Abstract
Very little has been published on the topic of vigilantism within recent applied ethics. Part of this dearth may be due to a perception that the issue lacks historical moorings, with little in the way of precedent in prior philosophical literature. However such a perception would be inaccurate; in fact there are interesting discussions of vigilantism in the history of philosophy. By way of illustration, this article examines an early treatment of the topic by the influential (though today oft-neglected) thirteenth-century Franciscan thinker, Alexander of Hales. Hales’ perspective reflects what would become a fairly general mediaeval consensus against the permissibility of vigilantism (or at least vigilantism involving deadly force). His discussion is interesting on its own account, but the main goal of this study is to help spur further historical inquiries – and perhaps by extension to prompt further interest in vigilantism within current applied ethics.
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Notes
Green (1994) and Dumsday (2009) remain the only articles published on the ethics of domestic vigilantism. Sometimes the literature on the ethics of international affairs applies the label ‘vigilantism’ in discussions relating to just war theory / foreign interventions (as for instance in Jordy (2007)); while not wholly unrelated, those discussions do extend the use of ‘vigilantism’ beyond its more common employment in the context of domestic criminal justice ethics.
See for instance this story in Canada’s National Post daily newspaper: “Three Years Ago, Citizens in Mexico Took on a Brutal Drug Cartel. Today, the Group’s Vigilante Leader is in Jail”, National Post, September 10, 2015. Accessed at https://nationalpost.com/news/world/three-years-ago-citizens-in-mexico-took-on-a-brutal-drug-cartel-today-the-groups-vigilante-leader-is-in-jail
I draw these biographical and textual details from Cullen’s (2003) helpful overview.
My own translation. The original French reads: “En dépit de son action fondatrice dans l’histoire de l’université de Paris comme dans la naissance d’un courant théologique franciscain, Alexandre de Halès (m. 1245) n’avait fait l’objet que d’études nombreuses morcelées….En outre, les ignorances et doutes sur sa biographie, la caractere inédit d’une partie de son oeuvre, enfin les délicates questions d’attribution que pose le Summa obscuricissaient notre comprehension d’une figure pourtant majeure dans l’histoire des idées et des méthodes intellectuelles.”
There is not yet an established, uniform citation style for Hales’ Summa (in the way there is for Aquinas), but the full citation for this portion of the text is as follows: Hales (1948, pp. 520–541) Summa Theologica, Tomus IV, Pars II, Inquisitio III, Tractatus II, Sectio I, Quaestio II, Titulus V.
“Utrum peccet contra hoc praeceptum qui sine potestate occidit maleficium amore iustitiae.” All translations from Hales are my own. The full citation for this article is as follows: Hales (1948, pp. 530–531) Summa Theologica, Tomus IV, Pars II, Inquisitio III, Tractatus II, Sectio I, Quaestio II, Titulus V, Membrum, II, Caput II, Articulus I.
“Quia maleficus est occiditur, et interficitur odio malitiae et amore iustitiae Et tunc distinguendum: aut occiditur ab illo qui habet ad hoc potestatem, ut a principe saeculari, et secundum hoc non prohibetur hic interfectio malefici; aut interficitur ab illo qui non habet potestatem, et secundum hoc prohibetur hic: prohibetur enim hic occisio hominis in quantum homo et occisio malefici inordinate.” Hales (1948, p. 525) Summa Theologica, Tomus IV, Pars II, Inquisitio III, Tractatus II, Sectio I, Quaestio II, Titulus V, Membrum I, Caput III.
“Puniuntur peccata per homines, sicut per iudices, qui potestate ad tempus utuntur; puniuntur peccata etiam per populos, sicut legimus quia saepe ab alienigenis Dei iussu excitatis propter divinae maiestatis offensam subiactus est populus Iudaeorum.”
That is a rough summary of the following: “Sed constans est quod populi non errant constituti iudices, et tamen errant a Deo incitati ad vindicandam culpam Iudaeorum. Arguitur ergo: nullus excitatus a Deo ad aliquid agendum, s facit illud, peccat faciendo illud ad quod a Deo excitatur; sed tales errant populi a Deo excitati; ergo non peccabant occidendo Iudaeos.”
A rough summary of the following: “Item, nullus faciens secundum Legem facit contra hoc mandatum; sed, demonstrato aliquo malefico digno morte, verum est quod iste secundum Legem est interficiendus; ergo qui interficit illum, facit secundum Legem; ergo non peccat.”
Summarizing the following: “Item, Moyses, qui in omnibus commendatur, interfecit Aegyptium rixantem cum Israelita, Exod. 2,12, et tamen tunc non habebat iudicariam potestatem; unde dicitur ei, Exod. 2,14: ‘Quis te constituit iudicem super nos?’ Ergo primum.”
“Qui sine aliqua publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida iudicabitur, et tanto acrius, quanto non sibi a Deo concessam potestatem usurpare non timuit.” The modern editors of the Summa identify this passage as being from Gratian’s Decretals, C. 23, q. 8, c. 33.
“Omnis praeter illum vel auctoritatem eius qui legitima potestate utitur, qui, ut ait Apostolus, ‘non sine causa gladium portat,’ cui omnis anima subdita esse debet, ad Rom. 13, 1, omnis, inquam, qui prateter huiusmodi auctoritatem gladium acceperit, gladio peribit.”
Hales (1948, pp. 531–533), Summa Theologica, Tomus IV, Pars II, Inquisitio III, Tractatus II, Sectio I, Quaestio II, Titulus V, Membrum, II, Caput II, Articulus II.
A rough (and rather condensed) summary of the following: “Sicut dictum est, non habens potestatem aut interficit voluntate aut necessitate aut casu. Primo modo simpliciter et indistincte est illicitum; secundo modo et tertio aliquando licitum, aliquando illicitum, sicut post manifestabitur. Unde nota ad hoc quod, sicut dicitur in legenda beatae Luciae, homo potest esse minister mortis, non vitate, quia omnis vita a Deo solo est, nec eam dari voluit per ministerium. Sicut ergo auferre rem alterius sine ipsius voluntate et auctoritate semper est illicitum, sic, et multo fortius, occidere, quod est auferre vitam sine Dei volutate et auctoritate, cuius proprie est vita et cuius solius est vivificare, semper erit illicitum: unde in Deuter. 32,39: ‘Ego occidam et ego vivere faciam.’ Ideo quicumque non accipit potestatem vel a divina auctoritate, quae est in Lege, vel ab eius voluntate, scilicet Dei, intellecta per internam inspirationem, si interficit, facit contra illud praeceptum ‘non occides.’”
A rough and very condensed summary of the following: “Ad primum ergo quod obicitur secundum Ambrosium, distinguendum, secundum quod dicitur in Canone, Causa XXIII, quaest. 5, quod peccata aliquando puniuntur per nescientes, aliquando per scientes. Per nescientes, sicut per Sennacherib populus Iudaeorum, Isai. 10, et per Nabuchodonosor, IV Reg. ultimo, et per Antiochum, I Maccab. 1. Unde et de Sennacherib dicitur Isai. 10, 5–7: ‘Vae Assur, virga furoris mei;’ et sequitur: ‘Contra populum furoris mei mandabo illi ut auferat spolia;’ et sequitur: ‘Ipse autem non sic arbitrabitur, et cor eius non ita aestimabit.’ Per scents, sicut per filios Israel punita sunt peccata Amorrhaeorum, Iosue per totum. In primo casu excitator a Deo voluntas ignorant quantum ad actionem punians quae iusta est, see non quantum ad actionem hominis quae perversa est. Unde Isai. 10, 5, 7: ‘Assur virga furores,’ qua scilicet ego gentes punio pro peccato, ‘sed ipse non sic arbitrabitur,’ sed ‘cor eius’ erit ‘ad conterendum’ etc, ac si diceret: non est ad hoc eius intentio. Ex quo patet quod, quamvis hoc fecerit divina auctoritate, non tamen voluntate, et ideo illicitum. In secundo vero casu taxatur voluntas quantum ad actionem et quantum ad intentionem, ut in bonis Israelitis, qui ex obedentia mandati Dei et ut vindicarent divinam iniuriam Chananaeos interfecerunt, ut ideo licite et meritorie. Primo modo populus excitatus a Deo peccat, non ex excitatione divina, sed ex malitia propria; secundo modo populus excitatus non peccat.” I should note that I have struggled with the interpretation of this passage. I believe the general sense conveyed in my summary is accurate, but fear I may be ‘reading into’ the passage more than I ought.
I say ‘typical case’ insofar as one can imagine partial exceptions — e.g., a vigilante going after a duly convicted but escaped criminal.
A rough summary, with the Latin reading as follows: “Ad secundum dicendum quod non sequitur: ‘multis de causis, iste interficiendus est secundum Legem, ergo qui interficit facit secundum Legem’. Ad interficiendum enim secundum Legem sufficit solus reatus, quo dignus sit interfici; ad interficientem verso secundum Legem requiruntur plura: iusta causa, iustus ordo, iustus animus. Iusta causa, ut reus meruerit interfici, quia dicitur Exod. 23, 7: ‘Innocentem et iustum non occides.’ Iustus ordo, ut occidens habeat potestatem, et convictus sit crimine.” Note that Hales then goes on to provide two supporting quotes, from Augustine and from Ambrose. Since these do not add new content to Hales’ argument, in the interests of space I will leave them out here.
Rather than translate this myself, I have opted to rely here on Stothert’s (1887) English rendering.
References
Alexander of Hales (1948) Summa Theologica, tom. 4, pt. 2 (Quaracchi: Collegi S. Bonaventurae).
Augustine (1887) Contra Faustum, translated by Richard Stothert (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co.) Available online at www.newadvent.org
Cullen, C. (2003) “Alexander of hales”, in: A companion to philosophy in the middle ages, eds. Jorge Garcia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 104–108.
Delmas, S. (2016). Ateliers de Recherches ‘Autours d’Alexandre De Hales’, Paris 2014-2015. Franciscan Studies, 74, 385–388.
Dumsday, T. (2009). On cheering Charles Bronson: The ethics of vigilantism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 47, 49–67.
Green, S. (1994). Vigilantism and the common good. Contemporary Philosophy, 16, 17–22.
Jordy, R. (2007) Preventive war and lawful constraints on the use of force: An argument against international vigilantism, in: Michael W. Brough, John W. Lango, and Harry Van der Linden (eds.) Rethinking the just war tradition (Albany: SUNY Press), pp. 183–204.
Schumacher, L. (2017). The early Franciscan doctrine of divine immensity: Towards a middle way between classical theism and Panentheism. Scottish Journal of Theology, 70, 278–294.
Thomas Aquainas (1920) Summa Theologica, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, accessible online via www.newadvent.org
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2018 meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, and I would like to thank those in attendance for their comments and questions. Special thanks are due to my commentator, Dimitrios Dentsoras. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my Concordia colleage John Maxfield for his helpful comments, and to the editor and referees for Philosophia.
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Dumsday, T. Alexander of Hales on the Ethics of Vigilantism. Philosophia 48, 535–545 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00093-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00093-5