Abstract
This paper criticizes the tendency to view the extension of the class of social actors, which stems from the process of democratization of data, as also implying the extension of the class of the political actors involved in the process of governance of the Information Society. The paper argues that social actors can upgrade to political actors once they become real interlocutors, namely political actors that can participate in the formation of the political discourse (which underlies political decisions) and that this can happen only once they are able to combine, to a greater or lesser degree, the reduction of information asymmetries with the reduction of power differentials.
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Notes
We do not intend to discuss in the present paper neither the notion of ‘patient’ (which differs from Butler to Cavarero) nor that of ‘those affected’ (Gould) as well as their relevance for politics and ethics (also Floridi, for instance, adopts the notion of patient in the moral field [Floridi 2013b]). We only want to signal that both politics and ethics are increasingly concerned with considering the standpoint of those receiving and enduring the result of someone else’s action: this standpoint, that is patient-oriented, may serve as a novel, different criterion to evaluate political or moral action.
This idea may be misleading, since it seems to suggest that an agent is or is not a political actor. We are aware that, in some literatures, political efficacy (or voice or effectiveness) is regarded as a continuum, not as an on/off parameter. We share this view, since, in real life, political efficacy (or voice or effectiveness) consists of a scalable evaluation (between the null degree and an ideally perfect situation of political efficacy). Therefore, to upgrade to the status of political actor means to distance oneself from the null degree towards a gradual implementation of political efficacy. Our thesis is thus that this gradual implementation of political efficacy (i.e., effective participation in democratic governance) requires a gradual and combined reduction of information asymmetries and other forms of power differentials.
This raises a complex and intricate question, i.e. whether or not or to what extent the globalization of the networked outlets of communication is also capable of expanding the existential contexts of interpretation (mutual understanding, cognition, etc.) we live in. We cannot deal here with this issue, which is, for instance, addressed, from a political standpoint, in Bevir (2010, 65–91; 245–250); and, from a cognitive standpoint, in Kallinikos (2011, 124–142). Furthermore, we should remark that, in existential contexts, information siloing and noise make it difficult to share information and, thus, to establish information symmetries. However, we should also remark that both law and politics are concerned, in many respects, with the correction of information asymmetries (think to the general principle of good faith in negotiation, in contract law, or to the strive for voice and accountability, in politics).
As to the ontological neutrality of a general definition of information, Floridi explains that the equivalence between ON (no information without data representation) and ON* (no information without material implementation) is not always justified; on the contrary, “ON, and hence GDI [the general definition of information], does not specify whether, ultimately, the occurrence of every discrete state necessarily requires a material implementation of the data representations. Arguably, environments in which all entities, properties, and process are ultimately noetic (e.g. Berkley, Spinoza) or in which the material or extended universe a noetic or non-extended matrix as its ontological foundation (e.g. Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Fichte, Hegel) seem perfectly capable of upholding ON without necessarily embracing ON*” (Floridi 2011, 90).
In real life, relationships are rarely governed by perfect information distribution, with the result that parties are not eager to exchange their own starting positions. That is the reason why John Ralws’ “veil of ignorance”, designed to neutralize differences in the starting positions, postulates an original symmetrical relationship based on the absence of information distribution. See Ralws (1971).
Of course, we do not want to suggest the idea that this is always the case (all the examples we cited are controversial and debated). The development of ICTs is very often not concerned with information distribution (take the case of ICTs for surveillance or for the enforcement of existing intellectual property rights). Furthermore, we often deal with several forms of the large concentration of information (or unequal distribution of information), as Victor Mayer-Schönberger remarks (2009, 7), “More importantly, though, by cleverly combining login data, cookies and IP address, Google is able to connect search queries to a particular individual across time—and with impressive precision. The result is striking. Google knows for each one of us what we searched for and when and what search results we found promising enough that we clicked on them. […] Quite literally, Google knows more about us than we can remember ourselves”.
That is why Victor Mayer-Schönberger criticizes David Brin’s (1998) idea of “reciprocal transparency” (i.e. a principle of sharing our information with our counterparts only if they reciprocate), by arguing that “Brin’s intriguing idea suffers from another weakness. He envisioned a world of information symmetries as individuals refuse to unilaterally negotiate away control over their information. But this view implies that the negotiations over ‘reciprocal transparency’ can be conducted on equal footing and without individuals being forced to give more than they receive from powerful transactional partners” (Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 107).
This role is, in reality, rather controversial and debated, and it may be accomplished, efficiently and efficaciously, with all the limits already signalled at note n. 6.
In this case, misinterpretation is used to taking advantage of the situation and to deepen power differentials that exist among parties. This is not limited to the case of a despotic regime. See, for instance, what Victor Mayer-Schönberger remarks (2009, 109), “Here is the important part: that information can be accessed, and for different reasons, by others than the original recipient restrains how Stacy expresses herself—in general. If one does not know how one’s utterances will be used and by whom, one must assume the worst, namely that any criticism will end up where it will cause the most damage”.
See in this regard what we have remarked at note n. 6.
In this respect, Paul Feyerabend, one of the most renowned twentieth century philosophers of science, used to say quite provocatively that it was unfair to consider rain dances an irrational practices of ancient times. It would be our fault if we were no longer able to perform a rain dance (as this would signify that we lost a specific know how). See Feyerabend 1975, 1994.
According to Victor Mayer Schönberger (2009, 108), this is the case for instance of digital remembering: “So far, we have looked at how digital remembering alters the balance of information power in a dyadic relationship and how this causes transactions to take place and under what conditions. Consumers, for example, may pay more for goods and services because of the information differential, a well-informed seller utilizing digital memory possesses. Think of a database of worldwide automobile accidents; those renting a car could be charged differently based on their past driving history, which through digital could be made instantly accessible to rental companies. […] A shift in information power therefore does not have consequences just for a particular transaction, whether and under what conditions it takes place, it also has the potential to influence how humans behave”.
See what Mayer-Schönberger (2009, 112) remarks, again with regard to digital remembering: “Because of the accessibility and durability of digital memory, information power not only shifts from individual to some known transactional party, but to unknown others as well. This solidifies and deepens power differentials between the information rich and the information poor and may deny the latter their own conception of their past”.
These conditions also figure among the key political institutions that characterize, according to Robert Dahl (1971, 1989), liberal democratic regimes: (1) elected officials, (2) free and fair elections, (3) inclusive suffrage, (4) the right to run for office, (5) freedom of expression, (6) alternative information, and (7) associational autonomy.
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Durante, M. The Democratic Governance of Information Societies. A Critique to the Theory of Stakeholders. Philos. Technol. 28, 11–32 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0162-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0162-y