Abstract
I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a (perhaps tacit) reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed.
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Notes
This suggests that the position I call constructive nominalism may be close to or even the same as Dupré’s promiscuous realism (see Dupré 1993). Our positions are equally promiscuous. If there is a difference in substance between us it lies in the importance I assign to Chang’s point that even fundamental magnitudes are products of negotiation.
Astrology might be justified, as baseball is, as an enjoyable pastime. But that would require denying that it affords any sort of access to the world beyond its borders.
‘Best available method’ is significant. It allows that the scientific method evolves over time. When, for example, statistics develops more refined methods, science will demand better statistics before countenancing a result.
I am grateful to Paul Teller for discussions of a previous draft of this paper and for access to his unpublished papers, and to an anonymous referee for valuable advice on how to strengthen this paper.
References
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Elgin, C.Z. Nominalism, realism and objectivity. Synthese 196, 519–534 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1114-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1114-0