Abstract
This paper outlines a shift in the role of self-awareness from Yogācāra to tantra and connects some of the dots between Yogācāra, Pratyabhijñā, and Buddhist tantric traditions in Tibet. As is the case with Yogācāra, the Pratyabhijñā tradition of Utpaladeva (10th c.) maintains that awareness is self-illuminating and constitutive of objects. Utpaladeva’s commentator and influential successor, Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.), in fact quotes Dharmakīrti’s (7th c.) argument from the Pramāṇaviniścaya that objects are necessarily perceived objects (sahopalambhaniyama). That is, everything known is known in consciousness; there is nothing that can be known outside or separate from consciousness. This aspect of Pratyabhijñā thought is shared with Yogācāra. While Utpaladeva drew upon Yogācāra epistemology to formulate a differential construction of objects (via apoha), he departed from this theory to develop a distinctive monistic framework for the interpretation of subjectivity. By appealing to the ultimate reality of a singularly nonconceptual, transcendental subject rather than a plurality of (non)conceptual particulars, Utpaladeva appropriated Dharmakīrti’s epistemological model while turning it on its head. That is, Utpaladeva critiqued Dharmakīrti in one context (his external realism) while he is indebted to him in another (his epistemic idealism) to establish the framework for his own absolute idealism, where everything happens in and through the absolute self that is Śiva. Utpaladeva extended (or made explicit) the place of self-awareness in Yogācāra to formulate an absolute idealism that is the theoretic foundation for philosophical tantra. In this paper, I will chart a trajectory of this development, from Yogācāra to Pratyabhijñā, and show how a parallel development took place in tantric assimilations of Yogācāra in Tibet.
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Notes
Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.5.2, 1: 198: ‘If the object did not have the nature of awareness (prakāśa), it would be without illumination (aprakāśa), as it was before [its appearance]. Awareness (prakāśa) cannot be different [than the object]. Awareness (prakāśatā) is the essential nature of the object.’ Trans. from Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, 110. Lawrence here translates prakāśa, which means ‘light’ or ‘luminosity,’ with ‘awareness,’ making explicit the strong parallel between light and (self-)awareness.
Abhinavagupta, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī (ĪPVV) II, 78. For Dharmakīrti’s statement, see Pramāṇaviniścaya, I.55ab; Steinkellner 1972: 206. Cited in Torella, The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti, 111n5. Abhinavagupta additionally drew from Vasubandhu and Dignāga, arguing that the idea of an external, indivisible particle that aggregates to construct the world of extended objects is incoherent. He explicitly cited Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vasubandhu’s Vimśatika when arguing against the idea that indivisible particles cannot aggregate to constitute a world of extended objects (ĪPVV II, 144). See Ratié, ‘The Dreamer and the Yogin,’ 450–452.
Utpaladeva, ĪPKV I.5.13.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK 1.6.3: ‘We call a concept (vikalpa) the determinate ascertainment (niścaya) of “that,” e.g., jar, resulting from the exclusion of the “not-that” by the cognizer who experiences the intuition (pratibhā) of both the “that” and the “non-that”.’ Translation adapted from Torella (Torella, 1994), 131.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.6.1–2. Translation adapted from Torella (Torella, 1994), 127–130.
Utpaladeva’s characterizes his ‘nonconceptual’ I-consciousness as ‘informed by language’ (vāgvapuḥ). Thus, there is a difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Utpaladeva’s characterization of vikalpa. Utpaladeva’s I-consciousness is ‘conceptual’ according to Dharmakīrti’s definition—‘what is suitable to be mixed with language’ (abhilāpasaṃsargayogya), whereas Dharmakīrti’s nonconceptual particulars (svalakṣaṇa), which, present a duality, are conceptual according to Utpaladeva’s characterization of vikalpa as ‘presenting a duality (dvayākṣepī).’ For Dharmakīrti’s characterization of vikalpa, see his Nyāyabindu, I.5; for Utpaladeva’s characterization, see ĪPK I.6.1 translated earlier.
See, for instance, Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.6.1–2, translated earlier.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.6.4–5: cittatvaṃ māyayā hitvā bhinna evāvabhāti yaḥ / dehe buddhāvatha prāṇe kalpite nabhasīva vā // pramātṛtvenāhamiti vimarśo ’nyavyapohanāt / vikalpa eva sa parapratiyogyavabhāsajaḥ //. Torella (Torella, 1994), 28.
Abhinavagupta also delineates the impure consciousness into two varieties: identification and synthesis, such that the former identifies something like ‘I am fat,’ while the latter (anusaṃdhāna) synthesizes, in something like, ‘I was fat, now I am now thin.’ See comments under ĪPK I.6.4–5, in his ĪPV, vol. I, 313–316; 324; English trans. in Pandey, Doctrine of Divine Recognition, vol. 3, 89–90; 92.
See Abhinavagupta’s commentary on ĪPK I.6.6, in his ĪPV, vol. I, 326–27; English trans. in Pandey, Doctrine of Divine Recognition, vol. 3, 93.
Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, 361–63.
Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, 359. Dignāga described self-awareness as a subset of mental perception. See Pramāṇasamuccaya, 6ab; translated in Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, 27.
The twelfth-century Tibetan, Sakya Paṇḍita, for instance, claimed that it is self-awareness that bridges nonconceptual perception and conception, with an analogy of self-awareness as an interlocutor introducing a blind speaker (conception) to a mute sighted person (perception). Sapaṇ, Treasury of Epistemology (tshad ma’i rigs gter), 10.
Śākya Chokden, Enjoyment Ocean of the Seven Treatises, vol. 19, 477–78. See also Komarovski, Visions of Unity, 163–64.
Śākya Chokden says ‘The gnosis that is the basic nature of reality is truly real.’ Śākya Chokden, Splendor of the Sun, vol. 19, 118: (chos kyi dbyings kyi ye shes bden par grub). See also, Komarovski, Visions of Unity, 220–25.
I take this term from Georges Dreyfus. See his discussion of this topic in Recognizing Reality, 89–91; 99. See also discussion in Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy, 53–79.
See, for instance, Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā, where he denies the reality of the relations that he affirms in other contexts.
His final position as absolute idealism is pushed upon him by Mādhyamikas like Tsongkhapa, who wish to negate it. Yet he is also pushed there, favorably, by figures like the seventh Karmapa, Chödrak Gyatso (chos grags rgya mtsho), and Śākya Chokden.
Utpaladeva, Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi 8; Trans. in Lawrence, ‘Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva’s Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi and Vṛtti by Harabhatta Shastri,’ 644.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.7.4: ‘The perceptions and non-perceptions, which in themselves concern this or that separate part, may cause the establishment of the causal relation only if they rest on a single knowing subject.’ Translation adapted from Torella (Torella, 1994), 137.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK I.3.6–7: ‘Thus, the functioning of the human world—which stems precisely from the unification (anusaṃdhāna) of cognitions, in themselves separate from one another and incapable of knowing one another—would be destroyed if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory, and exclusion.’ Translation from Torella (Torella, 1994), 102–103.
Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra v. 91.
Utpaladeva, ĪPK, I.5.13: cittiḥ pratyavamarśātmā. Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra v. 16 (also TS 1999): ‘Consciousness is the opposite of matter; this immateriality is nothing but its self-awareness’ (vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate / iyam evātmasaṃvittir asya yā ‘jaḍarūpatā). See Ichigo (Ichigo, 1985), 70n1.
Madhyamakālaṃkāra, v. 17 (also TS 2000): ‘Being singular without parts, it cannot be divided into three [the knower, the known, and the knowing]. This self-awareness is not constituted by action and agent.’ See also Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1.10; translated in Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, 29.
Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra v. 1: ‘All entities asserted by Buddhists or otherwise lack intrinsic nature, because ultimately they are neither one nor many, like a reflection.’ When anything is analyzed in terms of its essence, there is no singular, independent, or enduring essence found at all; thus, everything is said to lack intrinsic nature, appearing like an illusion, a reflection, or a dream.
In a commentary on the Guhyasamājatantra, the Geluk forefather, Tsongkhapa, laid out his explanation of the tantra in terms of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka but, importantly, references a tradition of describing the unity of (bliss and emptiness) in tantra based on ‘Cittamātra’ (that is, Yogācāra). Tsongkhapa, A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages, vol. 7, 101; English trans. in Kilty, 103–104. To see the trajectory that Yogācāra takes in Tibet, we must look beyond Tsongkhapa’s influential fifteenth-century vision of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka to earlier Buddhist traditions there.
The issue at stake in the competing interpretations of emptiness is highlighted in Ricoeur’s statement that ‘The question remains open for every man whether the destruction of idols is without remainder.’ Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 235.
Gadjin Nagao, ‘What Remains in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness,’ in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 51–60.
See Kālacakratantra, Chapter II, v.161. Trans. in Wallace, The Kālacakratantra: The Chapter on the Individual together with the Vimalaprabhā, 219. Kalki Puṇḍarīka’s commentary, the Vimalaprabhā, glosses the sentient emptiness as that which has all supreme aspects, like a divination mirror, a metaphor often associated with Tibetan depictions of ‘other-emptiness’ (gzhan stong).
For English translation of Utpaladeva’s Ajaḍapramātṛsiddha, see David Lawrence, ‘Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva’s Ajaḍapramātṛsiddha with the Vṛtti of Helabhatta Shastri,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (2009): 627–53.
See Kālacakratantra, Chapter II, v. 92 with Vimalaprabhā commentary. Trans. in Wallace, The Kālacakratantra: The Chapter on the Individual together with the Vimalaprabhā, 140–41. The notion of the Ādibuddha has a precedent in the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha, as an intrinsically pure reality that is to be discovered (recognized) rather than developed through transformation on a path. Kālacakratantra Chapter V, v. 66: ‘Sentient beings are Buddhas. There are no other great Buddhas here in this world.’ sattvā buddhā na buddhas tv apara iha mahān vidyate lokadhātau. Sanskrit cited from Vesna Wallace, Inner Kālacakra, 239n12. Similar statements are found in other anuttarayogatantras, such as the Hevajratantra: ‘Sentient beings are the Buddha as such, yet are obscured by adventitious defilements.’ Toh 418 rgyud, vol. 66, 108a3 (part II, IV.69. Tibetan ed. in Snellgrove, vol. 2, 71). See, also, Reverberation of Sound, 137–138, the root text of the 17 Dzokchen tantras of the Quintessential Instructions Series (man ngag sde): ‘Sentient beings are buddhas.’ See also, Wheel of the Life-force (srog gi ’khor lo), a ‘Mind Series’ (sems sde) text in the Collected Tantras of the Nyingma (mtshams drag ed.), p. 446; trans. in Karmey, The Great Perfection, 109.
See for instance, The Reverberation of Sound (sgra thal ’gyur), the root tantra of the ‘Seventeen Dzokchen Tantras,’ 107–108; See also Longchenpa, Treasury of Words and Meanings, ch. 1.
Dampa Deshek, Overall Structure of the Vehicles (theg pa spyi bcings), 23: thams cad rig pa’i chos ’phrul las/ kun bzang rol pa ’gags pa med.
Rongzom, Entering the Way of the Mahāyāna (theg chen tshul ’jug), 492–3:’khrul snang thams cad kun tu bzang po’i rol bar lta’o…spyod yul thams cad rang byung gi ye shes rang shar bar lta’o.
Mipam described arguments for establishing appearances as divine to be for those who accept an external world and arguments that establish the subject as wisdom for those who do not accept the existence of commonly appearing external objects. Mipam, Overview, 443; 450; English trans. in Luminous Essence, 45–6; 50.
See Rongzom, Secret Essence Commentary, 60–62. The Hevajratantra also expresses this: ‘I am the speaker; I am the teaching; I am the listener with good retinue. I am what is to be accomplished; I am the teacher of the world. I am the world and beyond the world.’ Hevajratantra 2.ii.39. Translation from the Tibetan (edition in Snellgrove, 49–50). For variant Sanskrit reading, see Ronald Davidson, ‘Reflections on the Maheśvara Subjugation Myth,’ 217.
Self-Arising Awareness (rig pa rang shar), 471: rang gi rig pa ’gyur med byang chub sems las thams cad byung.
All-Creating King (kun byed rgyal po’i rgyud), ch. 16, p. 76–77.
Ibid., ch. 50, p. 170.
Ibid., ch. 1, p. 56.
The Secret Scripture (mdo lung gsang ba) is cited in Lishu Takring, The Valid Cognition of Awareness (gtan tshig gal mdo rig pa’i tshad ma), 52: nga las ma byung gcig kyang med/ nga las mi gnas gcig kyang med/ kun kyang nga las sprul pa’i phyir/ des na nga rang nyag gcig go. Translation adapted from Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 229.
Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya II.144. Puṇyarāja glosses pratyātmavṛttisiddhā with svasaṃvedanasiddhā. Vākyapadīya, vol. 2, 223.
Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka I.2, vol. 2, p. 16: ‘I bow to the supreme Goddess, the intuition which is consciousness, the companion of Bhairava, making her abode on the lotus-trident whose parts are the cognizer, cognizing and cognition.’ Translation from Priyawat Kuanpoonpol, ‘Pratibhā: The Concept of Intuition in the Philosophy of Abhinavagupta’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1991), 263.
Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka IV.42b–44a; cited in Rafaele Torella, ‘Observations on yogipratyakṣa,’ 478n25.
Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka IV.42b–44a; cited in Rafaele Torella, ‘Observations on yogipratyakṣa,’ 478n25.
See Abhinavagupta, ĪPV I.5.13. See English translation and discussion of this passage in Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, 94.
Śakya Chokden, Ornament of the Treasury of Reasoning (tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgong rgyan rigs pa’i ’khor los lugs ngan pham byed) Collected Works vol. 10, 20.2: ‘This selflessness is as if the appearing object of yogic perception; selflessness is the self-illuminating, self-awareness empty of the twofold self.’ (bdag med de rnal dbyor mngon gsum gi snang yul yin pa lta bu’o/ ’dir bdag med ces pa bdag gnyis kyis stong pa’i rang rig rang gsal lo).
Leonard van der Kuijp, ‘An Early Tibetan View of the Soteriology of Epistemology: The Case of ’Bri-gung dJig-ldan mGon-po,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987), 63. Along with the new registers of meaning for self-awareness and yogic perception, ‘mindfulness’ (smṛti) also takes on a new meaning. See Dunne, ‘Toward and Understanding of Nondual Mindfulness,’ Contemporary Buddhism 12:1 (2011), 72–88. Thus in tantra it is said that there are ‘similar words with exalted values’ (sgra mthun don ’phags).
Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu, I.11.
Dharmakīrti described the innate misconception of duality as the ‘internal distortion’ (antarupaplava). Dharmakīrti PV3.359–362. See Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy, 89n57.
Jikten Gönpo said, ‘Valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) is the wisdom of Buddha’s gnosis.’ Chennga Dorje Sherap, Single Intention Commentary (dgongs gcig ’grel chen snang mdzad ye shes sgron me), vol. 1, 254; English translation in Roberts, Mahāmudrā and Related Instructions, 375.
See Abhinavagupta, ĪPV I.5.13. See also English translation and discussion of this passage in Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, 94.
Flood, The Tantric Body, 5.
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Duckworth, D. From Yogācāra to Philosophical Tantra in Kashmir and Tibet. SOPHIA 57, 611–623 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0598-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0598-5