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The Normative Significance of Desires

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Notes

  1. J. Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 2; D. Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1997: suppl., 71:99–130; W. Quinn, "Putting Rationality in its Place", in Quinn, Lawrence and Hursthouse (eds.), Virtues and Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 181–208; J. Raz, "Incommensurability and Agency", in his Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 46–66; T. Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); M. Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 41–49.

  2. See B. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", in Harrison (ed.), Rational Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

  3. See J. Hampton, The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); J. McDowell, "Virtue and Reason", in his Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); E. Millgram, Practical Induction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Quinn, 1998, op. cit., pp. 181–208; Scanlon, 1998, op. cit., pp. 41–49.

  4. See G.F. Schueler, Desire (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 29–38.

  5. See P. Pettit and M. Smith, "Backgrounding Desire", Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, 564–592 (1990).

  6. Quinn, 1998, op.cit., p. 189.

  7. D. Davidson, "Actions Reasons and Causes" in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 3.

  8. T. Schapiro, "The Nature of Inclination", Ethics, Vol. 119, 229–256 (2009).

  9. Quinn, 1998, op. cit,. p. 185.

  10. Quinn, 1998, op. cit., p. 189, emphasis added.

  11. See Quinn, 1998, op.cit.

  12. Raz commits the same mistake (see for example Raz op.cit. 58) and rests his argument against the normative force of desires on the same grounds.

  13. Pettit and Smith ,1990, op. cit., pp. 564–592.

  14. In Parfit, 1997, op.cit., his argument to the effect that desires never provide reasons is roughly the same.

  15. See D. Sobel, "Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, 437–457 (2005).

  16. Dancy, 2000, op. cit., p. 42.

  17. See C.G. Hempel, “The Theoretician’s Dilemma”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 2), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).

  18. See D. Velleman, "Deciding How to Decide" in Cuility and Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); R. Holton, "Rational Resolve", Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, 507–535 (2004); and M. Schroeder, "Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons", Philosophical Studies, Vol. 143, 223–248 (2009).

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  1. Beer Sheva University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel

    Dalia Drai

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Drai, D. The Normative Significance of Desires. J Value Inquiry 46, 417–434 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9360-6

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