Abstract
This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.
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Notes
I borrow the question from Peyton Young. See Young [42, p. 6].
This idea formed the core underpinning to my doctoral work at King’s College London and is the subject of a book I am currently writing.
For norms that involve negative injunctions, this takes the form of restraining one’s behaviour; for example, refraining from littering and instead carrying the garbage to the nearest trashcan.
The term “normative semiotics” is appears in some of the semiotic literature; however, the meaning here is markedly distinct from past usages of the term.
See, e.g., Leary [22, p. 129] “Since Darwin … all theories of emotion have assumed that the capacity for emotional experience evolved because it had adaptive value in helping organisms deal with recurrent challenges and opportunities in their physical and social environments.” (footnotes omitted).
A primary difference is that Posner pins his theory entirely on a rational choice model, choosing to completely ignore internalization. See Posner [31]. As well, I do not think cost is necessary to explain norms; the mere act of compliance is enough to signal cooperation.
Note this definition crucially includes abstract opinions and views, as these have the potential to be communicated to others and so can be understood as a form of behaviour.
I am in good company: Robert Cooter also asserts a norm only exists if it has been internalized. See Cooter [8, pp. 1661–1666].
However, this is not to imply that norms can never also possess a functional character. Often their functional characteristic is their chief feature and only standardize as signals thereafter.
Norms of course take the form of negative as well as positive injunctions, prescribing a course of action or inaction as the case may be.
E.g. phonological, syntactical, lexical, prosodic and paralinguistic subcodes.
The word “economic” here is used in its most sweeping sense: cooperation to ensure survival.
Of course, not all preferences are triggered by signalling; but all normative intuitions are.
Indeed, Frank sees the emotions as the progenitor of moral behaviour rather than rational decisions. See Frank [14, pp. 51–56].
Robert Trivers famously presented a similar idea in his 1971 paper The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, though not in terms of signalling. Trivers argued that due to the difficulty involved in computing the complex cost–benefit ratios that underpin long-term reciprocity, human emotions evolved as a regulating mechanism. See Trivers [39].
Herbert Gintis argues that the ability to internalize norms evolves as it enhances individual fitness in situations where social behaviour has become too complex to be evaluated piecemeal through individual rational assessment. See Gintis [15].
I radically diverge from Posner here; he believes that a normative act must be rationally chosen to qualify as a signal.
Two other problems arise when we embrace such a problem but are not dealt with here. First, why would norms that are consistently inefficient, such as samurai ritual suicide, emerge? Second, if internalization is advantageous, why do some actors not do so? The answer to the first is that we are conditioned to internalize a norm’s cooperation signals, not the norm's content. At times these signals can go quite haywire in evolutionary terms as in the case of ritual suicide. The answer to the second is that some players adopt the evolutionary strategy of opportunism, and internalization would impede such a strategy at times.
For example, animals certainly kill, but it is unclear if an animal can commit murder; we do not have the moral language for this, as we do not impose normative meaning on animal behaviour in the way we do for human behaviour.
This provocative contention brings up some important questions. For one, why does normativity differ in intensity? That is, why is it more wrong to murder someone than to push them out of your way? The answer is that acts will vary in terms of their normative intensity commensurate with how powerfully they signal non-cooperation. An actor who pushes someone may still have some cooperative potential; the murderer does not. Another question is why do cultures exhibit quite a bit of normative consistency? The answer to this is that many acts are natural candidates to standardize as cooperation signals in that they naturally signal non-cooperation, e.g. murder, theft, or cannibalism.
Early traces are arguably found in David Hume questioning how an ‘ought’ could be extracted from an “is.” See Hume [18, p. 469]. For a more contemporary and comprehensive account of moral scepticism see Mackie [24]. The branch of analytic philosophy known as meta-ethics addresses this idea extensively. The reader is referred to this fascinating (and relatively active) area of philosophy, specifically non-cognitivist approaches such as emotivism (which holds that moral propositions are merely expressions of emotion).
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Acknowledgments
I want to thank Prof. Eric Posner at the University of Chicago for his helpful comments and suggestions and Dr. Andreas Dimopoulos (PhD, Cantab.) at Brunel University in London for taking the time to help proofread this draft. Of course, any errors are entirely my own.
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Druzin, B.H. Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms. Int J Semiot Law 26, 257–274 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9271-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9271-z