Abstract
In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon anyother facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claimis that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that constitute it) as good and to view it as bad.
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Dreher, J.H. Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts. Philosophical Studies 108, 23–30 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015751812480
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015751812480