Abstract
Elinor Mason has provided an account of blame and blameworthiness that is pluralistic. There are, broadly speaking, three ways in which we aptly blame -- and ordinary sense, directed at those with poor quality of the will, and then a detached sense and an extended sense, in which blame is aptly directed towards those without poor quality of the will as it is normally understood. In this essay I explore and critically discuss Mason's account. While I argue that she has identified interesting aspects of the way in which we hold people morally responsible, I disagree with certain features of the account, in particular, that ordinary blame issues in demands and that there is any deep sense in which we can simply decide to take on responsibility.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Conversation and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2012.
This is based on a case presented in my earlier “The Suberogatory,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1992, 286–295.
Mason does acknowledge such a distinction between being blameworthy and being morally criticizable. For example, on page 89 she argues that a person who is just an uncaring person may in one sense have a bad will and be morally criticizable, but not blameworthy. However, the distinction itself isn’t spelled out.
“Good Intentions and the Road to Hell,” Philosophical Explorations, 2017, 40–54.
Funding
No funding.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Driver, J. Understanding blame. Philos Stud 181, 921–927 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01975-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01975-x