Abstract
In this paper, we deal with the issue of how it is possible for pretending children to engage in exploratory performances and entertain alternative states of affairs. We question the approach according to which pretenders must be capable of counterfactual reasoning. Instead, we follow an alternative action-based framework on cognition and thus pretense, which argues for a much more profound role of the context of play than the questioned Counterfactual Thinking Approach to Pretense (CTAP). First, we motivate this shift in theoretical perspective by critiquing CTAP and providing arguments in favor of the action-based alternative we endorse. Then, we demonstrate that the action-based framework allows for a fruitful analysis of pretense in terms of its context rather than (solely) mind-internal processes. This paper proposes that (1) thematic play-frames enable unusual manipulations with objects and words, and invite dynamic interactions between players who can discover new possibilities for action and communication, as well as that (2) pretense contexts understood generally as opposed to non-pretense contexts have selected features—specifically the adults’ approval of playing with cultural norms, the looseness of constraints, and the lack of particular goals leading to children’s positive feelings—that are genuinely conducive to play explorations. Finally, we discuss other contexts of possibilities, as well as the educational prospects of particular context-to-context transmissions.
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Notes
To utilize the well-known example, a frog sitting on the bank of a river can anticipate certain possibilities of interaction with the world: for instance, it can anticipate that tongue flicking will result in a fly being caught and digestive processes ensuing, or that jumping slightly forward will afford swimming in the river and shelter it from a flying predator. These anticipations can be false and the potential falsity can be discovered by the frog: all it takes is for the frog to actually try flicking its tongue or jumping into water; if the world does not support the anticipated interaction, then the organism-internal part of the process will destabilize and thus be falsified. Thus, situation representations and its particular aspects can be argued to have truth value.
By questioning the view that basic pretense is founded on counterfactual thinking that relies on a few specific representational abilities, e.g. on representing falsity as if it were true (see: paragraph 2.1.), we do not want to question simultaneously that pretending involves some forms of representations, such as (noticeably) the situation representations described above. Representations required for counterfactual reasoning are one thing, and representations required for basic pretending are other thing. If we undermine the role of mental representations in pretense in this paper, this should only be understood in the former sense. We acknowledge, though, that some advanced forms of pretense might likely be founded on counterfactual reasoning, and—therefore—by mental representations that are specific to it.
We admit it as highly likely that older pretenders, who are already advanced language users, can be exploring possibilities internally through their counterfactual thoughts. However, such a prospect does not diminish what we want to achieve with this paper, thus to provide an apt alternative account of pretense that accentuates its contextual features. We cannot, after all, not admit it as highly likely that even older pretenders—who are fully capable of reasoning counterfactually—are still interactively influenced by the contextual factors of pretense.
These authors have applied the similar research paradigm (differing only in the stories presented) as the one first proposed by Harris et al., (1996) who introduced to children a story about Carol walking across the clean floor wearing dirty shoes, and then asked them ‘What if Carol had taken her shoes off, would the floor be dirty?‘. Interestingly, Harris et al. have shown that children are able to answer these questions correctly starting from 3 years of age. This confronts us with the problem of inconclusiveness in the empirical data on the development of counterfactual thinking. Still, we have decided to refer to this data as we can spot the general developmental trend indicated by all the referenced studies, which is that 2-year-olds—who can already engage is some basic forms of pretense—have serious problems with reasoning explicitly in a counterfactual manner.
Such postulates are what Lakatos (1970) has famously recognized as the metaphysical “hard core” of a theory or a research program, which can be defended in principle indefinitely. It is always possible to formulate what Lakatos terms an auxiliary hypothesis that claims some issue in measurement or performance that has interfered with the actual results of the study, and thus continue to hold one’s theory unscathed (or make an ad hoc theoretical adjustment).
Lakatos himself did not allow for theoretical arguments about underlying metaphysics; he believed that a research program can only gradually become unproductive and replaced if there is another more fruitful model available–that is, he only allowed for the latter route we mention above. The present paper builds on that latter option, so the issue can be left open, but we wish to direct the reader to the work that argues for the legitimacy of theoretical arguments, e.g. Campbell & Bickhard (1986).
Nonetheless, we do not want to rule out the possibility that counterfactual norms could be implemented by pretenders at the action level and would be interpreted or read by others directly from pretense actions, and not by any intellectual means (e.g. children would pretend to pour out the tea from the cup even though they are not aware of the logic of counterfactual conditionals). We avoid juxtaposing notions taken psychologically and logically then, as we are talking about a certain action, a bit like logical thinking (its source) was described by Piaget (1963). (For more discussion between logical versus psychological norms of thinking, see: Gut 2015).
Some authors would claim that to follow the “illusion conservation rule” would be to simultaneously hold two separate representations in mind: the primary representation of what is real and the secondary representation of what is pretended (see: Leslie 1987, 1994; Perner, 1991). We would, however, be willing to offer an alternative explanation of how it is possible to comply with the “illusion conservation rule” without representing things mentally. Namely, specific contextual and interactional factors could be pointed out as ones making the difference between what is pretended and what is not. We have touched on this topic a few paragraphs above.
Enjoyment is often included in the definition of play. For example, in the online Cambridge Dictionary it is stated that “When you play, especially as a child, you spend time doing an enjoyable and/or entertaining activity”. It can also happen, though, that play becomes an unpleasant experience for some children, even turning into one that is frightening or repulsive to them—an activity being occasionally labelled as “evil play” (e.g., Schousboe 2013). Still, even an “evil play”—as we see it after analyzing a few cases of it—seems to be bringing pleasure and excitement to part of the group who engage in this type of activity, only becoming unpleasant for one or few of them. Nevertheless, discussing such “evil” manifestations of play is beyond the scope of this paper, as we want to focus here on the more common non-malicious forms of play.
The inspiration for this claim comes from the interactivist model of emotion, see, e.g. Bickhard (2003).
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Acknowledgements
We are sincerely grateful to Zuzanna Rucińska, Martin Weichold, Robert Mirski and three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful guidelines and comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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“The project is funded by the Minister of Science and Higher Education within the program under the name “Regional Initiative of Excellence” in 2019–2022, project number: 028/RID/2018/19, the amount of funding: 11 742 500 PLN”.
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Dunin-Kozicka, M., Gut, A. Pretense: the context of possibilities. Phenom Cogn Sci 21, 1107–1130 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09816-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09816-8