes pa myed de/ ral gri lta bu gcig yod pa la/ bse' ru cig [Msg = bswe ru gcig] zhes brjod pa bzhin du/ 'di' ltar gang zag dang phung po gnyis ni myed phung po nî yod ce'am/ de bzhin du gnyis po nî myed rang rig pa ni yod ces bya ba la stsogs pa kun du brtags pa bsal nas mtshan nyid pa yod par sgrub pa dang/ mtshan nyid pa de nyid la'ang chos dang chos can bdag nyid gcig par 'dod pa dang/ chos phan tshun kyang ngo bo nyid gcig pa lta bu tha dad nî 'gegs par byed la/ dngo po gcig ni sgrub pas de 'di skad du/ gnyis ni myed do gcig ni yod do zhes gnos po gcig go blo mi gtong ba 'di ni grangs kyi gcig pa zhes bya'o/ (RZSB 1.480.13–480.22).
Cf. PV 1, 67.
ThCh: de la dbyer myed pa'i gcig pa ni/ dper na nams mkha'i rang bzhin ni nams mkha' nyid do zhes brjod na/ re shig tha snyad kyi yul du nam mkha' dang nam mkha'i rang bzhin ces tha snyad kyi [481] yul du chos dang chos can du 'jog kyang/ nam mkha' zhes bya'ang stong pa nyid kyi tshig bla dwags/ nam mkha'i rang bzhin nam mkha'i nyîd ces bya ba'ang stong pa nyid kyi tshig bla dwags te/ 'di la gnyis su gzhag pa'i don gang yang mi rnyed do// de bzhin dy byang chub kyi sems zhes bya ba la'ang/ sems bkag nas byang chub sgrub par byed pa de'i tshe ni/ grags kyi gcig pa zhes bya bar 'gyur ro// gang gi tshe chos can sems ma grub pas/ de la rten nas gzhag pa'i byang chub kyang ma grub ste/ ji ltar nam mkha'i rang bzhin nam mkha' nyid ces brjod pa dang 'dra bar/ sems dang byang chub kyî dbye ba mi rnyed par 'dod pa de'i tshe/ dbyer myed pa'i gcig pa zhes bya'o// (RZSB 1.480.22–481.8).
In the work of Dharmakīrti, the natural or essential relation (svabhāvapratibandha) between the logical reason and the property predicated of it that is typically resolved in terms of either shared identity (tādātmya) or causal production (tadupatti) (Dunne, 2004, p. 152; Eltschinger et al., 2018, pp. 11, 41 n. 63).
Dunne (2004, p. 191). Smoke on the mountain pass proves the presence of fire in this way since being produced from fire is implicit in the concept of smoke. The question then becomes: does the fact that awakening (bodhi) is the ultimate character of ordinary mind (citta) prove that citta is called bodhicitta?
To be sure, the so-called negative-concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti, ldog khyab) obtains here insofar the very possibility of bodhi in a particular site is structured by the presence of citta there. In this sense, “bodhicitta” illustrates the point.
Would this satisfy the first option in Dunne (2004) for the possible resolution of the tatsvabhāva relation (211–212)? For his overview, see Dunne (2004, §3.4). An different question is this: on Rongzom’s analyses, is the identity relation between bodhi and citta one that may be recognized in some instance as resolving a relation not unlike the tādātmya variety? To be clear, I am not arguing that Rongzom is addressing Dharmakīrti’s text, but I am arguing, terminological disparities aside, Rongzom is engaging concerns that PV engages—relations, universals, proofs, etc.—which is not to say he is writing about PV. Rngog’s lost works aside, to date, we have no pre-13th century PV commentary in Tibetan.
ThCh: da ni skabs 'dir gcig pa dang tha dad par sgrub pa dang dgag pa la stsogs pa'i spyi'i tshul cung zad tsam brjod (RZSB 1.481.13–14).
ThCh: dper na bum pa myed zhes brjod na/ bum pa yod par rtog pa bzlog pa tsam du zad de/ bum pa myed pa'i sa phyogs la stsogs pa ni ston par mi byed do// de bzhin du gang zag myed ces brjod na/ gang zag yod par rtog pa tsam bzlog par zad de/ gang bag gîs stong pa'i phung po yod par ston par ni mi byed pa'o// (RZSB 1.481.21–24).
According to the method advanced in Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka, reductio ad absurdam argumentation is used to draw out the absurdities in an opponent’s philosophical theory without suggesting anything alternative perspective (ḍṛṣṭi, lta ba) of one’s own as a consequence. Candrakīrti writes: “thus, the prasaṅga method consists simply in the negation of an opponent’s thesis. It is not [that we are suggesting] that the opposite would be the case” (tataśca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvātprasaṅgāpādanasya nāsti prasañgaviparītārthāpattiḥ | [La Valée Poussin, 1970, p. 24].
ThCh: ma yin par dgag pa gang zhe na/ gzhan bgag nas gzhan ston pa ste/ ‘di ltar bum pa myed pa zhes brjod na/ bum pas stong pa’i sa phyogs go bar byed pa bzhin du/ gang zag myed pa zhes brjod na/ gang zag gis stong pa’i phung po stong par byed pa lta bu’o// de lta bas na myed par dgag pa ni gzhan gyi grub pa’i mtha’ sel ba tsam yin la/ ma yin par dgag pa ni de tsam gyis mi chog ste/ rang gi grub pa’i mtha’ ‘ang sgrub par byed pa yin no (RZSB 1.482.1–6).
In the Abhidharma context, we also see the term, piṇḍagrahabuddhi (*ekatvagrāha, gcig tu ’dzin pa): awareness of a whole is a state of awareness enacting apprehension of the five psycho-phsiycial aggregates as a unified self” (ekatvagrāha iti pañcopādānaskandheṣu piṇḍātmagrahataḥ | Engle, 2009, p. 506, n. 593).
ThCh: spyi gcig tu yod par 'dod pa ni ngo bo nyid du mar phye bas phyi gcig po 'jig go (486.13–14).
It may be worth exploring the scope of concern shared between the elements of Rongzom’s nature-distinction model and elements of logical epistemology—ad Pramāṇavārttikā 1, 61–62.
ThCh: gzhan yang gcig du sgrub par byed pa'i tshul yang rnam pa gnyis te/ bkar te gcig du bsgrub par byed pa dang/ bsdus te gcig du sgrub par byed pa'o// tha dad du sgrub par byed pa'i tshe na'ang gnyis te/ bzlog ste tha dad du bsgrub par byed pa dang/ phye ste tha dad du sgrub par byed pa'o/ (RZSB 1.484.18-484.21).
ThCh: de la ngo bo gcig yod par bsgrub pa gang zhe na/ spyi rdzas su yod par 'dod kyang rung/ btags par yod par 'dod kyang rung ste/ spyi gcig la ngo bo nyid du ma yod pa las/ 'di ngo bo nyid gcig du yod do zhes/ bkar te ngo bo nyid gcig yod par bsgrub bo// bkar te ngo bo nyid [485] gcig yin par bsgrub pa ni/ spyi la rten pa myed par ngo bo nyid du mar gnas pa rnams las ltos te/ bzlog nas bkar te 'di ngo bo nyid gcig yin no zhes yin par sgrub par byed do// 'di ltar chos dang chos can bdag nyid gcig par sgrub par byed pa na/ ngo bo nyid gcig sgrub par ste/ (RZSB 1.484.22-485.5).
For example, when we speak of that lotus’s blue color, it is as if two distinct natures must comprise a unity qua object.
ThCh: de la ngo bo nyid tha dad yod par bsgrub pa na/ spyi las phye ste sgrub par byed do// yin par sgrub pa na gcig las bzlog ste sgrub par byed do// de la chos gcig du sgrub par byed pa na// bkar te bsgrub par byed pa'i tshe// bum pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de'i cha shas ma lus par chu 'dzin par byed pa yin byas pa yin mi rtag pa yin no zhes khyad par gzhan spang shing chos gcig las bzlog nas sgrub bo// chos dang chos can gnyis chos gcig par sgrub par byed na/ ngo bo nyid phyogs su byas nas de'i cha shas ma lus par chos gcig du sgrub par byed do/ (RZSB 1.485.10-185.16).
PV 1, 61: “Although the two [words for property and property-bearer] indicate one [and the same thing], the [genitive case] ending, which expresses a distinction, presents the object as if [it were] different on account of a minute differentiation [created by a convention] in what is signified” (Eltschinger et al., 2018, p. 56). To be clear, I am not arguing that Rongzom is addressing, but not drawing upon Dharmakīrti’s text; he’s not writing about PV, but he is engaging concerns that PV engages: relations, universals, proofs, etc.
ThCh: chos dang chos can yang ngo bo nyid tha dad mi rnyed/ chos dang chos kyang ngo bo nyid tha dad mi rnyed de/ ngo bo nyid de ni gcig du yod pa'am ma yin par rdzas su grub par 'gyur la/ de'i chos ni ngo bo nyid de'i bye brag dang mtshan ma tsam du byas pa te/ so so na rdzas kyi cha shas myed par 'gyur te/ de lta na ngo bo nyid ni cha shas du ma myed pa rdzas gcig yod pa'am yin par sgrub par byed do/ (RZSB 1.485.09-486.12).
ThCh: de la rjes su gzhig pa'i blos rnam par phye ba'i du na ni/ spyi gcig tu yod par 'dod pa ni ngo bo nyid du mar phye bas phyi gcig po 'jig go// ngo bo nyid khyad par du mar phye bas ngo bo nyid gcig pa cha shas myed pa'i rdzas 'jig go// khyad par gcig po cha shas su phye chos gcig po'i rdzas 'jig ste mi 'grub bo// de ltar rims kyis rnam par phye na/ gcig dang du ma'i blo ni bskal pa'i bar du phye yang mi ldog du rung la// (RZSB 1.486.12-486.17).
ThCh: de lta na dngos por lta ba'i grub mtha' thams cad kyis rang gî grub pa'i mtha ni ril por [487] 'dzin pa'i blos ngo bo nyid gcig gi rdzas yod par bsgrubs/ gzhan gyi grub pa'i mtha' nî rjes su gzhîg pa'î blos bzhig ste rdzas su myed par bsgrubs kyang/ ji ltar bsgrubs pa de ltar tshad zin cing shes bya'i mthar phyin pa myed de dri ma che chung tsam du zad do// (RZSB 1.486.23–487.2). Cf. rang gi grub mtha' nî ril por 'dzin pa'i blos bzlums te/ khyed kyi grub mthas mi phyed par byed do// khyed kyi grub mtha' ni rjes su gzhig pa'i blos bshig ste/ ma grub par byed do// zhes khas ni mi len to// (RZSB 1.482.11–13).
ThCh: de la dang po sgrub pa thams cad kyi gzhi ngo bo nyid dang khyad par yin pas (RZSB 482.13–14). Here, nature, a common term in Buddhist philosophy, is described in terms of a unitive experience putatively amenable to attribution: “when the appearance of an object in awareness is undifferentiated in value and scope, it in fact appears possible to signify that undifferentiated mode as its nature” (de la ngo bo nyid gang zhe na/ blo gang la don gang snang ba na/ 'di ltar grangs kyis ma phye rgya che chung gis ma phye ste/ don gang snang ba de nyid mtshan mar byar rung bar snang ba'o/ RZSB 1.482.15–17).
The practice of vyākaraṇa style of grammatical and linguistic analyses is organized around the verbal root (dhātu) and its various derivatives and meanings (Monier-Williams, 2005(1899), p. xii). In classical terms, kṛt formations usually follow Pāṇinian treatments in which derivation structures two categories of meaning: the so-called bhāve sense of verbal action qua gerundive and “that of the various participants in an action” (Tubb & Boose, 1977, p. 50). The latter sense, of participation in an action, is exemplified by the “instruments of action,” the so-called kāraka categories, which themselves corresponds in meaning to the Sanskrit grammatical cases (vibhaktyartha) and the semantic roles through which they indicate verbal actions (this excludes the ṣaṣṭhīvibhakti genitive case, which typically interrelates nouns, and the vocative saṃbhodana, which is not a karaka in the technical sense). Fixing a suffix to an often-strengthened verbal root forms the kṛt pratyaya, which enacts participles, infinitives, gerunds, and variously formed substantives. The derivative meaning is contingent upon the particular suffix affixed. Taddhita pratyaya, on the other hand, affix to a strengthened nominal base and produce a variety of predications corresponding to the grammatical subject of a finite verb. Tubb and Boose write: “in each of these formulas the syntactically predominate element is a verb, while the word being analyzed is a noun” (52). On the Vedic practice of derivative analysis, see Scharfe, pp. 117–123; on some detail of the elements used in derivative analysis, see Tubb and Boose, chapter 6. This practice, which traces its roots back to the figure, Yāska, is grounded in the view that “nouns have their origin in verbs, and [thus explains] nouns by identifying the verbal roots they were derived from, showing how a verb semantically could be tied to a given word as its basis. In later Sanskrit scholarship, most derivative analyses were therefore made by linking the word being analyzed to a verb. As an example for this procedure, the following passage from Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the Repository of Systematized Dharma might be cited, where Vasubandhu first defines derivative analysis and then provides an illustration: 'A derivative analysis is a verbal dissection (nirvacana), like for example saying that the term “physical matter” (rūpa) is so-called, because it is breakable (rūpyate).' In other words, Vasubandhu gives the illustration that the standard Buddhist term for physical matter, namely rūpa, is a derivation of the verbal root 'to break' (rup), whereby the term rūpa is shown to be justified due to the breakable character of matter” (Kragh, 2009, p. 27).
Rongzom composed such a grammatical treatise: the Tibetan grammar known as the Smra sgo mtshon cha, ad RZSB 2.413–55.
It is to be recalled here that in the vyākaraṇa practice of linguistic analysis, that the role of the taddhita pratyaya is, inter alia, affix to a strengthened base to make predications of the logical subject.
ThCh: sgra'i bstan chos las kyang/ tha snyad ci brjod kyang med pa dang ma yin par dgag pa dang/ yod pa dang yin par bsgrub pa tsam las med de/ de la dngos po bsgrub pa'ang phal cher de la phan pa'i rkyen dang/ byed pa'i rkyen gyis brjod de/ de la phan pa'i rkyen ni 'di ltar can lta bu spyi ston pa dang/ gang yin pa lta bu ngo bo nyid ston pa dang/ nyid lta bu khyad par ston pa dang/ byed pa'i rkyen yang 'di ltar/ ring du 'gro bar byed pa ni ring du 'gro ba zhes yon tan ston pa dang ring du 'gro bar byed pa ni ring 'gro zhes yon tan ston pa lta bu'ang yod pa dang yin par ston pa las gud na myed do// gzhan yang ming kha ma tshang ba las kha tshang bar byas pa tsam dang/ rnam par dbye ba dang bcas pa tsam la yin byed kyi mtha' can zhes bya ste/ ras yug gi dkar po bya ba lta bu yod pa dang yin par ston pa'i rkyen myed pa'ang don de las mi 'da'o/ (RZSB 1.487.11–487.18). It is also noteworthy that in his commentary on Pramāṇavārttika, Legs bshad snang ba'i gter (90.1–91.5), treating PV 1, 61, Mipham (mi pham, 1846–1912), engages in a similar vyākaraṇa style of analyses based on primary and secondary derivations. Although his passage is longer, at the bottom, he employs some of the same tropes and topes. While Rongzom is not directly commenting on PV, one cannot escape the fact Mipham's remarks on PV employ language that is remarkably similar.
In the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, a Sarvāstivāda figure makes a distinction between his position on the unconditioned and that of his Vaibhāṣika opponent: the Vaibhāṣikas asserts that unconditioned dharmas have no arising by virtue of their empty nature (dharmatā) and the Sarvāstivāda argues that dharmatā in fact renders everything equal in terms of non-arising—a point of interpretation championed throughout ThCh. The section ends suddenly on a question of how, in light of interpretive divergences, to take scriptural statements (La Valée Poussin, 1988, pp. 249–250). In the Abhidharmasamuccaya attributed to Asaṅga, nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya are explained in chapter four on dialectical subjects in the context of a hermeneutical understanding of a deeper meaning (abhisaṃdhiviniścaya) of scripture (Rahula 242). There, determining the profound meaning is listed among six other legitimate topics for philosophical inquiry: significance (artha), explanations (vyākhyā), analytical demonstrations (prabhidyasaṃdarśana), collections (saṃgraha), and arguments (vāda) (ibid.).
ThCh: don gang snang ba de nyid mtshan mar byas rung bar snang ba'o// de mtshon par byed pa nî ming yin te/ 'dir ltar nā ma zhes bya ba'i sgra/ na ya dî zhes bya ste khrid par byed pas ming ste/ blo gang don gyi ngo bo nyid la khrid par byed sbyor bar byed pas ming zhes bya ste/ de ni 'di ltar ka ba dang bum pa zhes bya ba lta bu ngo bo nyid rgya chung ba la sbyor bar byed kyang rung/ ’dus byas dang 'dus ma byas zhes bya ba lta bu ngo bo nyid rgya che ba la sbyor bar byed kyang rung ste/ ji tsam du ming gis khrid pa'i don de la ngo bo nyid ces bya'o// (RZSB 1.482.17–22).
ThCh: ji tsam du ming gis khrid pa'i don de la ngo bo nyid ches bya'o/ (RZSB 1.482.22).
ThCh: la kṣa ṇa zhes bya ba/ rgyu'am mtshan ma'am rtags la 'jug ste/ de bas na rnam par rtog pa'i blo gang gis ming dang ming can bsres te gcig du zhen par byas nas/ don gyi mtshan ma dang rtags su byas [483] nas rgyu mtshan zhes bya'o// sangs rgyas kyi mtshan bzang po la yang la kṣa ṇa zhes bya ste/ tsham'am rtags su byas pa'o// de la ming dang rgyu mtshan de dag ni/ sgra'i bstan chos pa 'dod pa ltar don gyi ngo bo nyid la ldan pa ni ma yin te/ ngo bo nyid ni ming dang rgyu mtshan dang bral ba'o/ (RZSB 1.482.22–483.4).
ThCh: ngo bo nyid dang khyad par du gzhag pa'ang/ ngo bo nyid ni khyad par la ma rten par grub pa'o// khad par nî ngo bo nyid la rten nas bye brag so sor rnam par phye ba'o// de la khyad par de ston par byed pa ni tshig yin te/ 'di ltar bya dzā na zhes bya ba/ dpe byad bzang po'i ming yang yin/ tshod ma'i ming yang yin/ tshig 'bru la yang bya ste/ (RZSB 1.483.17–483.20). The Sanskrit term vyañjana also translates the Tibetan word “characteristic” (mtshan, Mvp 292); and it has aesthetic-epistemological registers, suggesting as it does “token,” “sign,” “making clear,” “manifestation,” “indication,” and “reminder,” among others (Apte, 1992, p. 1508a).
ThCh: de la dpe byad bzang po la bya dzā na zhes bya ba/ me tog gi ze'u 'bru nyid kyang me tog yin mod kyi/ me tog gi spyir ze'u 'brus 'byes par byed pa ltar/ dpe byad nyid kyang mtshan gyi khongs su gtogs mod kyi/ mtshan spyi dpe byad kyis 'byes par byed pa bzhin du/ bum pa mi rtag ches bya ba lta bu tshig gang gis ngo bo nyid de byed brag du 'byed par byed [BM, Th = bye brag du 'byed] pas de skad du'o// [484] ji ltar tshod mas zan gyi ro byed brag du 'byed cing khrid par byed pa ltar/ khyad par gyi tshig gang gis ngo bo nyid de bye brag du 'byed par byed/ phyogs gcig du 'dren par byed pas tshig 'brus zhes bya'o// (RZSB 1.483.20–484.3).
ThCh: chos dang chos can gnyis chos gcig par sgrub par byed na/ ngo bo nyid phyogs su byas nas de'i cha shasma lus par chos gcig du sgrub par byed do// (RZSB 1.485.15–16).
ThCh: 'di ltar ril bor 'dzin pa'i blos gcig du sgrub par byed pa'i tshe/ ngo bo nyid gcig du sgrub par byed na/ chos dang chos can yang ngo bo nyid tha dad mi rnyed/ (RZSB 1.486.7–9).
ThCh: rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul la rigs pa de dag gis phyogs cha tsam du'ang slebs pa myed di/ dper na rgya mtsho chen po'i gting dang nam mkha'i mtha' mda' rgyang dang mig rgyang gis gzhal bar 'dod par bzhin no/ (RZSB 1.487.9–11).
That is, (i) the reasoning of reality (dharmatāyukti, chos nyid kyi rigs pa), (ii) reasoning of efficacy (kāryakāraṇayukti, bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa), (iii) reasoning of dependence (apekṣāyukti, ltos pa'i rigs pa), and (iv) the reasoning of valid proof (upapattisādhanayukti, 'thad pa sgrub pa'i rigs pa). The locus classicus for this four-fold scheme is found in Tōh. 106, Saṁdhiniromocana-sūtra, chapter ten (for an English translation, see Powers 1995, pp. 284–289). Scholarly descriptions are found in Kapstein (2001, pp. 320–322) and Köppl (2008, pp. 61–88).
According to Köppl (2008), Rongzom uses reasoning “to establish a superior ontological status for purity” (p. 61). She also offers an important qualifier: “Rongzom’s treatment” of the reasoning of reality “appears somewhat unconventional” (ibid.). This, first and foremost, stems from the fact that Rongzom lists the principle reasoning of reality first rather than last, as it is in canonical sources (loc. cit.).
gzhan yang rigs pa'i bstan chos las rigs pa rnam pa bzhi'i sgo nas dgag sgrub byed pa rnams kyang/ dgag pa rnam pa gnyis dang/ bsgrub pa gnyis las mi 'da' ste/ rigs pa rnam pa bzhi'i sgo nas gzhal yang/ dngos por lta ba rnams kyi grub mtha' gcig la gcig gnod pa tsam yang dmigs la/ gzhan yang rigs pa nyid thal bar gyur nas slar gnod pa [488] dmigs par zad de/ des rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul la mi gnod pa ni snga ma bzhin no// (RZSB 1.487.20–488.1).
Glossing the four, Rongzom writes: “in the system of the four principles of reasoning, generally, it is established that arising as dependent relations is the character of phenomena. The reasoning of reality comprises proofs given in terms of essential nature. The reasoning of efficacy comprises of proofs given in terms of result. The reasoning of dependence comprises of proofs given in terms of cause. The reasoning of valid proof is comprises of proofs given in terms qualified by stainless reasoning alone” (de la rigs pa bzhi'i tshul ni/ spyir chos rten cing 'brel te 'byung ba bsgrub pa'i mtshan nyid la/ ngo bo nyid kyis sgo nas sgrub pa ni chos nyid kyi rigs pa/ 'bras bu'i sgo nas sgrub par byed pa ni bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa/ rgyu'i sgo nas sgrub par byed pa ni ltos pa'i rigs pa/ rigs pa nyid dri ma myed par byas te sgrub par byed pa ni 'thad pa sgrub pa'i rigs pa'o// RZSB 1.488.1–5).
ThCh: 'di rnams kyi sel ba bzhi ni/ ngo bo nyid la the tsom za ba dang/ byed pa la the tshom za ba/ dang mngon par 'grub pa la the tshom za ba dang/ rigs pa la the tshom za ba rnams go rims bzhin du sel bar byed do// (RZSB 1.488.6–8).
ThCh: 'di rnams kyi yul dang tshad ni/ chos kyi dngos gzhi la dri ma myed cing dngos gzhi ma log na chos nyid kyi rigs par gzhag du rung ngo// de bzhin du byed pa dang mngon par 'grub pa dang rigs pa'i dngos gzhi rnams la dri ma myed cing dngos gzhi la log na de rnams rigs par gzhag du rung ngo// (RZSB 1.488.8–11).
ThCh: de la dngos por smgra ba rnams dngos po sgrub pa na/ phal chers chos nyid kyi rigs pa dang mngon sum gyis sgrub par byed de (RZSB 1.488.20–21).
Excessive application of the four principles concerns the conventional truth associated with the Madhyamaka textual tradition, a philosophical category Rongzom criticizes as “a guardian of all realist theories” (ThCh: dngos por lta ba thams cad kyi srung mar 'gyur ro/ RZSB 1.489.15). This criticism may be aimed at what is traditionally described as the svatantrika interpretation. Rongzom’s critical review of Madhyamaka is buttressed in chapter one, where he describes the Madhyamaka conception of conventional truth as something fabricated and tainted (dbu' ma'i tshul las yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i khyad par gyi dbye ba byas pas/ de nyid kyis brnyogs pa bzhin du rang gis rang nyams par [45] byas pa brjod pa tsam yin te/ (RSZB 1.434.23–435.1). In general, Rongzom's concept of “realist views” ( dngos po'i lta ba) is closely tied to his concern for the perception of real entities (dravya, rdzas). lTa ba'i brjed byang describes the correspondence between theoretical stance and cognitive delusions: “when realist views are not collapsed there is no overcoming awareness [that fixates on] reality. When realist views are not collapsed, there is no overcoming the mind of craving—and as long as craving is not overcome, there is no overcoming bondage in existence” (dngos por lta ba ma log par/ mtshan nyid kyi blo ldog par mi 'gyur ro// de ma log na sred pa'i blo ldog par mi 'gyur ro// ji srid du sred pa ma log pa de sred du/ srid pa kun tu sbyor ba sdlog par mi 'gyur ro// RZSB 2.25.21–23). Moreover, on the view of equality in which all teachings are of one taste, the delusion imposed by realist views exists on a sliding scale of perceived reality. Rongzom writes: “insofar as the view of equality waxes, the view of inequality wanes. In short, [the view of equality] simply slowly diminishes fixation on realist views” (ThCh: ji ltar mnyam par lta ba shes che ba ltar/ mi mnyam par lta ba 'grib par 'gyur ro/ mdor na dngos por lta ba'i zhen pa khad kyis bri bar zad do/ RZSB 1.502.21–23).
Cf. Madhyāntavibhaṅgakārikā (bsTan 'gyur, Vol. 70, 903.6–8).
ThCh: 'di ltar sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad rang rig pa'i mngon sum ma yin nam// de ltar na mngon sum nyid yang dag pa'i shes pa ma yin nam/ de lta na de [490] la rigs pa gzhan gyîs bsgrub ci dgos/ gzhan yang yang dag pa'i shes pa de sun 'byin par byed pa'i yang dag pa'i shes pa gnyis pa/ de las mthu rtsal gyis che ba gzhan gang zhig yod/ (RZSB 1.489–90). See ThCh, chapter three, for the same language in a passage concerning hypostatization of the Yogācāra ultimate via existential and predicative proofs (RZSB 1.464.5–9).
ThCh: shes bya thams cad sems tsam yin na/ yang dag pa'i shes pa des gzhal zhing bsgrub par bya ba'î don gzhan yang cig zhig btsal dgos zhes chos nyid dri ma myed pa dang mngon sum dri ma myed par 'dzin to// (RZSB 1.490.3–5).
ThCh: gzhan du na de dag dri ma can du bsgrub par byed pa yang yod de/ 'di ltar thun mong ltar na mngon sum gyî blo de rnam pa dang bcas par skye ba zhig gam/ 'on te rnam pa myed par skye ba zhig de la rnam pa myed par skye na ni don la mngon sum du'ang ji ltar byed/ gal te rnam pa dang bcas par skye na ni ma 'khrul ba'i dpang po' ang gang gis bya/ (RZSB 1.490.5–9). On Rongzom's use of the concept of a “witness,” see note above.
ThCh: de bas na mngon sum nî tshad mar mi rung ngo zhes sun 'byin pa yang yod do// (1.490.9).
ThCh: rnal 'byor spyod pa po nyid kyi ltar na/ khams gsum pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa ma yin nam/ kun du rtog pa yhin na ji ltar mngon sum gyi blo rtog pa dang bral/ yang dag ma yin par grub na ji ltar mngon sum gyi blo ma 'khrul/ rtog pa dang bcas shing 'khrul pa dang bcas par gyur na tshad mar ji ltar rung/ (RZSB 1.490.10–14).
It would follow, moreover, that any such perception, structured in part by reflexive awareness, would consists in awareness steeped feeling and sensation. Thus, it would have no capacity to eliminate confusion, which is itself qualified by feelings and sensations.
ThCh: gal te phra zhing chung bar dgag pa yin te/ 'du shes phra ba la 'du shes myed ces dgag par ltar/ rtog pa 'phra ba la rtog pa myed ces brjod la/ gzugs chung ba la gzugs med ces brjod pa ltar/ 'khrul pa chung ba la ma 'khrul zhes brjod na ni/ ngo bo nyid rtog pa dang bcas shing 'khrul pa dang cas pa yin pas tshad mar ji ltar rung/ gzhan yang gzung 'dzin gyi ngo bo bsal yang/ shes shing rig pa'i mtshan nyid du skye ba nyid tshor bas nyams su myong ba yin na/ tshor ba'i spyod yul gyis 'khrul pa mi chod pas rang rig pa nyid de lta bur grub bam mi grub ma nges te da rung gzhal bya yin no// (RZSB 1.490.18–24).
It is worth noting that, instead of citing directly, Rongzom often alludes to, paraphrases, or, perhaps, even offers his own rendering of a canonical passage. See Sur (2015).
Perhaps further comparison can be made between Rongzom's discourse on “eliminating other distinctions” (khyad par gzhan spang) and Dharmakīrti's explanations of predicates. Indeed, Mipham's commentary employs “eliminating other distinctions” in explicating apohistic features of pramāṇa. Given Mipham’s outsize roll in producing Rongzom's extent works (see Sur, 2021), we cannot discount the possibility of the former's involvement in the composition of these passages; a thought I leave for another day.
ThCh: de bzhin du rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul [460] gyis chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur shin tu 'go mnyam pa nyid du rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas/ (RZSB 1.459.24–460.2).
ThCh: de yang chos dang chos can bdag nyid gcig par 'dod pa tsam gyis bden pa gnyis dbyer myed par rtogs pa'i grangs su mi chud de/ 'di ltar nyan thos kyi tshul las kyang/ 'du byed rnams mi rtag pa'i mtshan nyid du 'dod pa na/ mi rtag pa nyid 'du byed las gzhan yin par mi 'dod do// rnal 'byor spyod pa yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa gnyis pos stong pa'i mtshan nyid can du 'dod pa na/ stong pa nyid gzhan dbang las gzhan yin par 'dod do// de ltar na chos can la chos nyid yod par 'dod pa dag kyang gzhan yin par 'dod na/ dbu ma pa chos rnams rang bzhin myed pa nyid yin par 'dod pa la/ gzhan du 'dod pa lta smos kyang ci dgos te/ 'on kyang bden pa gnyi kyî blo mi 'dor bas/ gnyis su myed par lta ba'i grangs su mi chud de/ nam phyi nang gi dngos por snang ba 'di dag kun du brtags pa'i mtshan nyid dang 'go mnyam par rtogs pa de'i tshe/ bden pa gnyis dbyer med par lta ba zhes bya'o (RZSB 1.460.5–15).
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Thank you to Pascal Hugon and Khenpo Yeshe for criticisms and suggestions of an earlier drafts of this paper. The work here was made possible by a Fulbright IIE grant to Nepal (2012–2013). I also owe thanks to my blind reviewers and the editors of the Journal of Indian Philosophy.
Sigla and Abbreviations
Sigla and Abbreviations
ˆ | gi gu verso |
√ | Verbal root |
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PV | Pramāṇavārttika (Gnoli) |
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Di Zinno Sur, D. The Dzokchen Apology: On the Limits of Logic, Language, & Epistemology in Early Great Perfection. J Indian Philos 50, 1–46 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09492-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09492-z