Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 315 civil society, and as a c/t/zen in the state. A rational society provides these opportunities for the realization of the self as freedom. But when it comes to reflecting on the detailed working out of these moments, Wood seems more governed by the triadic structure (Abstract Right, Morality, Ethical Life) than by the five-fold schema of selfhood. The result is three chapters devoted to the concept of Ethical Life and far less than one devoted to the family. Perhaps in some other context this lack can be made up. But one should review the book the author has written and not one he might have written. The extensive attention devoted to the concept of Ethical Life is in itself doubly justified, both because of its centrality in Hegel's thought and because of its relevance for the contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians. Fittingly , Wood's conclusion addresses the question of Hegel's relation to liberalism. Students of Hegel, from undergraduates to Hegel scholars, and students of political theory, again from undergraduates to political theorists themselves, will benefit enormously from this wide-ranging study. MEROLD WESTPHAL Ford.ham University John E. Atwell. Schopenhauer: The Human Character. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 199o. Pp. xi + 259. Cloth, $39.95. While Nietzsche praised Schopenhauer for not sacrificing his insights to the altar of consistency, few of Schopenhauer's commentators have appreciated this as a virtue. Instead, as if in response to Schopenhauer's numerous assertions concerning the unity and harmony of the propositions composing his system, they have often rested content by simply exposing the many alleged anomalies, inconsistencies, and contradictions in his philosophy. The result of this is that much of the literature on Schopenhauer makes it difficult for readers to sense anything of philosophical significance in his thought. Although Nietzsche did not dwell on the internal inconsistencies in Schopenhauer 's writings, he seized upon another incongruity--that between the living Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer's philosophy. He praised Schopenhauer's willingness to speak his truths even though they pleased neither the world nor the demands of consistency. But for Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's most cherished truths were lies, and he esteemed foremost the honesty of Schopenhauer the man but not his "truths." In Schopenhauer: The Human Character,John E. Atwell presents both the problematical nature of Schopenhauer's account of the human character, as well as its continuing philosophical importance. Atwell details a number of fundamental inconsistencies in Schopenhauer's philosophy, and unlike Nietzsche he dwells on them. In particular he argues that Schopenhauer's analyses of the phenomena of repentance (Reue), compassion (M/t/e/d), and salvation (Erlbsung) do not comport with the "cornerstone" of his philosophy, the will/body identity thesis, the view that willing (volition) is identical to bodily action, the very thesis that allows Schopenhauer to transcend the world as representation and develop the metaphysics of the will. The inconsistencies between these 316 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~O'2 APRIL 1992 phenomena and the will/body identity thesis become a unifying theme of the book. Like Nietzsche, Atwel] perceives the incongruities in Schopenhauer's works as a sign of honesty (see 212), but unlike Nietzsche and many others, Atwell uncovers philosophical insights in this honesty which emerge clearly in his analyses of Schopenhauer's views concerning moral responsibility, ethical actualism, philosophical pessimism, and Atwell 's reconstructions of the moral import of acquiring character and salvific modes of conduct other than asceticism that are implicit in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Schopenhauer: The Human Character is divided into three parts and contains an Afterword, "Schopenhauer as Philosopher of Paradox." In Part ], "Doers and Their Deeds," Atwell articulates three models of human agency in Schopenhauer's philosophy and argues persuasively that the dominant model is "agent-causation," the view that given a motive, the character (will) of the agent is the ground of the resultant action. He argues that this model of human agency is inconsistent with the "imputability thesis," gleaned from Schopenhauer's views of intellectual freedom and repentance, both of which, he contends, highlight the ways in which people act out of character--an impossibility according to the agent-causation model. He...