Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Animal Beliefs and Their Contents

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper investigates whether, or not, the behavior of animals without speech can manifest beliefs and desires. Criteria for the attribution of such beliefs and desires are worked out with reference to Jonathan Bennett's theory of cognitive teleology: A particular ability for learning justifies attributing such beliefs and desires. The conceptual analysis is illustrated by examinations of cognitive ethology and considers higher-order intentionality. It is argued that the behavioral evidence only supports the attribution of first order beliefs and that languageless animals therefore could not possess higher-order intentionality. They are only capable of forming simple, i.e., first-order beliefs about their environment.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Bennett, J.: 1976, Linguistic Behaviour, Hackett, Indianapolis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.: 1978, ‘Some Remarks About Concepts’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 557-560.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.: 1983, ‘Cognitive Ethology: Theory or Poetry’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 356-358.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.: 1990, ‘How is Cognitive Ethology Possible?’, in C. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 35-49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.: 1991a, ‘How to Read Minds in Behaviour: A Suggestion from a Philosopher’, in A. Whiten (ed.), Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Basil Blackwell, London, pp. 97-108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J.: 1991b, ‘Folk-Psychological Explanations’, in J. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press, pp. 176-195.

  • Bennett, J.: 1991c, ‘Analysis without Noise’, in R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-36.

  • Burge, T.: 1978, ‘Concept of Mind in Primates?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 560-562.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R. and A. Whiten (eds.): 1988, Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R. and A. Whiten (eds.): 1991, ‘Computation and Mindreading in Primate Tactical Deception’, in A. Whiten (ed.), Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Basil Blackwell, London, pp. 127-141.

  • Cheney, D. and R. Seyfarth: 1990, How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1971, ‘Intentional Systems’, Journal of Philosophy 8, 87-106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1981, ‘Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology’, in R. Healy (ed.), Reduction, Time and Reality.

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1983, ‘Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ Defended’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 343-390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1987, ‘True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works’, in D. Dennett (ed.), The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 13-35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1988a, ‘The Intentional Stance in Theory and Practice’, in R. Byrne and A. Whiten (ed.), Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 180-202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1988b, ‘Out of the Armchair and into the Field’, Poetics Today 9, 205-221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1991, ‘Real Patterns’, Journal of Philosophy 88, 27-51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreckmann, F.: 1996, Wahrnehmen und Glauben. Eine auf empirische Wissenschaften Bezug nehmende Begriffsanalyse. Cuvillier Verlag, Göttingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, D. R.: 1976, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. Rockefeller University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, D. R. (ed.): 1982, Animal Mind — Human Mind: Report of the Dahlem Workshop on Animal Mind-Human Mind, Berlin 1981. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, D. R.: 1991, ‘Progress Toward a Cognitive Ethology’, in C. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ, pp. 3-17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel, C. G.: 1968, ‘Rational Action’, in N.S. Care and Ch. Landesman (eds.), Readings in the Theory of Action. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 281-305.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jamieson, D. M. and M. Bekoff: 1992, ‘On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.), Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2. Philosophy of Science Association 1993, East Lansing, pp. 110-124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kummer, H.: 1982, ‘Social Knowledge in Free-ranging Primates’, in D. Griffin (ed.), Animal Mind — Human Mind: Report of the Dahlem Workshop on Animal Mind-Human Mind, Berlin 1981. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 113-130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1969, Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge University Press, Massachussets.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menzel, E. W.: 1974, ‘A Group of Young Chimpanzees in a One-Acre Field’, in A. M. Schrier and F. Stollnitz (eds.), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates, Vol. 5. Academic Press, New York, pp. 83-153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Premack, D.: 1988, ‘Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?’ Revisited, in R. Byrne and A. Whiten (eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 160-179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Premack, D. and Woodruff, G.: 1978, ‘Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 515-526.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ristau, C. (ed.): 1990, Cognitive Ethology: the Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ristau, C.: 1992, ‘Cognitive Ethology: Past, Present and Speculations on the Future’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.), Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Vol.2. Philosophy of Science Association 1993, East Lansing, pp. 125-136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savage, C.W.: 1978, ‘Isn't the Answer Obvious?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 596-597.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savigny, E. von: 1995, ‘Keine Hoffnung für Hunde’, in E. von Savigny and O. Scholz (eds.), Wittgenstein über die Seele. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, pp. 41-56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schubert, G.: 1978, ‘Cooperation, Cognition and Communication’, Behavioral and Brain Science 1, 597-600.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, P.: 1982a, ‘Bennett's Beliefs’, Philosophical Studies 41, 431-442.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schubert, G.: 1982b, ‘On Animal Beliefs’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, 503-512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C.: 1964, The Explanation of Behaviour. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waal, F. de: 1986, ‘Deception in the Natural Communication of Chimpanzees’, in R. W. Mitchell and N. S. Thompson (eds.), Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit, State University of New York Press, New York, pp. 221-244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whiten, A. (ed.): 1991, Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Basil Blackwell, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whiten, A. and R. Byrne: 1988a, ‘Tactical Deception in Primates’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11, 233-244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whiten, A. and R. Byrne: 1988b, ‘The Manipulation of Attention in Primate Tactical Deception’, in R. Byrne and A. Whiten (eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 211-223.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodruff, G. and Premack, D.: 1979, ‘Intentional Communictation in the Chimpanzee: The Development of Deception’, Cognition 7, 333-362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Von Weiss Str. 4, 53639, Königswinter, Germany

    Frank Dreckmann

Authors
  1. Frank Dreckmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Dreckmann, F. Animal Beliefs and Their Contents. Erkenntnis 51, 597–615 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005593324763

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005593324763

Keywords

Search

Navigation