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I take Harman to be concerned with cases in which agent A fails to realize that her act X violates a general moral rule, and thus fails to realize that act X is wrong. Essentially, I take “moral ignorance” to involve ignorance of a moral principle(s).
A view related to Harman’s is found in the work of Aristotle (2009), who argues that acts done through ignorance of particulars, but not acts done through ignorance of universals, are nonvoluntary. Because acts done from ignorance of particulars are presumably caused by ignorance, they are excused. In the case of Emily, she is ignorant of a particular; she is ignorant of “to what end” she acts. She thinks that she is saving the greatest number of lives possible, when in fact, she is letting someone die unnecessarily.
Even if the fundamental wrong-making feature is something else, such as the “causing of unnecessary harm,” my argument still goes through. Arguably, the wrong-making feature of slavery is something basic, and thus the relevant moral principle, too, is basic.
Perhaps a virtue ethics approach that provides an account of right action (i.e., the act a virtuous person would perform), too, can account for this distinction, and thus it too might offer a solution to the puzzle. It can say that someone like Emily is not blameworthy because she did not act with a vicious character. The morally ignorant, though, do act viciously. For instance, they act with epistemic vices, which are in their control.
My argument, though, is compatible with other forms of (egalitarian) consequentialism.
Kantian Deontologists say that to determine if an act is right or wrong, we ought to consider the intention, motivation, or principle upon which the agent acts. Presumably, Emily acted on a principle that we can all get behind—the principle that she ought to save as many lives as possible. After all, she chose plan A because she thought that plan A would save as many lives as possible. So, if Deontology is true, then Emily is not even guilty of a failure to realize that “act P (putting plan A in motion) is a kind of act that is morally wrong,” because act P (putting plan A in motion) is not even wrong to begin with. Sam, though, acts on a principle that we cannot get behind—the principle that it is acceptable to use other humans as mere means to one’s own benefit. So, it is not clear that if Deontology is true, there is a puzzle to begin with. For Deontologists, if one acts, from ignorance, on a bad moral principle and thus does something wrong, one’s ignorance is essentially moral ignorance, which, according to Harman, is always culpable. If one acts from ignorance about a factual claim, but also acts on a principle that one can get behind, then the act is not wrong to begin with, and thus there is no “failure to realize” puzzle to begin with.
Harman talks primarily in terms of “blameworthiness” and “blamelessness.”
Utilitarians can judge someone to merit blame without actually blaming them.
I acknowledge that this is not usually how the term blameworthiness is used in the literature. But it is plausible for a Utilitarian to say that if it is right to blame P, then P is “worthy” of being blamed. On this view, being “worthy of blame” amounts to being “the proper object of blame.”
Here, I have in mind what McKenna (2013) refers to as directed blame and overt blame. The communicative argument does not entail that private blame is justified on a Utilitarian framework.
Coates and Tognazzini (2012) draw attention to the distinction between judging blameworthy and blaming.
Here, I am assuming that moral agents can easily know the principle of utility (through simple moral reflection).
Recall that we are assuming that the principle of utility is the “morally right” principle to act on.
Of course, one might say that some slave holders do not act on the principle of utility because they are ignorant of that principle, and their ignorance is excusable. But this response is irrelevant, given that I have granted the Blame Thesis, which says moral ignorance is never excusable.
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Abbate, C.E. On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman. Philosophia 48, 1355–1362 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00163-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00163-8